When disasters strike, autocrats typically try to avoid negative political fallout and cultivate rallying-around-the-flag instead. Yet we know little about why such events sometimes hurt and sometimes help incumbents' standing, largely because these phenomena are studied in isolation from each other, with mechanisms underexplored. This theory-building study leverages an important moment (COVID-19 onset) to unpack the underappreciated complexity of disaster effects in political behaviour. Exploiting the Russian president's effort to escape negative fallout by shifting operational responsibility for difficult pandemic-related decisions to provincial underlings, a large-scale survey experiment indicates such efforts can backfire: Subnational leaders gain politically from instinctive popular rallying around those empowered to help, leaving the 'symbolic' central leader mainly with identity-based fear-driven rally rewards too weak to offset the 'blind punishment' they also reap for the disaster's negative consequences. These findings may help explain potentially similar failures of duty-dodging decentralization in early-covid-era Brazil and the United States.

Autocrats frequently appeal to socially conservative values, but little is known about how or even whether such strategies are actually paying political dividends. To address important issues of causality, this study exploits Russian president Vladimir Putin's 2020 bid to gain a popular mandate for contravening presidential term limits in part by bundling this constitutional change with a raft of amendments that would enshrine traditional morality (including heteronormativity and anti-secularism) in Russia's basic law. Drawing on an original experiment-bearing survey of the Russian population, it finds that Putin's appeal to these values generated substantial new support for Putin's reform package, primarily from social conservatives who did not support him politically. These findings expand our understanding of authoritarian practices and policy making by revealing one way in which core political values are leveraged to facilitate autocracy-enabling institutional changes and potentially other ends that autocrats might pursue.

Since Russia’s ‘conservative turn’ of 2011–12, President Vladimir Putin’s regime has increasingly based its claims to legitimacy on appeals to ‘traditional’ Russian values on social issues, including gender intolerance and Orthodox religious traditionalism. We know very little, however, about whether and how this has actually worked. This reflects a larger gap in our understanding of authoritarian legitimacy: To what extent can it be shored up by appeals to illiberal ‘traditionalist’ values? This chapter explores the degree to which such appeals are in fact a source of popular support for Putin by analysing data from the 2021 LegitRuss survey. The results tell a somewhat counterintuitive story, one in which Putin surprisingly loses more support than he gains from his conservative rhetoric – at least, up until his 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Evidence from a survey experiment indicates that traditionalists may be supporting Putin for reasons other than their traditional values. Overall, findings suggest we should be careful not to assume that correlation reflects cause when we observe overlap between conservative authoritarian rhetoric and widespread conservative values among the population.

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Theory suggests that the meaning of identity categories can vary across populations and change with time. By implication, the analytical usefulness of a given category as a measure of ethnic identity can also change, varying along with its cognitive and social usefulness to the examined population. In a prior study, we claimed that the usefulness of different measures of ethnic identity in Ukraine had changed in response to a revolution and the initiation of violent conflict with Russia in 2014. We now test this theory with new data on a new cataclysm, Russia's 2022 full-blown invasion of Ukraine. Our analysis confirms that international conflict enhances the usefulness of categories related to external delimitation from foreigners while rendering less useful those pertaining to internal differentiation in Ukrainian society.

Conventional thinking suggests that autocrats need enemies and thus have incentives to create them. Russia's Vladimir Putin is often thought to reap domestic legitimacy from belligerence. We examine multiple public opinion datasets collected in Russia that span Putin's presidency to confirm that he gains popularity from a sense of Western threat. But findings indicate that until 2021, these gains came primarily from a carefully cultivated domestic reputation for responding to threats with moderation instead of bellicosity. Our survey experiment further suggests that Putin wins as much support when he is prudent and cooperative as when he is hostile and aggressive. These findings add to evidence that Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine was not a war of domestic political necessity. They also help explain why Putin felt that he had to promote the invasion at home as a careful, limited, defensive act rather than something glorious for which the Russian population should fully mobilize. Even the most aggressive autocrats may still cater to public preferences for moderate foreign policy.

