In early 2024, revelations concerning a meeting of far-right actors to discuss large-scale deportations triggered one of the largest waves of protest in modern German history. What brought people into the streets was not outrage at these plans alone, but also a deeper anxiety about the trajectory of liberal democracy, intensified by the growing strength of the Alternative f & uuml;r Deutschland (AfD). Against this backdrop, the present article draws on theories of grievances, mobilizing structures, political opportunity, and micro-mobilization to examine both the geography of protest and the determinants of participation. Combining protest event data with survey evidence, we suggest that mobilization was shaped less by grievances related to deportation threats than by the organizational strength of, and individual affinities with, parties of the center left. We also identify a curvilinear relationship between the legacy of far-right mobilization and anti-far-right protest: moderate levels of prior far-right activity tend to stimulate anti-far-right protest, while high levels may suppress it-particularly in contexts where mobilizing structures on the center left are weak or absent. In sum, these findings underscore the complexity of mass protest in defense of democracy, pointing to the interplay of various structural, organizational, and individual dynamics.
Public perceptions of immigration are often inaccurate, yet research lacks conceptual clarity and valid measurement of these misperceptions. Prior work focuses mainly on population innumeracy (misestimating immigrant shares) and cannot distinguish genuine misperceptions from mere guessing. We introduce a survey module that captures multiple dimensions of immigration-related perceptions alongside respondents' confidence in their estimates. Using population survey data from Switzerland, we develop confidence-weighted indicators that separate misperception from guessing. Although inaccurate perceptions are widespread across several immigration domains, they are less prevalent than often assumed; guessing accounts for a substantial share of observed inaccuracy. This measurement strategy enables more precise empirical tests of theories linking perceptions to political attitudes and behavior.
Patriotism and nationalism are typically conceptualized as two distinct if not conflicting forms of national attachment. Carrying a substantial normative dimension, the former is often linked to an enlightened sense of community that takes pride in the commitment to democratic values, whereas the latter is understood as an exclusionary and uncritical attachment to the nation. It is this dichotomy and the categorical assumptions at its core which this article subjects to critical appraisal largely missing from the debate. We first (a) address the confusion that comes from constructing national attachment as fixed and dualistic. Then, we (b) highlight the lack of contextual awareness in empirical research that employs scales and items regardless of geographical or temporal peculiarities. Finally, we (c) cast light on the implications entailed, in particular, the legitimacy provided to the civic ideal of a good and reasonable patriotism.
In Western Europe the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020 marked the close of a period of climate activism that had until then been dominated by the Fridays for Future movement, with its youth-driven protests and pleas to listen to the science. But now that its political star has faded more radical groups have taken the reins—many of which are less interested in organising mass rallies than in staging acts of civil disobedience. This article charts some of the fault lines created by this activist changing of the guard, takes a critical look at the now prevalent logic of attention at all costs and outlines how and why it may give rise to feelings of reactance. It concludes that the zeal of this new generation of activists must be curbed if the acceptance of climate protection measures is to be ensured.
Bibliographie: Bitschnau, Marco: Roepert, Leo. (2022). Die Konformistische Revolte: Zur Mythologie des Rechtspopulismus. Bielefeld: transcript. 256 Seiten, ISBN: 978-3-8376-6272-6, 39,00 Euro, ZRex – Zeitschrift für Rechtsextremismusforschung, 2-2023, S. 258-260. https://doi.org/10.3224/zrex.v3i2.08-----Open-Access-Lizenz: Dieser Beitrag ist ab dem 18.10.2023 im Open Access unter der Creative-Commons-Lizenz CC BY 4.0 (Namensnennung 4.0 International) verfügbar. Weitere Informationen zur Lizenz und den Nutzungsbedingungen finden Sie hier.
This article investigates how Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) have governed international student mobility (ISM) over the last two decades. While both are among the most popular destinations for international students and have experienced similar political trajectories during this period, they have pursued divergent education and immigration policies in regulating ISM. Driven by a mix of educational universalism and fear of future labor shortages, Germany offers financial benefits and generous right to stay opportunities. The UK, by contrast, combines high tuition fees with restrictive immigration policies, favoring students who will leave the country upon graduation. Drawing on a variety of parliamentary reports, policy documents, and interviews with politicians and civil servants, I argue that this divergence is rooted primarily in the different politicizability of ISM: international students are discursively treated as students (belonging to the non-politicized field of education) in Germany but as internationals (belonging to the hyperpoliticized field of immigration) in the UK.
For more than two decades, the work of Blank and Schmidt has greatly influenced empirical research on national attachment. Distinguishing between nationalism, patriotism, and national identity, it rests on a set of item batteries that have since been taken up by numerous researchers. In this contribution, we argue that the categorization of most of these items is inconsistent with the perception of a nonexpert sample and, in some cases, even in direct opposition to it. To substantiate this claim, we present the results of an online survey of German university students (N = 424) who were tasked with assigning all items from Blank and Schmidt’s 1997 article to one of the three categories. As hypothesized, the majority of respondents assigned only a few items correctly—so few that their overall agreement with Blank and Schmidt was even lower than what would normally be expected from a random distribution. We also asked about item understandability and found that while some items were considered relatively difficult to understand, there was no obvious correlation between these and the miscategorized ones. Taking this discrepancy between academic and nonacademic concept use into account can further our understanding of national attachment and help us refine existing survey techniques.
