Authoritarian leaders frequently send mixed messages about law. While official rhetoric typically emphasizes obeying law, leaders have proven willing to sidestep the law when it proves inconvenient. We explore the impact of this duality on the attitudes of Russian citizens, drawing on three rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. To identify the separate effects of cohort, age, and survey year, we use existing estimates of a function relating age to the predisposition to form new attitudes. Our results indicate that one factor driving Russians' attitudes on law-abiding is the strength of the Kremlin's messaging on the importance of obeying the law especially in their formative years. This effect would have been strongest for the oldest Russians. Yet, ceteris paribus, more years lived in Russia lead to declines in law-abiding attitudes. The net result of these two effects is that older Russians profess greater law abidingness. Putin's emphasis on obeying the laws on the books has left its mark in the increasing prevalence of law-abiding attitudes.

The Russian legal system has a spotty reputation, both domestically and internationally. The distrust stems from well-publicized cases involving enemies of political or economic elites in which the outcome in favor of the elites is obviously predetermined. Coexisting with such cases are millions of mundane cases in which judges adhere scrupulously to the statutory law. This sort of legal dualism is not uncommon under authoritarianism. Russia’s constitution reflects this dualism. Its relevance to daily life and its capacity to constrain arbitrary state actions is questionable. Adopted in 1993, it proclaims Russia to be a state governed by the rule of law and includes a chapter with a comprehensive list of rights guaranteed to citizens which cannot be changed without convening a constitutional assembly. The constitutional court, which is a post-Soviet institutional innovation, is charged with ensuring compliance with the constitution. Amending the constitution requires consent from both the national legislature and two-thirds of the regional legislatures. The electoral dominance of the political party associated with Vladimir Putin has made this seemingly high threshold for amendments easily achievable. He has bent the constitution to his political will with multiple amendments, culminating in a set of over 100 amendments approved in 2020. The use of courts by Russian citizens and businesses has increased steadily during the post-Soviet period. As a rule, disputes are handled quickly and inexpensively. Even so, litigating is not the preferred option; Russians typically end up in court only when informal negotiations fail. As a rule, they go to court to solve practical problems rather than to advance issues of principle. The courts’ dockets are dominated by civil claims, such as family law disputes and various forms of debt collection. The straightforward nature of the procedural rules allows many litigants to represent themselves. In criminal cases, which are fewer, defendants are required to be represented by a licensed attorney (advokat). The state covers the cost of legal representation for the poor. Litigants who are dissatisfied with the outcomes of their cases can pursue appeals, culminating in the Russian Supreme Court. Citizens who believe that officials have violated their rights can pursue their claims in the stand-alone constitutional court, whose decisions serve as binding precedent. The post-Soviet era has witnessed wide ranging reforms to the legal system. Some were aimed at depoliticizing the courts. Judges are selected by a professional council dominated by judges that assesses candidates’ knowledge of law and appropriateness for the bench. They enjoy life tenure, subject to removal for cause—a process that is occasionally hijacked to remove judges who fail to toe the line in political cases. The reforms also sought to ease the heavy workload of judges by introducing a form of plea bargaining in criminal cases and opening the door to a type of summary judgment in civil cases in which defendants have conceded their culpability.

How do Russian judges go about achieving justice? This question is explored through a case study of disputes initiated by vulnerable (often elderly) actors who seek to invalidate contracts for the sale of their residences on the grounds that they were tricked or duped. The analysis is grounded in a set of ninety recent judicial opinions from courts across Russia. It reveals that, despite a longstanding distaste for witnesses, judges are open to hearing testimony in these cases. But they rarely rely on such evidence in making their decisions, preferring instead to prioritize documentary evidence. Doing so revealed that Russian judges’ understanding of justice is primarily procedural. Their preference for documentary evidence allowed them to meet the quick turnaround times mandated by the procedural codes. This, in turn, served judges’ career interests by allowing them to compile a track record that makes them strong candidates for promotion.