Do populist leaders tend to win support from the same kinds of people abroad as they do at home? Since we know public opinion can shape foreign policy, the answer is important for understanding populists' potential to carry out their typically anti-establishment international agendas. We address this question through original surveys in three Southeast European EU-aspiring countries on one populist leader (US President Donald Trump), establishing that the answer is a qualified yes: It depends on geopolitical orientation. In Albania, where local elites are perceived to be aligned with American elites, Trump supporters stand out for the same dispositions linked to him in the US, including intolerance and Euroscepticism. But in Serbia, where the American elites opposed by Trump's own populism are seen as opposed to Serbia's own establishment, patterns are remarkably different: Trump sympathizers generally stand out for tolerance, support for the EU, and a general trust in politicians. In Kosovo, these differences collapse into its deep ethnic divide between Albanians and Serbs.

Abstract This concluding chapter draws larger conclusions from the preceding chapters and discusses what we can say now about Ukraine's future. It examines how Zelensky himself emphasizes the importance of knowing history for best shaping the country's future, and points out that he has helped strengthen Ukrainian civic identity by emphasizing people's common historical experiences as Ukrainian as the core of national identity (more so than any specific language or religion). This vision of identity also does not depend on having an enemy; it is strong and resistant to Russia whether or not Russia is emphasized as the "Other." Zelensky's high wartime popularity cannot be expected to continue even with full victory over Russia, and data reveals that potent domestic rivalries lurk under the surface, ready to reemerge when democratic competition returns in peacetime. These divisions, though, are not "ethnic" or "regional," but instead more akin to partisan differences in many Western democracies. Major threats do exist to Ukraine's democratic future, and these come from both sides (including Zelensky's) in different ways. But so also does victory present major opportunities for a bright and democratic future for Ukraine.

Abstract This chapter examines Zelensky's leadership on and after the launch of Russia's all-out war on February 24, 2022. It begins with a discussion of Zelensky's own Euro-Atlantic orientation and how he brought other Ukrainians around to this position while Russia was gearing up for its major escalation of the war. Putin's views on Ukraine are analyzed, as are his major speeches aimed at justifying it to his people and international audiences. These, the book shows, are deeply misguided and often had a hand in massive mistakes that contributed to Russian failure to achieve its goals in the war. Zelensky proved to be potent in leading Ukraine's resistance both because of who he is (a russophone eastern Ukrainian of just the sort Russia had expected would capitulate) and how he led it (not only through inspirational words and actions and mobilizing the international community, but also by not micromanaging the military effort). Nevertheless, the backbone of Ukraine's resistance, the book shows, is the Ukrainian people themselves and their strong senses of civic national identity and duty. Much of Zelensky's wartime effectiveness reflects his own reflection and amplification of these values.

Abstract This chapter addresses Zelensky's 2019 presidential campaign, explaining how the reputed "comedian" wound up winning Ukraine's largest presidential landslide election ever. His strategy, arguably unique, was not simply to run as an outsider or to emphasize social media (which he used very effectively), but to run as a virtual incumbent. This means not only that he ran while playing a president on a TV series that was being aired during the actual campaign, but also that he (like many actual incumbent presidents) forewent traditional campaigning practices like political rallies and instead emphasized continuing to do his job "as usual." In his case, this meant performing concerts and producing, appearing in, and advertising his shows. The chapter documents that he did, however, have a clear message in his campaign (one based on civic national identity and duty) and shows how it resonated more strongly with the Ukrainian population than did the messaging of his opponent, the actual incumbent Poroshenko. The chapter examines apparent support Zelensky received from key Ukrainian oligarchs, including media they owned, and how this compared to his chief rival.

