The practice of chemistry is undergoing rapid transformation driven by innovation, convergence with other disciplines, and an urgent need to address global challenges from climate change to public health. At this critical juncture, the global chemistry community must embrace not only scientific excellence but also a shared commitment to ethical and responsible conduct that is aligned with world needs. Despite the existence of important national and sectoral ethical frameworks, their fragmented application has left a gap in establishing a truly global, inclusive, and actionable reference point for responsible chemistry. In response to this need, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) has developed and committed to propagating worldwide a set of guiding principles for the responsible practice of chemistry. These principles, developed by chemists for the profession of chemistry, provide a unifying ethical foundation and practical pathways to employ responsible innovation across chemistry research, education, and industry worldwide. These principles aim to provide a common ethical foundation for responsible chemistry worldwide—across sectors, generations, and locations. By aligning scientific excellence with societal well-being and environmental stewardship, these principles offer chemists and institutions tools to foster trust, accountability, and global collaboration.

Quantitative real-time PCR and genomic sequencing have become mainstays for performing molecular detection of biological threat agents in the field. There are notional assessments of the benefits, disadvantages, and challenges that each of these technologies offers according to findings in the literature. However, direct comparison between these two technologies in the context of field-forward operations is lacking. Most market surveys, whether published in print form or provided online, are directed to product manufacturers who can address their respective specifications and operations. One method for comparing these technologies is surveying end-users who are best suited for discussing operational capabilities, as they have hands-on experience with state-of-the-art molecular detection platforms and protocols. These end-users include operators in military defense and first response, as well as various research scientists in the public sector such as government and service laboratories, private sector, and civil society such as academia and nonprofit organizations performing method development and executing these protocols in the field. Our objective was to initiate a survey specific to end-users and their feedback. We developed a questionnaire that asked respondents to (1) determine what technologies they currently use, (2) identify the settings where the technologies are used, whether lab-based or field-forward, and (3) rate the technologies according to a set list of criteria. Of particular interest are assessments of sensitivity, specificity, reproducibility, scalability, portability, and discovery power. This article summarizes the findings from the end-user perspective, highlighting technical and operational challenges.

Blister agents damage the skin, eyes, mucous membranes and subcutaneous tissues. Other toxic effects may occur after absorption. The response of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to a request from the OPCW Director-General in 2013 on the status of medical countermeasures and treatments to blister agents is updated through the incorporation of the latest information. The physical and toxicological properties of sulfur mustard and clinical effects and treatments are summarised. The information should assist medics and emergency responders who may be unfamiliar with the toxidrome of sulfur mustard and its treatment.

A letter to this Journal provided useful comments and accurate enumerations of isomers for sets of organic compounds discussed in the paper "Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service Numbers, Isomer Enumeration, Ring Strain, and Stereochemistry: What Does Any of This Have to Do with an International Chemical Disarmament and Nonproliferation Treaty?". We address comments raised in that letter and propose revisions to our original paper to incorporate the accurate enumeration values.

The integration of novel technologies for monitoring and investigating compliance can enhance the effectiveness of regimes related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This report looks at the potential role of four novel approaches based on recent technological advances – remote sensing tools; open-source satellite data; open-source trade data; and artificial intelligence (AI) – in monitoring and investigating compliance with WMD treaties. The report consists of short essays from leading experts that introduce particular technologies, discuss their applications in WMD regimes, and consider some of the wider economic and political requirements for their adoption. The growing number of space-based sensors is raising confidence in what open-source satellite systems can observe and record. These systems are being combined with local knowledge and technical expertise through social media platforms, resulting in dramatically improved coverage of the Earth’s surface. These open-source tools can complement and augment existing treaty verification and monitoring capabilities in the nuclear regime. Remote sensing tools, such as uncrewed vehicles, can assist investigators by enabling the remote collection of data and chemical samples. In turn, this data can provide valuable indicators, which, in combination with other data, can inform assessments of compliance with the chemical weapons regime. In addition, remote sensing tools can provide inspectors with real time two- or three-dimensional images of a site prior to entry or at the point of inspection. This can facilitate on-site investigations. In the past, trade data has proven valuable in informing assessments of non-compliance with the biological weapons regime. Today, it is possible to analyse trade data through online, public databases. In combination with other methods, open-source trade data could be used to detect anomalies in the biological weapons regime. AI and the digitization of data create new ways to enhance confidence in compliance with WMD regimes. In the context of the chemical weapons regime, the digitization of the chemical industry as part of a wider shift to Industry 4.0 presents possibilities for streamlining declarations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and for facilitating CWC regulatory requirements.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) exists as an international body currently comprised of 192 member states with the shared mission of eliminating chemical weapons worldwide. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and OPCW came into existence in the 1990s with the vision of developing verification strategies primarily designed for use with the traditional state actors toward the goal of eliminating chemical weapons across the globe. The perception of chemical warfare as a potentially effective pathway to victory has stood as a serious impediment to the elimination of its threat and employment. The loathing of the art of chemical warfare, which led to a long history of belligerents seeking special controls through rules of war, has culminated in numerous efforts to rebut such actions. The Technical Secretariat assists the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council while also performing verification duties outlined in the CWC.

