Although artificial intelligence (AI) has become increasingly smart, its wisdom has not kept pace. In this opinion article, we examine what is known about human wisdom and sketch a vision of its AI counterpart. We introduce human wisdom as strategies for solving intractable problems-those outside the scope of analytic techniques-including both 'object-level' strategies, such as heuristics (for managing problems), and 'metacognitive' strategies, such as intellectual humility, perspective-taking, or context adaptability (for managing object-level task fit). We argue that AI systems particularly struggle with this type of metacognition. Wise metacognition would lead to AI that is more robust to novel environments, explainable to users, cooperative with others, and safer by risking fewer misaligned goals with human users. We discuss how wise AI might be benchmarked, trained, and implemented.

Abstract This special issue examines how natural and artificial intelligences (AIs) model the world, and what this modelling reveals about cognition and relationships between life and mind. Rather than adopting a single definition, the collection considers how world models function and emerge in biological and artificial systems, exploring a diverse range of world modelling including causal, self-referential, individual goal-directed, collective and narrative forms. A recurring theme is the extent to which current AI systems trained on vast quantities of data learn the context-sensitive, temporally embedded, value-laden dimensions of world modelling that characterize diverse biological intelligences, or whether their impressive capabilities arise primarily from statistical surface regularities. The contributions also raise broader issues concerning embodiment, complexity, learning architectures and the social and scientific contexts in which world models operate. With this collection, we hope to clarify the conceptual landscape, identify key points of similarity and divergence between natural and artificial minds, and outline questions that may guide future research on the forms of world modelling that support grounded understanding, robust agency and potentially human-like general intelligence. This article is part of the theme issue ‘World models in natural and artificial intelligence’.

This article reviews two case studies in which AI systems were evaluated for abstraction and analogy-making capabilities and compared with those of humans. These studies illustrate how AI systems should be evaluated not only for accuracy on benchmark tasks but also for robustness to task variations and for insight into how the system is solving the tasks. These studies also illuminate the need for transparency, interpretability, and scientifically informed experimental methodology in AI evaluations.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) systems are often evaluated using binary correctness or peer agreement, yet such evaluations obscure how individual agents revise their answers during social interaction. We study the microscopic dynamics of answer revision in large language models (LLMs) using ConceptARC, a 2D grid-reasoning benchmark that admits quantitative distance measures between candidate solutions. By exposing a target model to controlled configurations of peer answers, we analyze how revision likelihood and direction depend on both social context and the distance between answers and the ground truth. We find that agents are more likely to revise when their answers are farther from the correct solution, and that revisions of incorrect answers exhibit a systematic contraction toward the ground truth, even when the final answer remains incorrect. Conversely, correct answers can be overturned by social pressure, particularly when wrong peers are near-correct. Together, these results show that multi-agent interaction induces structured, distance-aware movements in solution space that are invisible under binary correctness, clarifying when social reasoning leads to improvement, stability, or gradual regression in solution quality.

In people, the ability to solve analogies such as "body: feet:: table: ?"emerges in childhood, and appears to transfer easily to other domains, such as the visual domain "( : ) :: < : ?". Recent research shows that large language models (LLMs) can solve various forms of analogies. However, can LLMs generalize analogy solving to other domains like people can? To investigate this, we had children, adults, and LLMs solve a series of letter-string analogies (e.g., a b : a c :: j k : ?) in the Latin alphabet, in a near transfer domain (Greek alphabet), and a far transfer domain (list of symbols). Children and adults easily generalized their knowledge to unfamiliar domains, whereas LLMs did not. This key difference between human and AI performance is evidence that these LLMs still struggle with robust human-like analogical transfer.

Emergence is a concept in complexity science that describes how many-body systems manifest novel higher-level properties, properties that can be described by replacing high-dimensional mechanisms with lower-dimensional effective variables and theories. This is captured by the idea 'More is Different'. Intelligence is a consummate emergent property manifesting increasingly efficient-cheaper and faster-uses of emergent capabilities to solve problems. This is captured by the idea 'Less is More'. In this paper, we first examine claims that Large Language Models exhibit emergent capabilities, reviewing several approaches to quantifying emergence, and secondly ask whether LLMs possess emergent intelligence. This article is part of the theme issue 'World models in natural and artificial intelligence'.

Modern AI systems have exceeded human performance on many benchmarks meant to evaluate general cognitive capacities. However, it is often the case that benchmark performance does a poor job of predicting general capacities in real-world settings. In this article I describe several issues related to evaluation that can cause this mismatch, and propose six principles, inspired by developmental and comparative psychology, that need to be adopted to enable rigorous evaluation for AI systems. These principles are illustrated by case studies from the psychology and AI literature.

Julia has two sisters and one brother. How many sisters does her brother Martin have? Solving this tiny puzzle requires a bit of thinking. You might mentally picture the family of three girls and one boy and then realize that the boy has three sisters. Or you might figure out a more general rule: Any boy in the family will have one more sister than any girl. In other words, the answer to such a puzzle isn't something you immediately know, like Paris is the capital of France; it requires reasoning, a central feature of human intelligence, and one that large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4, for all their impressive behavior, struggle with.