Abstract This chapter examines the experience of the "independence generation," the first generation coming of age after Ukraine gained independence from the USSR, through the 2004–5 Orange Revolution. It describes the formation of the ideas and ideals of the Ukrainian civic nation as pre-dating 1991. The chapter looks at Zelensky's childhood in the hardscrabble city of Kryvyy Rih in a southeastern Ukrainian context that was an important, if little known, source of dissident activity. The chapter traces the experiences of the independence generation that Zelensky is part of through the economic and social turmoil of the 1990s under Kravchuk and Kuchma. It addresses the challenges they faced while making their livelihoods as the generation before them produced the oligarchs that came to dominate much of Ukrainian politics and the economy through to 2022 while the masses remained impoverished. This period also featured the blooming of Ukrainian civic national identity, as it came to be less about ancestry and ethnicity and more about attachment to the newly independent state.

Abstract This concluding chapter draws larger conclusions from the preceding chapters and discusses what we can say now about Ukraine's future. It examines how Zelensky himself emphasizes the importance of knowing history for best shaping the country's future, and points out that he has helped strengthen Ukrainian civic identity by emphasizing people's common historical experiences as Ukrainian as the core of national identity (more so than any specific language or religion). This vision of identity also does not depend on having an enemy; it is strong and resistant to Russia whether or not Russia is emphasized as the "Other." Zelensky's high wartime popularity cannot be expected to continue even with full victory over Russia, and data reveals that potent domestic rivalries lurk under the surface, ready to reemerge when democratic competition returns in peacetime. These divisions, though, are not "ethnic" or "regional," but instead more akin to partisan differences in many Western democracies. Major threats do exist to Ukraine's democratic future, and these come from both sides (including Zelensky's) in different ways. But so also does victory present major opportunities for a bright and democratic future for Ukraine.

Abstract This chapter introduces the book's topic, summarizes the argument, and discusses its importance. It begins with the onset of Russia's all-out invasion on February 24, 2022, and documents Zelensky's initial reactions and actions to mobilize the nation and the world to save Ukraine. At the same time, it shows how Zelensky's actions were just one part of a larger Ukrainian mobilization. It is shown that much of this came as a surprise to the world due to a number of misconceptions about Ukraine and Ukrainians, most of which could have been avoided had people paid attention to social scientific research on Ukraine. The chapter then explains key social science concepts that shed light on the story, including civic national identity (which we argue underpinned this mass resistance), rallying-around-the-flag, generational effects, and patronalism. The concept of "the Zelensky Effect" is summarized as referring to how Zelensky has both reflected and amplified Ukrainians' senses of civic national identity and civic duty.

Abstract This chapter covers the history of Ukraine from the 2004 Orange Revolution through the start of the Euromaidan mass mobilization in 2013. It examines how some members of the independence generation rallied to the civic nation while others like Zelensky did not yet join in. The hopes of the Orange Revolution were soon dashed as "politics as usual" returned in Ukraine, resulting in incessant and corrupt political battles among rival political-economic networks rather than true people power. Ukraine's masses grew increasingly disillusioned and even voted the Orange Revolution's chief villain, Viktor Yanukovych, into the presidency in a free and fair election. It was during this time, after working in Moscow, that Zelensky returned to Ukraine, founded his famous Kvartal 95 studio, and rose to prominence both as a performer and a media mogul. This position gave him major managerial experience, but also put him in the uncomfortable position of overseeing highly biased news coverage on the country's leading TV channel while simultaneously producing biting satire that lambasted Ukraine's political establishment, reflected the struggles of ordinary Ukrainians, and gained him considerable fame. His rise coincides with that of the independence generation and the continued strengthening of Ukraine's civic national identity.

