There seems to be an innate tension between the individualand authority in all of its forms that affects the individual’s freedom.Ever since the modern era, freedom has been a self-defining valuefor the individual. Things that once provided meaning and a frame-work for understanding life, such as the Church, the State, tradition,and the hierarchical structure of the world, are losing their prestigeand authority. People begin to question the effect and influence thesehave on their existence, which previously had been considered posi-tive. A new, informal kind of authority emerges the pressure of themasses, the tyranny of the majority, a peculiar modern phenomenonthat Mill and Kierkegaard addressed in their writings. What seemsto change with the modern era is the individual’s awareness andability to take on this relationship, and its effects that impinge on thefreedom of thought and action. What were once viewed as immutableand indisputable sources of authority have now become questionablein the mind of the individual. Sources of authority that were onceaccepted as given and provided meaning and structure to anyone’slife are now rather perceived as threats to individual freedom. Thenew form of authority drawing on masses and majorities, as well asthe growing significance of public opinion, has become increasinglypresent in the modern age. Our study will analyze the relationshipbetween freedom and authority, especially within the modern eraparadigm focusing mainly on the individual and the masses. Fol-lowing the evolution of the relationship between these two socialactors, we will show how this relationship is challenged nowadays.The postmodern individual is more concerned with finding theirnarcissistic authenticity than contributing to the progress of society,while the irrational and destructive nature of the (modern) masses is refuted by the positive effects of the social movements and protestsstarting with the second half of the 20th century.
Authenticity is a guiding concept in existentialism, as it provides the basis of a proper understanding of peculiar existentialist themes and notions such as anxiety, individuality, otherness, freedom, selfhood, self-consciousness or responsibility. Basically, authenticity regards our own innermost self, our sheer individuality. Authenticity gives us a sense of self. However, authenticity is not a natural given, but a challenge for the individual to embark on a journey towards becoming a true self. Starting from S & oslash;ren Kierkegaard's fundamental distinction between the individual and the crowd, we will discuss the fate of the postmodern concept of authenticity that has been slowly stripped of its initial meanings in the philosophical discourse. On the surface, this authenticity still resembles its existentialist meanings, but at the core has become a customizable commodity, able to accommodate a more free-floating, versatile, opportunistic view of the person, one that means whatever the speaker wants it to signify, and promises to be radically liberating. This "new kind" of authenticity implies, among other meanings, the requisite of reaching a different, superior version of the self, following the assumption that people are born and grow into a sort of imperfect, flawed, inferior, rigid state, that they need to transcend. The pressure to restore or discover an ideal of authenticity that is just a placeholder can be easily transformed into a powerful ideological device, a political instrument. In this respect, we draw on a few views that treat authenticity as central to understanding various populist movements of our times. We believe that what might operate as an antidote to the empty contemporary popular understanding of authenticity is to link it to the ideal of a good life, one that comes with the idea of responsibilization and continuous questioning of one's current commitments, including values such as authenticity itself.
The present paper proposes a brief comparative analysis between two distinct metaphysical approaches about the person, with consequences in the area of morality. On the one hand, there is a Cartesian, Kantian perception, adopted and adapted by John Rawls, who essentially understands the individual as a rational and autonomous entity. On the other hand, in a Kierkegaardian understanding, people are, in a primary sense, natural beings, i.e. dependent, relational and guided by natural (not instrumental, determined) needs. This second perspective can be understood as an "alternative metaphysics of the person/self", which would suggest a different foundation for morality. In other words, our moral thinking would have its origins in certain natural needs, in love and affection (which also come with certain duties, attributes and responsibilities), rather than in rights and in autonomy.
This article elaborates on Jean Baudrillard's ideas about the moral effects of the rise of the consumerist society, and also on Patrick Stokes' conceptual distinctions between different reactions individuals can display when faced with moral decisions. I start from Baudrillard's viewpoint that in the consumerist society, characteristic for the occidental post-modern world, the need (necessity) itself has been replaced by the desire to consume per se. The Western individual perceives abundance as a natural right, and this is transforming both the meaning of work and the value of its products. In essence, Baudrillard describes a form of alienation, with effects that transcend the commercial realm of commodity consumption, and which is better understood within the moral domain. Patrick Stokes exploits the Kierkagaardian concept of interesse while expressing his view of moral vision. He is designing a thought experiment that reveals a fundamental distinction between radically different moral reactions of hypothetical individuals, even when they are sharing the same cultural, educational, political or religious background. Starting from these two positions, I analyze a few situations and events from the world of contemporary tennis, revealing how universal values get to be ignored, or contextualized under the influence of social prejudice and schemas. My conclusion is that, nowadays, we are witnessing a reshaping of the way people regard and act on their values, especially in the realm of social media. Thus, situations that should be approached by the appeal to values such as truth, justice, and humanity, in fact get to be interpreted in a biased way, due to the existence of some pre-existing patterns of understanding.
Creative Capitalism, Multitudinous Creativity, Radicalities and Alterities, Edited by Giuseppe Cocco and Barbara Szaniecki, Lexington Books, Lanham. Boulder. New York. London, 2015, 269p.
This article tries to make sense of the concept of repetition in Søren Kierkegaard’s works. According to Kierkegaard repetition is a temporal movement of existence. What is repetition and what is its meaning for human existence? In answering this question the Danish philosopher depicts repetition by comparing three different approaches to life. Throughout the article I try to develop a coherent argument on ‘the new philosophical category’ by analysing the three types of repetition and their corresponding human prototypes. I consider repetition a key concept in summarizing Kierkegaard’s theory of existence, where existence pictures the becoming of the human-self that follows several stages. Constantin Constantius’s repetition is an unsuccessful attempt, an aesthetic expression of human-life. The young lover’s repetition is spiritual, albeit not yet authentic, religious, but more poetic, even if he regains his self. Only Job’s repetition is an authentic movement of existence, an expression of a spiritual trial and of genuine faith.
G. V. Loewen, We Other Nazis: How you and I are still like them, Alcoa: Old Moon Academic Press, 2013, 268 p.
A discussion about free choice and its variants, about sinning and the implication of evil, about God and about creature's freedom is to be found in the following pages. A short view over Abelard's position regarding sin should also be useful for a better understanding of the concept as it was viewed in the 12th century through bringing together, in this respect, the thinking of two of the most important theologians of the time, namely Anselm of Canterbury and Abelard.
Review to: Jason A. Mahn, Fortunate Fallibility: Kierkegaard and the Power of Sin, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 282 p.
Review of: Simon D. Podmore, Kierkegaard and the Self Before God Anatomy of the Abyss, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion, Bloomington, 2011, 280p.
Review of: Patrick Stokes, Kierkegaard’s Mirrors Interest, Self and Moral Vision, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 223 pp.
Review of: Sylvia Walsh, Kierkegaard Thinking Christianly in anExistential Mode. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009