OpenAI's o3-preview reasoning model exceeded human accuracy on the ARC-AGI-1 benchmark, but does that mean state-of-the-art models recognize and reason with the abstractions the benchmark was designed to test? Here we investigate abstraction abilities of AI models using the closely related but simpler ConceptARC benchmark. Our evaluations vary input modality (textual vs. visual), use of external Python tools, and reasoning effort. Beyond output accuracy, we evaluate the natural-language rules that models generate to explain their solutions, enabling us to assess whether models recognize the abstractions that ConceptARC was designed to elicit. We show that the best models' rules are frequently based on surface-level “shortcuts,” capturing intended abstractions considerably less often than humans. In the visual modality, AI models' output accuracy drops sharply; however, our rule-level analysis reveals that a substantial share of their rules capture the intended abstractions, even as the models struggle to apply these concepts to generate correct solutions. In short, we show that using accuracy alone to evaluate abstract reasoning can substantially overestimate AI capabilities in textual modalities and underestimate it in visual modalities. Our results offer a more faithful picture of AI models' abstract reasoning abilities and a more principled way to track progress toward human-like, abstraction-centered intelligence.

A few weeks ago, a colleague of mine needed to collect and format some data from a website, and he asked the latest version of Anthropic's generative AI system, Claude, for help. Claude cheerfully agreed to perform the task, generated a computer program to download the data, and handed over perfectly formatted results. The only problem? My colleague immediately noticed that the data Claude delivered was entirely fabricated.

LLMs have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, there is debate on the extent to which they are performing general abstract reasoning versus employing non-robust processes, e.g., that overly rely on similarity to pre-training data. Here we investigate the robustness of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs on three of four domains studied by Webb, Holyoak, and Lu (2023): letter-string analogies, digit matrices, and story analogies. For each domain we test humans and GPT models on robustness to variants of the original analogy problems that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but are likely dissimilar from tasks in the pre-training data. The performance of a system that uses robust abstract reasoning should not decline substantially on these variants. On simple letter-string analogies, we find that while the performance of humans remains high for two types of variants we tested, the GPT models' performance declines sharply. This pattern is less pronounced as the complexity of these problems is increased, as both humans and GPT models perform poorly on both the original and variant problems requiring more complex analogies. On digit-matrix problems, we find a similar pattern but only on one out of the two types of variants we tested. On story-based analogy problems, we find that, unlike humans, the performance of GPT models are susceptible to answer-order effects, and that GPT models also may be more sensitive than humans to paraphrasing. This work provides evidence that LLMs often lack the robustness of zero-shot human analogy-making, exhibiting brittleness on most of the variations we tested. More generally, this work points to the importance of carefully evaluating AI systems not only for accuracy but also robustness when testing their cognitive capabilities.

When we solve an analogy we transfer information from a known context to a new one through abstract rules and relational similarity. In people, the ability to solve analogies such as "body : feet :: table : ?" emerges in childhood, and appears to transfer easily to other domains, such as the visual domain "( : ) :: < : ?". Recent research shows that large language models (LLMs) can solve various forms of analogies. However, can LLMs generalize analogy solving to new domains like people can? To investigate this, we had children, adults, and LLMs solve a series of letter-string analogies (e.g., a b : a c :: j k : ?) in the Latin alphabet, in a near transfer domain (Greek alphabet), and a far transfer domain (list of symbols). As expected, children and adults easily generalized their knowledge to unfamiliar domains, whereas LLMs did not. This key difference between human and AI performance is evidence that these LLMs still struggle with robust human-like analogical transfer.

Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, it has been debated whether they are actually performing humanlike abstract reasoning or instead employing less general processes that rely on similarity to what has been seen in their training data. Here we investigate the generality of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs (Webb, Holyoak, Lu, 2023). We take one set of analogy problems used to evaluate LLMs and create a set of "counterfactual" variants-versions that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but that are likely dissimilar from any pre-training data. We test humans and three GPT models on both the original and counterfactual problems, and show that, while the performance of humans remains high for all the problems, the GPT models' performance declines sharply on the counterfactual set. This work provides evidence that, despite previously reported successes of LLMs on analogical reasoning, these models lack the robustness and generality of human analogy-making.

A few months after ChatGPT was released, the neural network pioneer Terrence Sejnowski wrote about coming to grips with the shock of what large language models (LLMs) could do: “Something is beginning to happen that was not expected even a few years ago. A threshold was reached, as if a space alien suddenly appeared that could communicate with us in an eerily human way.…Some aspects of their behavior appear to be intelligent, but if it’s not human intelligence, what is the nature of their intelligence?”

The abilities to form and abstract concepts is key to human intelligence, but such abilities remain lacking in state-of-the-art AI systems. There has been substantial research on conceptual abstraction in AI, particularly using idealized domains such as Raven's Progressive Matrices and Bongard problems, but even when AI systems succeed on such problems, the systems are rarely evaluated in depth to see if they have actually grasped the concepts they are meant to capture. In this paper we describe an in-depth evaluation benchmark for the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), a collection of few-shot abstraction and analogy problems developed by Chollet [2019]. In particular, we describe ConceptARC, a new, publicly available benchmark in the ARC domain that systematically assesses abstraction and generalization abilities on a number of basic spatial and semantic concepts. ConceptARC differs from the original ARC dataset in that it is specifically organized around "concept groups" -- sets of problems that focus on specific concepts and that are vary in complexity and level of abstraction. We report results on testing humans on this benchmark as well as three machine solvers: the top two programs from a 2021 ARC competition and OpenAI's GPT-4. Our results show that humans substantially outperform the machine solvers on this benchmark, showing abilities to abstract and generalize concepts that are not yet captured by AI systems. We believe that this benchmark will spur improvements in the development of AI systems for conceptual abstraction and in the effective evaluation of such systems.