Abstract Chapter 2 analyses the development of courts, judges, and judicial reform in late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia—from the democratizing tendencies of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras through the Putin years, which added counter-reforms consistent with growing authoritarianism. The reform process concentrated on two large foci—judicial governance (including methods of selecting, promoting, and disciplining judges) and the courts themselves (including number and types, jurisdiction, procedural norms, staffing, administration, and technology). Within judicial governance the emphasis in the 1990s was on enhancing the independence and power of judges, but from the start of Putin’s leadership, this shifted to first their accountability (often at the expense of independence) and eventually their control. Within the courts, there was a constant concern with ways of coping with increased caseload (through creation of new courts and simplification of procedures, for trials and appeals alike) and with improving efficiency (through adding new staff and computerization). The chapter concludes with the Constitutional Reforms of 2020 and the courts.

Authoritarian leaders frequently send mixed messages about law. While official rhetoric typically emphasizes obeying law, leaders have proven willing to sidestep the law when it proves inconvenient. We explore the impact of this duality on the attitudes of Russian citizens, drawing on three rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. To identify the separate effects of cohort, age, and survey year, we use existing estimates of a function that relates age to the predisposition to form new attitudes. We find that Russians’ attitudes on law-abiding are driven by the strength of the Kremlin's messaging. This effect was strongest for the oldest Russians. Yet, ceteris paribus, more years lived in Russia lead to a decline in law-abiding attitudes. The net result of these two effects is that older Russians profess greater law abidingness. Putin's emphasis on obeying the laws on the books has left its mark in the increasing prevalence of law-abiding attitudes.

Abstract Chapter 7 details the evolution of the justice-of-the-peace courts, which were created towards the end of Yeltsin’s tenure and came to fruition under Putin. They were intended to alleviate the crush of cases being handled at the district court level and to maximize the accessibility of courts. Their jurisdiction has been adjusted from time to time to achieve the desired flow of cases. During their relatively short lifetime, these courts have become the workhorses of the Russian judicial system, handling a majority of civil cases, almost all administrative cases, and many low-level criminal cases. Justices of the peace have been able to manage their heavy caseload thanks to procedural innovations that allow straightforward cases to be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, without hearings on the merits.

Abstract Chapter 4 educates readers as to the structure of the Russian legal profession. Much like other continental legal systems, it is divided into specialties. These divisions have persisted at a formal level in the post-Soviet era, though moving between them is easier. Though many contemporary Russian lawyers continue to work for the state, they now have greater opportunities to engage in private practice. Acting as a representative for the state or for a private client in the Russian courts generally requires advanced (university-level) legal education. While anyone with this training can represent a client in a non-criminal case, only lawyers who are licensed members of the bar (advokaty) are legally entitled to represent criminal defendants. The Constitution guarantees representation to criminal defendants. In the post-Soviet era, new specializations have arisen in response to market-driven demands, as have private law firms designed to service companies. The demand for legal assistance has also contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of educational institutions training lawyers, though the quality of these institutions is uneven. Yet, the straightforward language of the procedural codes has made it possible for many Russians to represent themselves successfully in simple, non-criminal cases.

Abstract Chapter 10 focuses on the arbitrazh courts, a post-Soviet judicial institution created to handle disputes involving legal entities. In the decades following their creation in 1992, the jurisdiction of these courts expanded to include causes of action that were non-existent in the Soviet era but became relevant with the advent of the market, such as bankruptcy, shareholder derivative claims, and intellectual property. The structure of the courts also changed in response to needs, integrating intermediate appellate courts. Until 2014, the arbitrazh courts were a self-contained hierarchy. At that time, the apex court of this system was merged into the Russian Supreme Court. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the role of private arbitration in Russia, an option favoured by large corporations, both foreign and domestic.

Abstract Chapter 9 explores how Russian courts handle civil disputes involving individuals. Such cases consistently dominate the dockets of Russian courts. They encompass a wide variety of disputes, ranging from family arguments to disagreements between workers and managers to the non-payment of various debts, including credit cards, rent, and utilities. In most of these debt collection cases, debtors offer no defence, thereby allowing the judge to resolve them without hearings on the merits. The prerequisites for filing civil claims are laid out clearly in the procedural code and judges tend to err on the side of accepting cases rather than discarding them for minor procedural errors. Judges are required to resolve cases within two months of filing and they rarely violate this deadline. Litigants have shown little interest in mediating their civil claims. Few cases are settled after being initiated. Almost all claims brought result in a judicial decision.

