This paper responds to Cowley, Webb and Bale's critique of our paper on sortition, parties and political careers. Cowley et al. argue that within-party sortition will not increase parliamentary descriptive representation (PDR). We largely agree with that claim, which was not the focus of our original paper. If PDR is thought to be important then quotas might be necessary alongside within-party sortition. We emphasise our argument is about changing the character of parties and MPs by reducing factionalism, increasing deliberation and reducing voter scepticism about politicians by reducing patronage, clientelism and careerism. Using evidence from Morena in Mexico we suggest sortition within parties is more likely to succeed in these aims than Cowley et al.'s more sceptical counterfactual speculation on these matters.

There is a vast array of different terms applied to diverse aspects of political representation. We provide a review of 51 different terms which we discuss under three broad types: fundamental (or substantive); evocative (or descriptive) and manufacturing (or constructive). Some discussions of representation concern aspects of these broad types, others how to measure representation theoretically or empirically, while some discuss the complex multi-dimensional nature of each type. We schematically represent these three types to form a complex typology. Some accounts of representation are set up as rivals to others, and we discuss this rivalry, but argue that generally most conceptions of representation are logically and empirically compatible with each other. The rivalry concerns the normative weight of different aspects of political representation notably within different institutional and environmental contexts. Some forms might need greater emphasis than others in different institutional or environmental contexts or when applied to different sorts of principals. We argue that the fundamental type should underpin all other discussions, as it epitomises the crucial issues concerning political representation.

This paper introduces the seven articles in the symposium on policy success and failure together with a short introduction to the large literature on policy success and failure. The issue brings together an analysis of success and failure within seven discrete policy domains, including Indigenous policy; immigration; foreign policy; water; government roll-outs; education; and foreign aid. Previous case studies have not looked as systematically at both success and failure within the same policy domain, and so the direct comparison in a most similar systems framework has not previously been adopted. Each paper sets its own criteria for what it considers success and failure, allowing for the forthcoming analyses to remain relevant to their specific context and parameters. However, despite their differences, the papers reflect on the importance of institutions, implementation processes-specifically their attentiveness to the on-ground conditions and target groups-political dimensions, time, expectations, and memory. This suggests that while it may be difficult to compare across policy domains, our within-policy domain comparison reveals that good governance, despite some failures, is not a lost art. Points for practitioners The criteria for success or failure of government policy is relative to time, perspective, ideology, and context. The criteria for success or failure of government policy might vary across policy domains; what is appropriate for some domains might not be for others. We can consider policy success and failure in terms of programme, outcome, or political agenda. Programmes can succeed in some aims and fail in others. Case studies are the appropriate means for examining success and failure, and capturing the narrative is important in how a policy is viewed.

One reason for growing distrust of politicians, parties, and governments is the increase in ‘careerism’: politicians who have never worked outside politics and seem to work inside politics for themselves as much as for the common good. Sortition—choosing representatives by lottery—is one solution. However, random selection of representatives breaks the accountability link provided by elections and leaves amateur politicians at the mercy of their civil servants. It would, critics argue, destroy competitive party politics, the foundation of modern democracy. We suggest that parties select their candidates through sortition of party members, with successful incumbent MPs standing again. This would mitigate the ills of patronage and adverse selection without losing professionalism and political experience. It would encourage deliberation and the proper persuasive and representation function of parties, alongside the accountability that elections provide. It would also, we suggest, lead to better advice to politicians from policy units within and outside the public service.

Previous analyses of the presence of non-partisans in cabinets consider the relative power of presidents as the explanatory factor. However, their analysis either uses indices of presidential power or is in terms of regime type - semi-presidential, parliamentary, or monarchical. Using a novel dataset on non-partisan appointments in 30 European democracies, we deploy an innovative two-step fractional response regression. This enables us to disentangle different determinants of the presence of non-partisans and how many (their magnitude). We show that these determinants have partly different effects on whether any non-partisans are appointed to cabinets and on their magnitude. Direct presidential elections increase the likelihood, but not the magnitude, of non-partisan appointments, and a president's power to dissolve parliament increases both likelihood and magnitude. Furthermore, we discover that a prime minister's power to dissolve parliament decreases the magnitude of such appointments but does not affect their likelihood. Our analysis fine-tunes the institutional details that affect the likelihood and magnitude of non-partisan appointments. In so doing, we show that regime types are concealing important within-type differences.

Most writers on political science methods seem to suggest that explanation means causal explanation. Certainly, many explanations in the political sciences are causal. However, natural science often provides non-causal explanations, while non-causal explanations are recognized by philosophers of science. Causal inference, in itself, is not a causal explanation; it explains alongside theory. In this paper, we defend explanatory pluralism, arguing that many important explanations in political science are not causal in nature. We identify two important types of non-causal explanation - constitutive explanation (CE) and explanation by constraint (EC) - providing examples from the political sciences literature. We conclude by outlining what we believe non-causal explanation can contribute to political science.

