This article analyzes the peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been playing out since fall 2024, and explains why it is unlikely to succeed. As of spring 2026, negotiations had reached an impasse over how the Turkish constitution should be amended to recognize Kurdish rights. Obstacles also included how to facilitate the reintegration into society of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and his militants; renewed violence between Turkey and the PKK's ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which had been embroiled in fighting with the militias of post-Assad Damascus; and a deadlock in the Turkish parliamentary committee charged with implementing the peace process. Despite these setbacks, the analysis suggests, Ankara could still calculate that it would gain strength rather than weaken if it were to extend to the Kurds constitutional recognition and rights, as the resulting peace and unity could bolster its domestic and international position.

In fall 2024, the Turkish government suddenly proposed that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) disarm and disband in return for unspecified concessions. Abdullah Ocalan, the group's long-incarcerated leader, agreed. During its extraordinary 12th Congress of May 2025, the PKK declared that its 40-year violent struggle had "brought the Kurdish issue to the point of resolution through democratic politics, thus completing its historical mission." It would therefore dissolve. This demarche has raised hopes that after decades of violence, Ankara and the militant group are moving toward peace. However, this article contends that despite its promise, the effort will likely fail, as it does not offer any constitutionally guaranteed rights to the Kurds-merely surrender. The analysis investigates why Ocalan supposedly agreed to break up his organization and shows that the government's real purpose may be to use the Kurds as temporary allies to marginalize opposition parties in the scheduled 2028 presidential election. Bolstering the argument is an examination of earlier, failed attempts to end this struggle. The conclusion suggests the conflict is likely to continue, though potentially with reduced violence and more political initiatives.

The main argument of this article is that today’s Turkey’s lacks a robust, modern civil society and concomitant implementation of fair solutions to modern women’s issues. This is in addition to the many other existential problems that have curtailed Turkish democracy and statehood under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A vibrant civil society is crucial to a viable democracy and undoubtedly necessary to understand and begin solving women’s issues in contemporary Turkey. To analyze this situation, this article first examines the general concept of civil society. With this foundation, it next briefly examines women’s issues in Turkish civil society as an important part of the Kurdish issue and then turns its main focus specifically upon women’s CSOs in Turkey, and finally examines the recent, important Varieties of Democracy Study interpreting current Turkish democracy before closing with pertinent conclusions.

As the modern Republic of Turkey—officially established on 29 October 1923—enters its second century and crucial national elections for president and parliament were held on 14 and 28 May 2023 in which the Kurds played a crucial role, this is a particularly important time to reappraise the county’s long-continuing Kurdish insurgency and related events. Over the years, two over-arching, seemingly contradictory themes involving change and continuity have characterised Turkey’s policy toward the Kurds. During Ottoman times (1261-1923) and even into the early Republican days (1923- ), the Kurds were granted a type of separate status befitting their unique ethnic identity. However, probably largely because of the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, Kemalist Turkey abruptly cancelled this policy and instead initiated one of denial, assimilation, and force. The fear was that the Kurds would potentially challenge Turkey’s territorial integrity and divide the state. Only gradually beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, when this position of, denial, assimilation, and the fist had clearly failed, did Turkey cautiously and incrementally begin again reversing its policy and granting the Kurds some type of recognition. Thus this article also will cover the PKK insurgency, as well as Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan’s capture and its consequences. Subsequently, Part II of this reappraisal will bring events up to the present in 2024.

Michael M. Gunter explains why Recep Tayyip Erdogan—the current populist, charismatic, but divisive president of Turkey and arguably the most consequential Turkish leader since Kemal Ataturk—was again reelected in May 2023 despite so many negative factors working against him such as a terribly faltering economy, deadly earthquake, and authoritarian reputation, among others. Gunter analyzes how several different domestic and especially foreign initiatives contributed to his continuing electoral success. Gunter introduces succinctly Erdogan’s storied advancement to authoritarianism, how, although an Islamist, he triumphed by eventually humbling the long-ruling, secular Kemalists and even more powerful military who had up to then been the ultimate arbitrator of Turkish politics. Erdogan's Path to Authoritarianism: The Continuing Journey will introduce the consequences of the long-running Kurdish PKK problem, the failed coup attempt in July 2016, neo-Ottomanism, transnational Islamist organizations and pro-Turkish militias such as the Diyanet and SADAT, , as well as back to the Kurds, although this time in Syrian Kurdistan, also known as Rojava. In addition, this book analyzes Erdogan’s many other foreign initiatives regarding Iraq, the EU, Arab Spring, Israel, NATO, Cyprus, Greece, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran, among others. The final chapter specifically analyzes the May 2023 presidential elections and how Erdogan won.

ABSTRACT: This chapter analyses Turkish civil society and how it impacts the success of democracy. A detailed analysis of the struggling civil society in Turkey follows including GONGOs or government-organized nongovernmental organizations. The chapter also discusses gender issues, and numerous specific civil society organizations in Turkey and how many have been largely co-opted by the Erdogan government. However, Turkish civil society continues to exist and strive for dialogue, reconciliation, and the construction of a viable democracy.