Abstract This book examines the courts of the Russian Federation under President Putin, how they work in practice, and what shapes the behaviour of its judges. It stresses the dual nature of a judicial system, where ordinary cases are mostly handled fairly but where cases of interest to powerful persons are subject to influence—a common situation in authoritarian states. The authors trace the origins of some contemporary practices to the Soviet past but also identify novelties. They pay attention to the struggles of reformers to make the courts fairer and more efficient, along with the measures taken to ensure that judges conform to the expectations of their political masters. This means dealing with the evolution of judicial governance, including the selection, promotion, and disciplining of judges. In studying the operation of the courts, the authors take a socio-legal approach, emphasizing how different players (petitioners, respondents, lawyers, prosecutors, accused, judges) behave and why. They deal with justices of the peace through to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts and detail the handling of civil disputes, criminal cases, business disputes, administrative justice (claims against state officials), and constitutional matters. They also examine the relation of the public to the courts, including its readiness to litigate disputes despite generally negative views of the courts. This analysis is as up to date as possible, including both the Constitutional Amendments of 2020 and developments relating to the first months of the 2022 war in Ukraine.

Abstract Chapter 11 examines constitutional and administrative justice in the Russian Federation, stressing the adjustments and compromises made by the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) that facilitated its survival in an authoritarian state. This chapter starts with a portrait of the RCC in the Yeltsin years and goes on to explain the efforts of President Putin to assert increasing control over it and the Court’s pragmatic response to its difficult position. This meant consistently delivering to the regime the decisions it desired in cases that mattered to it, while giving priority to legal and constitutional considerations in other cases. The chapter goes on to discuss the changing relationship of the RCC to the European Court of Human Rights and how the constitutional and legal changes of 2020 may distort the RCC’s role. Finally, we discuss the progress of administrative justice in Russia, and conclude with thoughts about the ways that constitutional justice is joining administrative justice in helping authorities to identify and fix anomalies without threats to the system.

Abstract Chapter 5 challenges the conventional wisdom about societal attitudes towards courts in Russia. Trust in the Russian courts, as measured by public opinion polls, remains low. Yet, this lack of trust has not discouraged the use of the courts. When efforts at resolving problems informally fail, Russians have proven willing to turn to the courts for assistance. The caseload data show a steady increase in the number of cases filed in the post-Soviet era. Surveys of court users document their general satisfaction; they mostly feel as though they have been treated fairly and that judges have relied on the law in reaching their decisions. The tendency of judges to handle cases expeditiously and the relatively low cost of using the courts likely affects both Russians’ willingness to use the courts and the positive assessments of their experiences. Even so, court veterans tend to be more distrustful of courts than are those who have never been to court.

This article assesses the usefulness of Fraenkel's concept of the dual state for understanding the role of law under authoritarianism. The concept, reframed as legal dualism, helps make sense of legal systems in which law matters most, but not all, of the time. A review of other analytical frameworks social scientists use to study authoritarian law reveals that they focus on the predilection of authoritarian leaders to manipulate law and courts to advance their interests. They pay little attention to how mundane disputes are handled. Only legal dualism contemplates multiple narratives of law that are a reality in contemporary authoritarian regimes.

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As the transmission belt between citizens and their government, lawyers are a critical component of civil society. Yet their relevance depends on society's willingness to call upon them and on the state's openness to being challenged. In the U.S., we take the political importance of lawyers for granted. Elsewhere, especially in authoritarian countries, lawyers play a more peripheral role. This Essay focuses on Russian lawyers. Although there is a large literature on various types of Russian lawyers, their status in society has not been much explored. The Essay tracks the evolution in societal attitudes towards lawyers in Russia, beginning with the Soviet period (1917-1991) and continuing through the post-Soviet period (1992-present). Drawing on memoirs, public opinion polling, and surveys, the Essay documents lawyers' low status in the Soviet Union. The introduction of market institutions in post-Soviet Russia opened the door to new types of lawyering, many of which are highly remunerated. The effect has been to increase the attractiveness of the profession to Russian youth and their parents and increase its esteem more generally.