Abstract The chapter explains the 2013 Euromaidan mass mobilization and assesses the resulting, important changes in Ukrainian politics and society. It also examines Zelensky's relationship to oligarchs and political life more generally. Yanukovych sparked the Euromaidan by moving Ukraine away from Europe, toward Russia. By violently attacking the protesters, he turned even more of the country against him, resulting in his February 2014 ouster and the election of a new president, Petro Poroshenko. Within weeks, Russia had seized Ukraine's Crimean peninsula and fomented insurgency in other Ukrainian regions, launching a war that would kill thousands yearly straight through 2022. While Zelensky lay low during the Euromaidan itself, his entertainment production ramped up its political content soon afterward, now giving special emphasis to Ukrainian civic identity, territorial integrity (including Crimea), the need to support Ukraine's military, criticism of the political establishment, and citizens' own duty to fight corruption in daily life as well as politics. The chapter examines his Servant of the People TV series and shows how it set the stage for his entry into electoral politics. Ukraine's civic national identity deepened considerably and became more firmly Euro-Atlantic in orientation. Zelensky's growing public appeal tapped into just this.

Abstract This chapter covers the history of Ukraine from the 2004 Orange Revolution through the start of the Euromaidan mass mobilization in 2013. It examines how some members of the independence generation rallied to the civic nation while others like Zelensky did not yet join in. The hopes of the Orange Revolution were soon dashed as "politics as usual" returned in Ukraine, resulting in incessant and corrupt political battles among rival political-economic networks rather than true people power. Ukraine's masses grew increasingly disillusioned and even voted the Orange Revolution's chief villain, Viktor Yanukovych, into the presidency in a free and fair election. It was during this time, after working in Moscow, that Zelensky returned to Ukraine, founded his famous Kvartal 95 studio, and rose to prominence both as a performer and a media mogul. This position gave him major managerial experience, but also put him in the uncomfortable position of overseeing highly biased news coverage on the country's leading TV channel while simultaneously producing biting satire that lambasted Ukraine's political establishment, reflected the struggles of ordinary Ukrainians, and gained him considerable fame. His rise coincides with that of the independence generation and the continued strengthening of Ukraine's civic national identity.

Abstract This chapter assesses the Zelensky presidency from his 2019 election up until the night Russia launched its all-out war in February 2022. Zelensky's presidency compares favorably to past Ukrainian presidencies in terms of reforms enacted and the ability to win and sustain popular support, even though he had to face the additional challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. While many expected him to reverse key Poroshenko-era reforms, in fact he continued and deepened many of them, including language policy, decentralization, and military reform. Continuing to strike his central theme of civic national duty, Zelensky won many Ukrainians newly over to a pro-democracy, Euro-Atlantic orientation. Opponents' accusations of incompetence and cronyism are addressed, as are Zelensky's role in the Trump impeachment scandal and his relationship with oligarchs and corruption. The strongest case for his naivete is in his expectation that simply talking with Russia could end the war, though he quickly changed tactic. Unable to persuade or manipulate Zelensky, the Kremlin realized it no longer had any hope of winning over Ukraine by anything other than massive force, arguably explaining the Kremlin's war timing.

Abstract The chapter explains the 2013 Euromaidan mass mobilization and assesses the resulting, important changes in Ukrainian politics and society. It also examines Zelensky's relationship to oligarchs and political life more generally. Yanukovych sparked the Euromaidan by moving Ukraine away from Europe, toward Russia. By violently attacking the protesters, he turned even more of the country against him, resulting in his February 2014 ouster and the election of a new president, Petro Poroshenko. Within weeks, Russia had seized Ukraine's Crimean peninsula and fomented insurgency in other Ukrainian regions, launching a war that would kill thousands yearly straight through 2022. While Zelensky lay low during the Euromaidan itself, his entertainment production ramped up its political content soon afterward, now giving special emphasis to Ukrainian civic identity, territorial integrity (including Crimea), the need to support Ukraine's military, criticism of the political establishment, and citizens' own duty to fight corruption in daily life as well as politics. The chapter examines his Servant of the People TV series and shows how it set the stage for his entry into electoral politics. Ukraine's civic national identity deepened considerably and became more firmly Euro-Atlantic in orientation. Zelensky's growing public appeal tapped into just this.