Journal Article Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy Get access Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy. By Stephen Wertheim. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020. 262 pp. Cloth, $32.00. Paper, $19.95.) George C Herring George C Herring Emeritus, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 111, Issue 1, June 2024, Pages 184–185, https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jaae068 Published: 01 June 2024

My article in the second issue of Diplomatic History (Spring 1977) remains very special among my publications. It was my first scholarly publication on the Vietnam War, a subject to which I would devote my career. I had written a short overview for Forum Press in 1975 even as the war was ending. That experience spurred me to undertake what became America’s Longest War. At the Georgetown University SHAFR meeting that summer, I persuaded an initially skeptical Bob Divine to consider such a book for his America in Crisis series. I began archival research in the summer of 1976, initially focusing on the early years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. By this time the once rancorous debate on the origins of the Cold War had cooled, and the domestic debate on Vietnam had begun to spill over into an emerging scholarship. The first issue I grappled with was U.S. policy toward French Indochina in 1945, already a hot topic among scholars. Gary Hess, Walter LaFeber, and Christopher Thorne had recently published major articles about Franklin D. Roosevelt’s visceral opposition to French colonialism, the curious fate of his trusteeship scheme, and the implications for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. What was missing was analysis of what happened after Harry S. Truman took office. This was the sort of challenge I welcomed because it involved historical detective work in archives. As strange as it must sound to outsiders, there was no thrill quite like the discovery of documents with new evidence on important subjects. I found in the Truman Library, National Archives, and Edward Stettinius Papers at the University of Virginia evidence proving that the Truman administration’s acquiescence in the return of France to Indochina derived not from happenstance or inertia but from a calculated decision having little to do with Vietnam and much to do with France and Europe. Typically, perhaps, there was much greater clarity with Truman’s decisions than with FDR’s policies. The consequences for Vietnam, of course, were quite profound.

This forum includes essays by six leading experts on the Vietnam War discussing the recent book by James G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), which recounts the various secret efforts mediated by East European governments to foster peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam that would bring an end to the war. All of the commentators praise the book and the scope of Hershberg's research, but most of them do not share Hershberg's belief that a major chance for peace was genuinely “lost.” All the commentators agree that Hershberg provides a rich, nuanced analysis and has performed a valuable service in outlining future directions for research on the topic. The forum ends with a reply by Hershberg to the six contributors.

Marigold presents the first rigorously documented, in-depth story of one of the Vietnam War's last great mysteries: the secret peace initiative, codenamed Marigold, that sought to end the war in 1966. The initiative failed, the war dragged on for another seven years, and this episode sank into history as an unresolved controversy. Antiwar critics claimed President Johnson had bungled (or, worse, deliberately sabotaged) a breakthrough by bombing Hanoi on the eve of a planned secret U.S.-North Vietnamese encounter in Poland. Yet, LBJ and top aides angrily insisted that Poland never had authority to arrange direct talks and Hanoi was not ready to negotiate. This book uses new evidence from long hidden communist sources to show that, in fact, Poland was authorized by Hanoi to open direct contacts and that Hanoi had committed to entering talks with Washington. It reveals LBJ's personal role in bombing Hanoi as he utterly disregarded the pleas of both the Polish and his own senior advisors. The historical implications of missing this opportunity are immense: Marigold might have ended the war years earlier, saving thousands of lives, and dramatically changed U.S. political history.

January 01 2011 Mark Philip Bradley, Vietnam at War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009. 233 pp. $29.95 George C. Herring George C. Herring Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information George C. Herring Online ISSN: 1531-3298 Print ISSN: 1520-3972 © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2011 Journal of Cold War Studies (2011) 13 (1): 226–228. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_r_00078 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation George C. Herring; Mark Philip Bradley, Vietnam at War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009. 233 pp. $29.95. Journal of Cold War Studies 2011; 13 (1): 226–228. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_r_00078 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsJournal of Cold War Studies Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2011 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

"LBJ: Architect of American Ambition. By Randall B. Woods (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 2006. Pp. 956. $35.00.)." The Historian, 69(4), pp. 800–801

Pierre Asselin. A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement. (The New Cold War History.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2002. Pp. xx, 272. Cloth $45.00, paper $18.95 Asselin Pierre. A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement. (The New Cold War History.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2002. Pp. xx, 272. Cloth $45.00, paper $18.95. George C. Herring George C. Herring University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 109, Issue 1, February 2004, Pages 161–162, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/109.1.161 Published: 01 February 2004

July 01 2004 The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy Mitchell B.Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. 320 pp. George C. Herring George C. Herring University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information George C. Herring University of Kentucky Online Issn: 1531-3298 Print Issn: 1520-3972 © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2004 Journal of Cold War Studies (2004) 6 (3): 168–170. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2004.6.3.168 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation George C. Herring; The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy. Journal of Cold War Studies 2004; 6 (3): 168–170. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2004.6.3.168 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll JournalsJournal of Cold War Studies Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Peace & ChangeVolume 27, Issue 2 p. 162-164 Introduction to Special Issue: Non-Governmental Organizations and the Vietnam War George C. Herring, George C. Herring University of KentuckySearch for more papers by this author George C. Herring, George C. Herring University of KentuckySearch for more papers by this author First published: 17 December 2002 https://doi.org/10.1111/0149-0508.00225Citations: 2AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume27, Issue2April 2002Pages 162-164 RelatedInformation

A landmark work of narrative history and the first comprehensive political history of the Vietnam War and the politicians and policymakers who waged it. A Grand Delusion is the first comprehensive single-volume American political history of the Vietnam War. Spanning the years 1945 to 1975, it is the definitive story of the well-meaning, but often misguided, American political leaders whose unquestioning adherence to the crusading, anti-Communist Cold War dogma of the 1950's and 1960's led the nation into its tragic misadventure in Vietnam.At the center of this narrative are seven political leaders-Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, J. William Fulbright, Mike Mansfield, and George McGovern. During their careers, each occupied center-stage in the nation's debate over U.S. policy in Vietnam.This is a piercing analysis of political currents and an epic tragedy filled with fascinating characters and antagonisms and beliefs that divided the nation.

Journal Article Larry Berman. No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam. New York: Free Press. 2001. Pp. xv, 334. $27.50 Get access Berman Larry. No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam. New York: Free Press. 2001. Pp. xv, 334. $27.50. George C. Herring George C. Herring University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 107, Issue 2, April 2002, Page 574, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/107.2.574 Published: 01 April 2002