Cohort studies are an important tool for public health research about emerging infectious diseases. Willingness to participate in research is associated with multiple factors. Little is known about the role of people's feelings, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Affective polarisation, an affinity for people with similar attitudes to oneself and hostility toward those with opposing views, is a measure of feelings about issues, including COVID-19 vaccination. The aim of this study was to investigate factors associated with willingness to participate in a future household-based cohort study on pandemic preparedness. We did a cross-sectional online survey in the Canton of Bern, Switzerland. We invited a random sample of persons aged 18 + years from 15,000 private households. We asked about willingness to take part and collected data about demographic, social and household characteristics, and affective polarisation related to COVID-19 vaccination. We performed univariable and multivariable analyses, weighted by household size to estimate odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals, CI). Among responders, 49.8% (95% CI 47.9-51.8, weighted proportion) were willing to take part in a cohort study. In multivariable analysis, higher educational level (adjusted odds ratio 2.48, 95% CI 1.81-3.39) and higher monthly income (1.92, 1.39-2.65) were most strongly associated with higher willingness to participate. Opposition to COVID-19 vaccination was associated with lower willingness to participate (0.53, 0.39-0.72). Affective polarisation modified the relationship between vaccination attitudes and willingness to participate. Compared with non-polarised vaccination supporters, polarised supporters were more willing to participate (marginal adjusted odds ratio 1.51, 1.05-2.16), whereas willingness to participate was lower among both non-polarised (0.53, 0.32-0.86) and affectively polarised (0.26, 0.12-0.56) vaccination opposers. Willingness to participate in a cohort study was moderate. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing affective polarisation, as well as socioeconomic factors, is needed to improve participation in pandemic preparedness research.

In recent years, depression has entered the research agenda of political psychology, emerging as a meaningful psychological correlate of diverse political attitudes and behaviors. Surprisingly, however, its link to populism-the political phenomenon that has probably attracted most public and scholarly attention over the past several years-has not yet been studied. We address this notable blind spot and provide a first exploratory evaluation of the relationship between depressive symptoms and the inclination to populism. To do so, we make use of two European datasets (CRONOS-2 and ESS 11) that include a validated, epidemiological short scale to measure depressive symptoms (CES-D8) and allow us to consider both populist attitudes and populist voting as key individual-level manifestations of populism. Our analyses show that individuals experiencing depressive symptoms tend to exhibit a stronger affinity for populist ideas and are more likely to support populist parties. Our study thus underlines the importance of prevention, early detection, and treatment measures targeting the widespread "black dog" of depression-also in the interest of preserving and promoting democratic health.

A rural consciousness, encompassing a rural identity and resentments directed at urban areas and the political elite, has emerged as a key explanation for the growing rural–urban political divides affecting many Western democracies. However, existing research has largely focused on the case of the United States; there is also no consensus as to the structure or dimensionality of rural (and urban) consciousness. In response, this paper develops and tests a battery of 16 items for measuring consciousness in five Western European countries: Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. We show that both rural and urban consciousness are best understood as comprising a dimension of identity and three dimensions of resentment pertaining to power, resources, and culture, in line with Cramer’s original conceptualization. We furthermore find that rural consciousness in Western Europe is generally associated with indicators of “left behind” status such as low income and lack of a university education and is also associated with identification with the political right. This shows how rural–urban identities and resentments can help illuminate the changing political landscape of Western Europe.

The vaccination against COVID-19 has torn societies apart. Against this background we evaluate three interrelated research questions: (1) does vaccination polarize citizens even after the COVID-19 pandemic has faded; (2) do opinions about vaccination correlate with group formation and identification, and (3) do we observe opinion-based affective polarization regarding vaccination in the post-pandemic era? Based on two original surveys from Switzerland in early 2022 and late 2023, our results highlight that respondents have distinct opinions about vaccination, but that only pro-vaccination respondents have formed an opinion identity. We also observe an asymmetric affective polarization: pro-vaccination respondents show higher levels of liking toward other pro-vaccination respondents but significant dislike toward anti-vaccination respondents, while the same does not hold true for anti-vaccination respondents. Overall, affective polarization toward vaccination is less pronounced in the aftermath of the health crisis than during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, at a time when globalization is boosting the threat of pandemics, caution is warranted, as an increasing salience of vaccination could widen the divide again.

For many, direct democracy is said to increase political interest. To date, however, empirical findings regarding this relationship remain inconclusive. In this article, we claim that this inconclusiveness can be partly ascribed to the diverse effects that direct democracy has on individuals. In other words, direct democracy influences political interest, but how and to what degree depends on an individual’s personality traits. Running hierarchical regression models with survey data from random samples of eligible American and Swiss voters, we arrive at the following three conclusions: First, in both countries, the use of direct democracy is not directly connected to political interest. Second, the Big Five personality traits affect the interest in politics. Third, neuroticism, in particular, alters the relationship between direct democracy and political interest, suggesting that a certain personality type is likely to be more sensitive to popular votes, and a vibrant democratic environment can help to inspire interest in politics for people who, because of their personality, tend to be detached from it. Quite intriguingly, these relationships hold irrespective of the country and research period.