The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has provided advice in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention on assistance and protection. We present the SAB's response to a request from the OPCW Director-General in 2014 for information on the best practices for preventing and treating the health effects from acute, prolonged, and repeated organophosphorus nerve agent (NA) exposure. The report summarises pre- and post-exposure treatments, and developments in decontaminants and adsorbing materials, that at the time of the advice, were available for NAs. The updated information provided could assist medics and emergency responders unfamiliar with treatment and decontamination options related to exposure to NAs. The SAB recommended that developments in research on medical countermeasures and decontaminants for NAs should be monitored by the OPCW, and used in assistance and protection training courses and workshops organised through its capacity building programmes.

The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has provided advice on assistance and protection in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In this, the first of several papers describing the SAB's work on this topic, we describe advice given in response to questions from the OPCW Director-General in 2013 and 2014 on the status of available medical countermeasures and treatments to organophosphorus nerve agents. This paper provides the evidence base for this advice which recommended to the OPCW pretreatments, emergency care, and long-term treatments that were available at the time of the request for this class of chemical warfare agent (CWA). It includes a bibliography of over 140 scientific references, which can be used as a platform for watching future medical countermeasure developments. The information provided in this paper should serve as a valuable reference for medical professionals and emergency responders who may have no knowledge of the symptoms and treatment options of exposure to nerve agents.

Strategic goals of green and sustainable chemistry in the context of chemical disarmament and nonproliferation are discussed, especially, goals relevant to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Concepts of importance in green chemistry appear throughout four core areas of chemical disarmament and nonproliferation: destruction of chemical weapons, nonproliferation and prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons, assistance and protection and promoting international cooperation through peaceful uses of chemistry. Synergies between principles of green chemistry and those underpinning work in the aforementioned operational areas of the Chemical Weapons Convention are highlighted. It is concluded that while operationalisation of an international treaty and scientific research in green and sustainable chemistry appear quite different, aspirations of both activities are complementary. Both seek to realise and maintain a safer and more secure world, free of chemicals that can harm humans and the environment.

Chemical weapons cause harm in a most unselective manner, a silent threat bringing death through painful struggle, indiscriminately injuring and killing combatants and civilians alike, without dest...