On Heroes, Hero-Worship, & the Heroic in History" ist der etwas sperrige Name einer Aufsatzsammlung, mit der der Historiker Thomas Carlyle Mitte des 19.Jahrhunderts die Grundlagen dessen schuf, was später als "Great Man Theory" einige Bekanntheit erlangen sollte."All things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result [...] of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world", heißt es dort in der ersten von insgesamt sechs Vorlesungen ("The Hero as Divinity"), die sich unter anderem mit so illustren Figuren wie Robert Burns und Oliver Cromwell befassen.Vor allem der politische Führer hatte es dem Schotten dabei angetan, erkannte er in ihm doch jenen Persönlichkeitstypus, der
This article analyzes the Migration-Mobility Nexus (MMN) and shows how it can be conceived as a tool to make sense of the relationship between migration and mobility. Being polysemic, the term nexus offers three different ways to conceptualize this relationship: as continuum, process, and dyad. The first highlights the connected space between long-term and short-term and between monodirectional and circular movements. The second focuses on the sequential transition from migration to mobility in both history and scholarship. Finally, the third suggests that boundless mobility and restricted migration are not contradictory but constitutive of each other. Taking a closer look at these readings, we find that all three can be helpful points of departure for conceptual investigations into contemporary human movement.
Understood not only as a challenge to democracy but as a crisis, populism has received widespread attention in both media and academic circles for the better part of the past decade. Yet the outbreak of COVID -19 and its escalation into a pandemic eclipsed the fear of rising populism within weeks: With lockdowns imposed and civil liberties suspended, it lost its menacing character and became a mere background nuisance. This, I argue in this article, is the consequence of a discursive constellation in which there is only room for one dominant crisis – a meta-crisis as I call it – at a time. Populism filled this meta-crisis role for a long while, but the COVID -19 shock redirected society’s attention to a more pervasive and immediate threat. While this does not spell the end of populism , it still marks a notable shift in the relative importance we attribute to it.
Auch mehr als fünf Jahre nach dem Höhepunkt der letzten populistischen Welle werden Fachwelt und Feuilleton nicht müde, die inzwischen zum Gemeinplatz erstarrte Erzählung vom rise of populism mit stetig neuem Besorgnismaterial auszukleiden. Ausgehend von der so originellen wie sinnigen Populismuskritik David Arts wirft der vorliegende Beitrag ein fragendes Schlaglicht auf drei mit dieser Erzählung essentiell verbundenen Sachkomplexe: (1) Die Annahme, dass Populismus wirklich das brauchbarste Konzept ist, um die so rubrizierten Akteure analytisch zu fassen; (2) die Annahme, dass deren Wirken Teil eines transnationalen bis transkontinentalen Großprojekts sei, dass also mithin nur verschiedene Varianten eines gemeinsamen Clamors vorliegen; und schließlich auch (3) die titelgebende Annahme vom rise als einem unidirektionalen Siegeszug populistischer Kräfte in Europa und der Welt.
Swiss Political Science ReviewVolume 28, Issue 2 p. 407-409 BOOK REVIEW The War of Words: A Glossary of Globalization Harold, James, New Haven und London, Yale University Press (2021), 368 p., ISBN 978–0–300-25829-5 Marco Bitschnau, Corresponding Author Marco Bitschnau [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-2700-7259 Universität NeuenburgSearch for more papers by this author Marco Bitschnau, Corresponding Author Marco Bitschnau [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-2700-7259 Universität NeuenburgSearch for more papers by this author First published: 02 May 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12518Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL No abstract is available for this article. Volume28, Issue2Special Issue: The Swiss National Elections 2019June 2022Pages 407-409 RelatedInformation
Abstract Across Western democracies, immigration has become one of the most polarizing and salient issues, with public discourses and individual attitudes often characterized by misperceptions. This condition undermines people's ability to develop informed opinions on the matter and runs counter to the ideal of deliberative democracy. Yet, our understanding of what makes immigration so prone to misperceptions is still limited – a conundrum that this review seeks to answer in three steps. First, we take stock of the existing evidence on the nature of misperceptions about immigration. Secondly, we borrow from diverse bodies of literature to identify their motivational underpinnings and elaborate on how the protection of group identity, the defence of self-interest and security concerns can lead to distorted perceptions of immigration. Thirdly, we highlight relevant determinants of misperceptions at the level of both contextual influences and individual predispositions. We conclude that misperceptions about immigration are ubiquitous and likely to remain a key element of immigration politics.
Not even two years after his electoral victory, US President Joe Biden finds himself in a rather dire position. While irritated allies and the humiliating Taliban takeover of Afghanistan taint his foreign policy record, his domestic agenda has been curtailed by difficulties to win congressional majorities backing social policy reforms. In addition, the president is increasingly under pressure from an “unholy trinity” consisting of activist progressives, skeptical moderates, and resurgent Republicans who have overcome the confusions of the Trump era and have refined their tactics. Casting particular light on the Biden administration’s institutional predicaments, this contribution gives an overview of the various difficulties the president is confronted with and the possible consequences for the upcoming mid-term elections. If Biden wants to avoid Jimmy Carter’s fate, he must pacify his party and achieve meaningful victories sooner rather than later.
Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit sexualpolitischen Positionierungen innerhalb des europäischen Rechtspopulismus. Vor dem Hintergrund der beständig wachsenden Akzeptanz gleichgeschlechtlicher Beziehungen und des zugleich immer stärker aufscheinenden Nutzwertes der Thematik für die Popularisierung und Legitimierung islamfeindlicher Diskursmuster stellt sich für Rechtspopulist*innen zunehmend die Frage, inwieweit strategische Haltungswechsel in Fragen der Sexualpolitik eine erfolgversprechende Zukunftsperspektive darstellen. Ausgehend von einer näheren Betrachtung der rechtspopulistischen Positionsvarianz wird argumentiert, dass ein anti-islamisch grundierter Homozivilisationismus als Variation des in der Literatur gängigen nationalstaatszentrierten Homonationalismus in West- und Mitteleuropa bereits in Ansätzen vorhanden ist und künftig wohl noch stärker akzentuiert werden dürfte.