While recent research has shown that supporters and opponents of COVID-19 vaccination have polarizing political attitudes and beliefs, we lack a thorough understanding of how these two groups think about each other. To investigate the feelings and stereotypes between supporters and opponents of COVID-19 vaccination, this study draws on cross-sectional survey data from six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), collected between January and March 2022 (n = 6379). Our findings indicate an opinion-based affective polarization between supporters and opponents of COVID-19 vaccination. Both groups not only adopt different positions on the issue but also display dynamics of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility. Most notably, our assessment of thermometer scores and character trait ratings shows that this affective polarization is asymmetric, as it is stronger among the pro-vaccination group. Our findings are critical to the control of infectious diseases because affective polarization has been shown to influence health behaviors such as compliance with government policies. The issue is even more pressing as globalization boosts the threat of pandemic emergence and accelerates the global transmission of diseases.

We argue that threat-induced anger is not a universal driver of populist attitudes and waning political support. Instead, we hypothesize that anger erodes democracy-relevant political attitudes only when a threat affects citizens’ norms and only when blame for said threat is attributed to the domestic political system. We corroborate our hypotheses using data from a unique survey experiment conducted in Germany in 2022, in which we vary the level of responsibility attribution and threat noxiousness by exposing respondents to different threats that were salient during the field phase. The results indicate that citizens differentiate whom they hold accountable, such that it is not necessarily the quality of the threat but the quality of the political response to the threat that determines the future of democracy.

There is growing concern about a political divide between urban and rural places. Against this background, we evaluate the geography of regime preferences regarding a key aspect of democratic support, e.g. attitudes towards democracy and its authoritarian alternatives. We would like to find out whether possible rural-urban differences are due to different socio-economic situations, differing values or to the degree of political discontent of urbanites and rural dwellers. Using recent European Values Survey data from 32 European countries and over 30,000 respondents from 2017 to 2020, we show that rural residents are more supportive of authoritarian regimes than urban dwellers are. Moreover, our path analyses indicate that socio-economic and cultural differences between urbanites and ruralites are particularly crucial, while the political mechanisms cannot explain the spatial divide of regime preferences.

As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments even in consolidated democracies have adopted drastic measures, temporarily constraining individual freedoms and expanding executive political decision making. In light of this trade-off between public health measures and democratic norms, it becomes crucial to assess the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on public support for democratic versus authoritarian regimes. Following insights of the affective intelligence theory, emotions, and not only rational considerations, are key to understanding behavioural and attitudinal responses to crises. In the article it is argued that the pandemic threat of COVID-19 affects regime preferences by evoking distinct negative emotions, in particular anger and fear. Using original survey data in six European countries, it is shown that COVID-19-induced anger and fear have divergent effects on regime preferences. While democratic regime preference has declined for angry respondents, there is also a message of hope: fearful respondents display increased support for a democratic regime.

While conventional wisdom connects crises and external threats to increasing support for populism, several questions remain unanswered. Following insights of affective intelligence theory (AIT), we posit that anger and fear elicited by pandemic threat relate differently to populist attitudes. While such relations have already been explored in the context of other hazards (such as financial turmoil, terrorism, or immigration), our study allows us to evaluate the emotional bedrocks of populism in the context of a threat that is not apparently connected to the classical political grievances underlying populism. Expanding the literature on psychological underpinnings of populism and on the political consequences of the pandemic, our analyses of original survey data support our contentions that pandemic threat-induced anger is positively related to populist attitudes while fear is negatively linked to populist stances. This holds in particular for anti-elitism and the Manichean outlook inherent in populism. Altogether, we provide new comparative evidence to the puzzle about the emotional bedrocks of populism by illuminating a domain that has not been systematically explored before.

AbstractThis chapter focuses on political culture in Switzerland and in an international comparison. It starts with a discussion on political culture as an object of research, followed by a brief summary of measurement and available data on political culture. Finally, we survey political culture in Switzerland and compare the results with other European countries. Switzerland is especially interesting as an object of investigation, since it consists of three linguistically, culturally, religiously, and regionally different groups and can thus be seen as a microcosm of Europe. Following the research tradition of Almond and Verba, we define political culture as a ‘particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation’ and investigate attitudes toward the system as a whole (polity culture), attitudes toward the political process (politics culture), and attitudes toward political issues (policy culture). Evaluating survey data, we reach the following two main findings: First, attitudes toward democracy and the political system, as well as toward the institutions and actors in the political process, have been characterized by a high degree of stability in Switzerland over the past decades. Second, our analysis shows that Switzerland has a particularly strong approval of democracy and is characterized by a high degree of trust and political participation compared with other European countries. Switzerland, with its particularly pronounced direct democracy, is thus a haven for a political culture with a great deal of support and trust.