The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter 'the Convention'), an international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, entered into force in 1997. It prohibits the development, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Today there are 193 nations ('States Parties') that are members. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in The Hague, is the implementing body of the Convention. Herein we outline the verification regime of the Convention and how the work of the OPCW has evolved in recent years in response to the use of chemical warfare agents (CWAs), as well as potential impacts from advances in science and technology (S&T). We describe challenges recognized from recent contingency operations in response to the use of CWAs and how S&T might support the development of safe and effective approaches to verification. The role of OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board and its Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology are discussed; specifically, how scientific advice supports the development of the capability for the verification of alleged use of CWAs, as well as informing the decisions made by policymakers. The importance of engagement with forensic agencies for the continuing development of state-of-the-art approaches to verification is highlighted.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international disarmament treaty that prohibits the development, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. This treaty has 193 States Parties (nations for which the treaty is binding) and entered into force in 1997. The CWC contains schedules of chemicals that have been associated with chemical warfare programmes. These scheduled chemicals must be declared by the States that possess them and are subject to verification by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW, the implementing body of the CWC). Isotopically labelled and stereoisomeric variants of the scheduled chemicals have presented ambiguities for interpretation of the requirements of treaty implementation, and advice was sought from the OPCW's Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in 2016. The SAB recommended that isotopically labelled compounds or stereoisomers related to the parent compound specified in a schedule should be interpreted as belonging to the same schedule. This advice should benefit scientists and diplomats from the CWC's State Parties to help ensure a consistent approach to their declarations of scheduled chemicals (which in turn supports both the correctness and completeness of declarations under the CWC). Herein, isotopically labelled and stereoisomeric variants of CWC-scheduled chemicals are reviewed, and the impact of the SAB advice in influencing a change to national licensing in one of the State Parties is discussed. This outcome, an update to national licensing governing compliance to an international treaty, serves as an example of the effectiveness of science diplomacy within an international disarmament treaty.

Abstract The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine of the USA, the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, and the Brazilian Chemical Society held a workshop: “Innovative Technologies for Chemical Security”, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 5 July 2017. This event was part of a four workshop series held to inform the report of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board on developments in science and technology to the Fourth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which will be held in November 2018. The workshop explored the potential of new technologies to enhance capabilities for the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There is a continuing need for recognition that emerging scientific developments can have beneficial applications with respect to implementation of the Convention, particularly in prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons. The objectives of this workshop were to present, discuss and critically evaluate the emergence and practical applications of new and existing technologies – as tools for detecting biochemical change in complex environments – and the applications of these technologies in support of chemical disarmament and chemical security. This issue of Pure and Applied Chemistry presents a series of papers that originate from topics discussed in the workshop. This preface describes the scientific review process for the Chemical Weapons Convention and how it was supported by the Rio de Janeiro workshop, as well as introducing the papers in the collection and their corresponding authors.

The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has provided advice on the long-term storage and stability of samples collected in the context of chemical weapons investigations. The information they compiled and reviewed is beneficial to all laboratories that carry out analysis of samples related to chemical warfare agents and is described herein. The preparation of this report was undertaken on request from the OPCW Director-General. The main degradation products for chemicals on the Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons Convention are tabulated. The expertise of the 25 scientists comprising the SAB, a review of the scientific literature on environmental and biomedical sample analysis, and answers to a questionnaire from chemists of nine OPCW Designated Laboratories, were drawn upon to provide the advice. Ten recommendations to ensure the long-term storage and stability of samples collected in relation to the potential use of chemical weapons were provided and are repeated here for the consideration of all laboratories worldwide.

Compounds that cause powerful sensory irritation to humans were reviewed by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in response to requests in 2014 and 2017 by the OPCW Director-General to advise which riot control agents (RCAs) might be subject to declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention (the "Convention"). The chemical and toxicological properties of 60 chemicals identified from a survey by the OPCW of RCAs that had been researched or were available for purchase, and additional chemicals recognised by the SAB as having potential RCA applications, were considered. Only 17 of the 60 chemicals met the definition of a RCA under the Convention. These findings were provided to the States Parties of the Convention to inform the implementation of obligations pertaining to RCAs under this international chemical disarmament and non-proliferation treaty.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is a science-based international treaty for the disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) serves as its implementing body. The treaty bans chemicals weapons, includes a verification mechanism to monitor compliance, and requires scientific and technical expertise for effective implementation. This necessitates a continuous engagement with scientific communities, whether informal or institutionalized (as demonstrated by the Designated Laboratories, Validation Group, and Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), of the OPCW), to ensure operation of the treaty keeps pace with scientific advances, and that enabling opportunities to meet challenges through scientific advances can be seized. The effective use of science for treaty implementation demands scientific literacy for decision making. Herein, the Convention, its scientific basis, need for scientific expertise, and mechanisms through which the OPCW engages scientists, are described. The function of the OPCW SAB, its review of science and technology to advise disarmament and non-proliferation policymakers, and its role in raising awareness of science within the world of international diplomacy, are reviewed.