Theorizing poverty requires reflection on the practical consequences of poverty research itself—and ultimately on the particular responsibility of the academic to participate in the eradication of global poverty through and beyond her research. Accordingly, I will discuss whether professional academics, based in the affluent West (or Global North), should engage in activism aimed at social and political change in the Global South. To answer this question, I will first examine a series of arguments from the ‘post-development’ perspective that point to problems of paternalism and self-aggrandizement within Western academic activism. However, though the concerns of post-development critics should be taken seriously, I will argue that this actually demands more, not less, activism from Western scholars.

This chapter examines the state-led measures to curb corruption and also points out to the limitations of the same. It argues instead for a human rights approach for the same, thereby, resolving the vast economic inequalities among people in the country and dealing with the corruption and inefficiency. The concept of human rights, as she suggests, provides a firm anchor for raising ethical concerns about policy, and for creating clear, comprehensive and practicable guidelines for fighting corruption fairly and sustainably. The author articulates that a human rights approach to anti-corruption reform will shift its focus from a negative objective of 'framing and catching' individuals to a positive goal of the realization of human rights, especially those rights whose fulfilment is obstructed by corruption. The chapter argues that the Indian government's approach to fighting corruption, exemplified by its recent experiment with 'demonetization', is an example of how anti-corruption reform can adversely impact the most marginalized and deprived sections of society, which are also the 'worst casualties of corruption'.

This article begins by highlighting the strengths of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as compared to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which guided international action against poverty between 2000 and 2015. Then, through an analysis of SDG 1 - the goal that aims to end poverty in all forms everywhere - it argues that while the SDGs make important advances over the MDGs, they are marred by weakly worded targets that provide little indication of how the goal will be achieved and by whom. This basic flaw, the article further argues, is a reflection of two deeper, foundational problems that apply to the SDGs as a whole. The first is that the SDGs make it easy for governments to go slow on the realisation of human rights, and the second is that the SDGs do not specify a clear division of labour, which is what a human rights-based duty to eradicate severe poverty fundamentally requires.

Sports mega-events tend to follow a top-down, increasingly neoliberal, developmental logic that reflects the aspirations and material interests of their host countries' elites. The 2010 Commonwealth Games (CWG), held in Delhi, India, falls within this pattern. It also provides valuable insight into the country's larger development trajectory. I locate the roots of the CWG's troubling effects, such as slum demolitions and securitisation of the city, not within neoliberalism per se, but within a paradigm of 'development' that equates 'progress' primarily with catching up with the West. I emphasise the striking similarities between the CWG's impact on Delhi, and that of the 1982 Asian Games, which India hosted while it was still following a state-interventionist development model. Much like the organizers of the CWG, the organisers of the Asian Games tried to convert Delhi into a 'modern' city cleansed of shanty towns and street vendors. Although this effort was ultimately unsuccessful, it produced many adverse consequences for the city's marginal populations. When compared, the legacies of the CWG and Asian Games indicate that it is the larger paradigm of development at work in India that ought to be questioned, not only how it is actualised through state-interventionist or free-market (neoliberal) policy.

Though they improve upon the millennium development goals (MDGs), the new sustainable development goals (SDGs) have important draw-backs. First, in assessing present deprivations, they draw our attention to historical comparisons. Yet, that things were even worse before is morally irrelevant; what matters is how much better things could be now. Second, like the MDGs, the SDGs fail to specify any division of labor to ensure success. Therefore, should progress stall, we won't know who is responsible to get us back on track. We won't “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” without an agreement on who is to do what. Third, although the SDGs contain a goal calling for inequality reduction, this goal is specified so that the reduction need not start till 2029. Such delay would cause enormous death and suffering among the poor and enable the rich to shape national and supranational design in their own favor.

French anthropologist Marc Augé's concept of the ‘non-place’ is a useful tool for critiquing the excesses of modernity and capitalism, such as the destruction of small, egalitarian communities, and the dissolution of meaningful, face-to-face relations between people. Augé's concept is used in this essay to explore the multifaceted changes brought about by the 19th Commonwealth Games to the city of Delhi, India, where this ‘mega-event’ was held in October of the year 2010. The politics driving the creation and proliferation of ‘non-places,’ particularly in relation to the Commonwealth Games, are examined, in an attempt to provide insight into how neoliberal policies and practices are advanced and entrenched at the local level in India, altering economic, social, and political relationships. Additionally, disruptions of the intended meaning and function of ‘non-places’ are explored in order to draw attention to the fragility of neoliberal projects, imposed from ‘above’, and the emergence of local spaces of resistance. Processes of neoliberalization, as this essay suggests, are often incomplete or discontinuous.

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is scheduled to adopt its 2015-2030 development agenda in September 2015: the Sustainable Development Goals. The United Nations Open Working Group (OWG) on the SDGs set a draft of this agenda before the UNGA in September 2014. Despite clear positives, this draft fails to take advantage of the SDGs' non-binding and aspirational nature to encourage global leaders to set aside short-term gain in order to invest in a sustainable future. Specifically, the draft ought to identify actors responsible for specific achievements, to envision structural reforms in the global institutional order, to provide for objective and precise progress measurement, and to include stronger human rights language. In addition, particular goals and their means of implementation should be redrafted or strengthened to ensure that they project their full moral force and appeal. A better pact is possible; the UNGA must adopt goals reflecting a genuine commitment to a livable future for all.