This study examines citizens’ attitudes toward technocratic ministers in European democracies. While previous research has focused on either the supply-side factors driving technocratic appointments or individual-level determinants of public support, this paper bridges these disconnected literatures through a multi-method approach. Using a novel dataset on technocratic ministers, we employ latent class analysis to identify two distinct environments: “Low technocratic” (few, sporadic technocratic appointments) and “High technocratic” environments (numerous and persistent technocratic appointments). Analysis of European Value Survey data (1999–2021) reveals that citizens in “High technocratic” environments demonstrate significantly higher support for technocrats. Contrary to prevailing theories, economic conditions and technocrats holding finance portfolios do not affect public perception. However, growing perceptions of executive corruption substantially increase public support for technocrats. These findings challenge existing explanations of technocratic appeal and suggest that institutional familiarity with technocratic governance, rather than economic performance, shapes public attitudes toward expert rule in democratic systems.

In The Lottocratic Mentality, Cristina Lafont and Nadia Urbinati claim that random selection of representatives undermines political equality. They argue that radical proposals to either replace or constrain legislatures selected by the vote by assemblies selected by sortition are antithetical to democracy. We agree with Lafont and Urbinati that constraining assemblies selected by the vote with sorted institutions is problematic. In this article, however, we argue it is possible to address the concerns lottocrats have with substantive political inequalities in a way that uses random selection but does not replace or constrain legislatures selected by the vote. We suggest legislative representatives should be elected by the vote, but the candidates up for election should be randomly selected. We argue that we can retain the advantages of sortition if political parties randomly select the candidates they support for election from the party’s membership base. We also consider a more centralized proposal to randomly select a nationwide pool of electoral candidates.

Many philosophical accounts of manipulation are blind to the extent to which actual people fall short of the rational ideal, while prominent accounts in political science are under-inclusive. We offer necessary and sufficient conditions - Suitable Reason and Testimonial Honesty - distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative influence; develop a 'hypothetical disclosure test' to measure the degree of manipulation; and provide further criteria to assess and compare the morality of manipulation across cases. We discuss multiple examples drawn from politics and from public policy with particular attention to recent debates about the ethics and politics of nudge.

Algorithm Decision Making (ADM) systems designed to augment or automate human decision-making have the potential to produce better decisions while also freeing up human time and attention for other pursuits. For this potential to be realised, however, algorithmic decisions must be sufficiently aligned with human goals and interests. We take a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach to the questions of ADM alignment and trust. In a broad sense, ADM is beneficial if and only if human principals can trust algorithmic agents to act faithfully on their behalf. This mirrors the challenge of facilitating P-A relationships among humans, but the peculiar nature of human-machine interaction also raises unique issues. The problem of asymmetric information is omnipresent but takes a different form in the context of ADM. Although the decision-making machinery of an algorithmic agent can in principle be laid bare for all to see, the sheer complexity of ADM systems based on deep learning models prevents straightforward monitoring. We draw on literature from economics and political science to argue that the problem of trust in ADM systems should be addressed at the level of institutions. Although the dyadic relationship between human principals and algorithmic agents is our ultimate concern, cooperation at this level must rest against an institutional environment which allows humans to effectively evaluate and choose among algorithmic alternatives.

We argue that new public management (NPM) and other processes have led to adverse selection and agency rent problems within the political elite in Australia. The politicisation of the public service and the rise of careerist politicians have led to the de-separation of what was once two distinct career paths within the political elite. This has changed the decision premise of the advisory system for policy formation and implementation, leading to worse public policy, even policy disasters. We recommend that some of the principles of the Westminster form of government be updated and re-instituted for political elites within the structures of the Australian government. We canvass four reforms: return to merit appointments and promotion for public servants; a return to tenure for senior public servants; an enhanced push for descriptive representation within the career public service; and a formal role for staffers with centralised appointments, inability to instruct public servants, and restrictions on political and policy roles once leaving public service. These are designed to end the distrust, perceived corruption, and poor governance in the Australian government.Points for practitioners Having separate career paths for non-elected policy elites and elected elites is vital for information transmission and good governance. Each should operate with separate decision premises and work together in creative tension. NPM practices have weakened the separate career paths of public servants and politicians, leading to adverse selection and agency rent for both. The Westminster system has a logic that has been diluted or weakened within the Australian government, leading to poorer policy and policy disasters. The paper presents four areas for reform.

