Although the eminence of Newton in mathematics, astronomy, and physics is universally known, his powerful and misleading influence upon psychology is not generally appreciated. In accordance with the spiritistic philosophy current in his time, and on the basis of his prismatic color experiments, he constructed a model of perception which has dominated psychological thinking for centuries in complete variance from fact and naturalistic theory.
Although humankind has created many sciences of a powerful and effective type, crucial problems still remain concerning the relationship of scientists to the events they study. Especially is this the case since the development of quantum physics when the question arose as to whether descriptive constructs are or are not the basic data. In general, the situation may be put in the form of a question, how do the laws of nature relate to the events of nature? Is there an identity or a parallelism? Do scientific descriptions merely represent events or create them? The present article attempts to clarify some of these problems as they pertain to the sciences of physics and psychology.
While replying to an attack Dixon made upon rational philosophy and scientific psychology, the writer exposes the legerdemain irrationalists use to preserve animism in science and in psychology.
Because the problems of juvenile retardation are so important, it is gratifying that so many psychologists are interested in describing and interpreting such events in preparation for modifying them.
To a great extent, all humanistic studies Iead to the absorbing theme of the nature of human nature. But the various views of scholars lack consensus asid often validity. The ground for this is assumed to be inadequate foundations in scientific phiosophy asad psychology. Conventional views about human nature include notions of innateness asid trascendence. Tbe present essay is designed as a naturalistic alternative based on the interdisciplinary consideration of biological, ethnological, asid psychological principies. It is proposed that a naturalistic approach can provide satisfactory infonnation concerning dic evolution and interbehavior of human beings with the things asid events isa their envi¬ronments. It is interbehavioral events that constitute the natures of hominids.
The celebration of the 200th anniversary of Kant’s Critik der reinen Vernunft offers an occasion to consider the value of naturalistic psychology for scjence and philosophy. The importance of the occasion is enhanced by the well-known fact that Kant was profoundly at home in the sciences of his day, and his work still influences the thinking of later scientists and philosophers, as well as psychologists. As Kantor (1969) has pointed out, Kant is one of the formulators of what is today the predominant model of cognitive psychology.
Describes dic nature and development of interbehavioral psychology, with particular reference to its origin, postulation, data, operations, laws, asid implications.
Many persons still regard it as a problem whether psychology is an authentic science or at best only a profession. The writer considers the many attempts and failures to provide psychology with a scientific foundation and the primary circumstances attending the difficulties of scientizing the psychological discipline. Further, suggestions are offered as to how psychology can take its place among the physiochemical and biological sciences.
Because the current resurgence of the mentalistic interpretation of cognitive events runs counter to scientific norms, it prompts a thorough analysis of the source and nature of Cognitivism. As to the source, Cognitive psychology is definitely a continuation of the spiritistic way of thinking developed by the Church Fathers as early as the 2nd century B.C. The evidence of this continuity is well symbolized by the antiscientific writings of St. Augustine.
Viewpoints concerning the relationships of man and machines, including the problems of computers as thinking machines, the brain as an intelligent computer, et cetera, are reviewed critically. Various classes of machines are described which are seen as behavioral aids with their inventions, operations, and programs credited to persons.
Although behaviorism constitutes a veritable revolution in psychology, as the renunciation of animism in favor of a concern with directly observable events, it continually faces misunderstandings, both within and without the movement. Within the movement, it is confused with the technique of conditioning in various forms, while nonbehaviorists misinterpret the disapproval of animistic interpretations as a rejection of such important forms of behavior as perceiving, thinking, feeling, and so on. It is proposed that the interbehavioral version of antianimism shows the way toward a valid, comprehensive, system of scientific psychology.
As a general object of investigation, education is, of course, a great composite of interrelated institutions and events. Consequently, it can be approached from a number of different angles —social, political, religious, economic, psychological, and so on. In this article educational institutions and practices are examined in the perspective of scientific psychology. Unfortunately, much of what is regarded as scientific psychology is contaminated with traditional metaphysics. Accordingly, this analysis is based upon interbehavioral psychology, which rejects venerable but misleading authority in favor of free observation of organisms as they interbehave and develop in contact with environing objects and conditions. Only such a psychological perspective can illuminate the nature and problems of education and educational procedures.
Assuming that the value of a scientific discipline depends upon the metapropositions upon which it is erected, the question is raised as to the logic of scientific psychology. Prevailing psychological foundations do not appear to meet natural science criteria. It is suggested that Interbehavioral Postulates offer satisfactory Propositions for a scientific psychology.