On 1 January 2015, India's 64-year-old apex policy-making body, the Planning Commission, was replaced by a new institution, the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog. While it is still too early to assess the NITI Aayog's impact on India's complex policy landscape, or the full extent of its social and political implications, the emerging architecture of the new institution provides valuable insights into the Modi government's economic policy priorities and preferred style of governance. My paper argues that, contrary to the government's claims that the NITI Aayog will spur innovative thinking by objective experts' and promote co-operative federalism' by enhancing the voice and influence of the states, the new institution is being crafted to enlarge the power of the executive government and the prime minister. The elimination of the Planning Commission, a once-powerful advocate of public investment-led development, and of the National Development Council, an important platform for states to work together towards common goals, has set the stage for what the NITI Aayog will turn out to be. Developments to watch for include the NITI Aayog's role in diminishing horizontal institutional accountability; in reducing the ability of state governments to negotiate with the central government; and in narrowing intellectual diversity within elite policy circles.

Despite some clear positives, the draft text of the Sustainable Development Goals does not fulfill its self-proclaimed purpose of inspiring and guiding a concerted international effort to eradicate severe poverty everywhere in all of its forms. We offer some critical comments on the proposed agreement and suggest 10 ways to embolden the goals and amplify their appeal and moral power. While it may well be true that the world's poor are better off today than their predecessors were decades or centuries ago, to judge whether this is moral progress, we must bring into view what was possible then and what is possible now. We may well find that there have never been so many people avoidably subjected to life-threatening deprivations as there are today, and if this is the case, we should insist that our governments end this oppression immediately through appropriate institutional reforms to be prominently outlined in their post-2015 agenda.

The debate about the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when they expire in 2015, is moving very quickly. Weighing in on this debate, we argue that if the SDGs are to be as effective as they can realistically be, concrete responsibilities must be assigned to specific competent actors, measurement methods involved in development targets must not be allowed to be changed midway, and the tracking of progress must be left to independent experts. New development goals should aim for inequality reduction, a more comprehensive view of poverty, and, most importantly, systemic reforms of global institutions. The world will not make decent progress against poverty until the most powerful agents accept real action commitments, not only in the marginal area of development assistance, but in all their policy and institutional design decisions, at both the domestic and especially the supranational level. We end with eight examples of institutional reform goals – ranging from deterring trade barriers to mitigating the effects of lost corporate tax revenues on poor populations – that should be included in the new list.

Soon upon its release in December 2008, Slumdog Millionaire (hereafter Slumdog), a rags-to-riches story about a fictional Mumbai slum dweller, Jamal Malik, took its place among the most celebrated films of our times. Riding on a wave of rave reviews, the film won Hollywood's highest tribute in February 2009, the Academy Award for Best Picture, along with seven more Oscars, including one for British filmmaker Danny Boyle as Best Director. The film earned effusive praise not only for being an enjoyable work of fiction, which it arguably is, but for its potential to give voice to poor and marginalized children such as Jamal, the slumdogs born and raised in India's slums. This essay takes issue with the latter expectation, arguing that, given Slumdog's reductive and demeaning depictions of slums and slum dwellers, there is a much stronger likelihood that the film will work against the interests of those who live and work in India's slums, lending justification to policies that only deepen their distress.

For the new development goals to be effective, it is necessary for institutional reforms to be implemented, as well as for a commitment to be made specifying who is in charge of what in order to achieve the objectives.

A hunger strike that played upon Gandhi's legacy of civil disobedience and mass protest was India's capstone event for 2011. Initiated by Anna Hazare, a 74-year-old self-styled Gandhian, the protest targeted the government's new anti-corruption legislation, which Hazare proclaimed as too weak. Hazare's demand for a strong anti-corruption law, leading to the establishment of an independent ombudsman (Lokpal), had slowly gained momentum in the first half of 2011, when Hazare collected a sizeable following. It was his unexpected arrest on the eve of the August protest, however, that thrust him into the limelight, sparking candle-lit marches across the country and swelling the ranks of his movement, Indian Against Corruption (IAC). Hazare was hailed as a leader of Gandhian proportions and applauded for his humble origins, numerous awards, and ecologically conscious development work in Ralegan Siddhi, where Hazare took up residence in 1975, following a brief career in the army. His movement, which appeared to be climbing from strength to strength, was thought to be a major political force of lasting influence. But in the year since the Ramlila protest, Hazare's movement has lost steam, with key leaders oscillating between calling for a stronger movement based on ‘the people's guidance’ and entertaining the possibility of entering electoral politics through the formation of a new political party. This article investigates the reasons for the deceleration of the Hazare movement, with an emphasis on why Hazare failed to win the support of the liberal and left sections of society, particularly the intelligentsia.