The beneficial role of voluntary work for social integration makes it an important aspect of social cohesion. Thus, there is broad interest in understanding the individual and contextual foundations of volunteering. With regard to the latter, a particular focus is on the role of policies and institutions of the welfare state. They might set incentives for civic engagement and create new scope for voluntary work (crowding-in thesis), but they might also make it redundant (crowding-out thesis). We follow the argument that generous welfare states enable volunteering and assume that two mechanisms are at work. First, they establish a general culture of helping and caring for others in a society (cultural mechanism). Second, they provide those who benefit or potentially benefit from welfare state policies with resources and the abilities to engage in volunteering (resource mechanism). Thus, welfare benefits in specific areas of the welfare state are expected to increase volunteering among members of targeted groups (e.g., the elderly if pensions are high). To test these arguments, our empirical analysis combines country-level data of area-specific welfare benefits with survey data of around 29,000 respondents from 23 countries included in the most recent European Value Survey 2017/2018. We estimate hierarchical regression models with cross-level interactions to test whether particular groups of society are activated by general and area-specific welfare programs to become volunteers. Our findings show that volunteering is generally higher in more generous welfare states, lending support to the crowding-in thesis. Area- and group-specific analyses indicate that the resource mechanism works for some groups but not for all. Pension welfare strengthens volunteering among the retired and the elderly. Unemployment welfare reinforces volunteering among the less educated, but these results are slightly less robust, and we do not find support for higher levels of volunteering among the actually targeted group of unemployed persons.

In times of severe crises, citizens are frequently found to rally-'round-the-flag - i.e. to increase trust in their government. Drawing on an original survey experiment with real-world information at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, we portray the saliency of rally-relevant issues of the crisis. Contrary to our expectation, this priming effect lowers governmental trust. Mediation analyses show that respondents are more trusting towards their in-group, but simultaneously display less pride in institutions and less positive attitudes towards the political elite, which leads to a reduction in governmental trust. Our study shows that crises do not always lead to a rally-'round-the-flag effect - it crucially depends on whether people consider their democratic institutions capable of coping with the crisis. Moreover, our findings demonstrate the need to unravel the black box of the rally-effect to get a more accurate picture of the driving forces behind governmental trust during crises.

Behavioural immune system theory predicts that attitudes towards immigrants become more hostile during times of increased threat from pathogens, as pandemic threat triggers aversive emotional responses, which in turn foster outgroup hostility. We test this notion in the context of the current Covid-19 crisis. Combining both original individual-level survey data of around 6,000 European respondents during the second Corona wave in winter 2020/2021 and regional data of pandemic threat in a multilevel design, we show that Covid-19 pandemic threat exposure in 105 European regions is indeed associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Moreover, hierarchical path models indicate that Covid-19-induced anger fosters anti-immigrant attitudes, while we find no evidence that disgust as a pivotal avoidance-oriented emotion is crucial. In contrast to conventional wisdom, individuals reacting with fear to the pandemic hold more immigrant-friendly orientations. Taken together, our results indicate that the behavioural immune system (BIS) appears as a compelling obstacle to inclusive orientations. However, our findings challenge the notion that every emotion triggered by the BIS translates the pandemic threat into negative attitudes towards immigrants.

While analysis of the impact of threatening events has moved from bit player to center stage in political science in recent decades, the phenomenon of pandemic threat is widely neglected in terms of a systematic research agenda. Tying together insights from the behavioral immune system hypothesis and standard political science models of emotional processing, we evaluate whether exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic threat is related to authoritarian attitudes and which emotions do the work. Using 12 samples with over 12,000 respondents from six European countries at two time points (2020 and 2021), we argue that pandemic threats can generate disgust, anger, and fear. Our analyses indicate that exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic threat particularly activates fear, which in turn is linked to authoritarian attitudes.

Drawing on the behavioural immune system hypothesis, we argue that the prevalence of the Covid-19 pandemic threat in an individual's respective environment relates to exclusive, ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Referring to the affective intelligence theory, we maintain that specific negative emotions are prompted by the perception of being exposed to a pandemic threat, and these emotional states in turn structure political preferences regarding national belonging. Using an original survey in six European countries during the first peak of the pandemic in late April and early May 2020, we analyze both the impact of individual Covid-19 experiences and the contextual exposure to a pandemic threat through hierarchical analyses of 105 European regions. Our empirical analysis shows that exposure to the pandemic is linked to stronger ethnic national identities for both levels of analysis. We also find that anger substantially mediates this relationship and has primacy over feelings of fear. Taken together, our results indicate that the behavioural immune system appears as a pervasive obstacle to inclusive orientations.

The Corona crisis is an unprecedented challenge for societies. Lockdowns and physical distancing orders have generated economic, social and health-related consequences in many countries. In this regard, we evaluate how information about positive economic expectations during the crisis affects citizens' attitudes. Using a real-world survey experiment, our analyses indicate that information about a positive economic outlook and governmental support to mitigate the crisis actually promote people's subjective feelings of disadvantage rather than reducing them. Interestingly, it seems that information about economic recovery that opens up opportunities may backfire due to increased upward comparisons and perceived competition. Structural equation analyses suggest that this relationship is mediated by critical views about democratic institutions during the crisis. Citizens lose confidence in their governments and democratic decision-makers to uphold principles of fairness after the crisis ends. Our results have important implications on how to communicate measures that aim to deal with the crisis.