Abstract Process tracing systematizes qualitative historical description to enable inferences about token causal processes. Contrary to some claims it does not provide a rival account of causation to large-n studies rather it answers questions posed at a different level of detail. Large-n and small-n analyses pose questions at different levels of analysis. By drawing an analogy with the external and internal validity of experiments we can view many historical disputes in terms of what causal aspects are foregrounded (as a “cause”) and what backgrounded (as “background conditions”). Process tracing examines detailed processes within type-mechanistic explanation. While it can demonstrate that specific mechanisms do not apply to the case under consideration, case studies on their own cannot test theoretically generated mechanistic claims, nor empirical generalization. Debates over what constitutes critical junctures usually concern the level of appropriate explanation and what aspects in a causal account are to be foregrounded.

This article provides the first analysis of gendered promotion issues for cabinet ministers using most-similar systems design for three "Westminster-style" governments: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Using individual-level data and controlling for biographical, institutional, and country effects we find, in common with earlier literature, that women are more likely to be given less prestigious cabinet posts and be assigned to "feminine" portfolio. Using both sequence and event history analysis, we see the careers of men and women starkly diverge. We find that women are less likely to be promoted than men but find no relationship between prestigious portfolio and promotion. However, feminine portfolio assignments decrease the promotion prospects for women yet increase them for men.

Whether or not there is such a thing as moral expertise, and, if so, what constitutes it, is much debated. Empirical expertise bestows epistemic authority over propositional content; that is not the case in moral domains, technical expertise notwithstanding. This article identifies three types of agencies with some authority over decisions in moral matters. It shows that the source of the authority wielded by such agencies, while varying across the three forms identified, is based on empirical and technical knowledge and does not derive solely from any moral expertise of its members. The article examines, and finds wanting, two recent arguments for giving others authority over moral content.

Abstract Nudge advocates contend that nudges are liberty preserving, while government regulations are not. We interrogate that assumption by considering negative liberty in the forms suggested by the proponents of nudges. Specifically, we examine three ways of measuring negative liberty – liberty as freedom of choice, liberty as absence of coercion and liberty as absence of interference – applying the measures to a case study relevant to the nudge literature: regulations governing healthy food manufacture. We show that, depending on the liberty measure adopted and the estimated impact on producer and consumer behaviour, some regulations can be liberty reducing, while others are liberty preserving or liberty enhancing. When it comes to comparing nudges and more traditional policies aimed at increasing the health and welfare of citizens, there is no a priori negative liberty ground for preferring nudges.

Floyd defends normative behaviourism against 'mentalism'. His characterization of political philosophy as mentalism is uncharitable, and it is not clear that normative behaviourism provides greater evidence of convergence that we find in liberal political philosophy. To interpret behaviour, one must theorize the effects of institutions on that behaviour, it is therefore problematic to defend institutions on behavioural grounds alone without 'mentalistic' theory. Normative behaviourism uses a 'contingent imperative'; however, this leaves the behaviour normatively undefended. A potential response by Floyd to these criticisms depends upon misinterpreting Cohen's argument that fact-free principles underlie all policy recommendations. Floyd's own recommendations require at least one fact-free principle in Cohen's sense. Floyd is correct that behavioural evidence is important to political philosophy.

James Johnson argues that formal models are best conceived as fables which provide lessons about empirical phenomena and the “standard rationale” of testing model predictions fails. Without justifying the “standard rationale” as such, we argue that models produce scientific predictions. These predictions come at different levels or granularity of description and in different forms each bearing some degree of uncertainty, but still give conditions for the existence of political phenomena. Models and their predictions require projection onto the world, and that projection involves interpretation. Tests utilize inference to the best explanation, and it is the conceptual or theoretical aspect of models that make them explanatory. We discuss the extent to which our characterisation of models and their explanatory form versus that of Johnson constitutes a verbal or substantive dispute.

We introduce the special issue and provide an extensive review of the career patterns of politicians in twenty-seven multi-level countries worldwide, the largest number ever analyzed. Based on the wider evidence we provide a new synthesis and explanation of those patterns. While supporting previous claims on some of those factors our analysis shows that political, party, and electoral system features provide the strongest explanations for divergence in the development of career movement patterns in multi-level systems worldwide. We also introduce a set of novel factors, most notably, the existence of a dominant party, power-sharing agreements, and asymmetrical federal design. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our research and identify new avenues of research on political careers and comparative federalism.

Abstract Process tracing systematizes qualitative historical description to enable inferences about token causal processes. Contrary to some claims it does not provide a rival account of causation to large-n studies rather it answers questions posed at a different level of detail. Large-n and small-n analyses pose questions at different levels of analysis. By drawing an analogy with the external and internal validity of experiments we can view many historical disputes in terms of what causal aspects are foregrounded (as a “cause”) and what backgrounded (as “background conditions”). Process tracing examines detailed processes within type-mechanistic explanation. While it can demonstrate that specific mechanisms do not apply to the case under consideration, case studies on their own cannot test theoretically generated mechanistic claims, nor empirical generalization. Debates over what constitutes critical junctures usually concern the level of appropriate explanation and what aspects in a causal account are to be foregrounded.