Contributing marginally to the history of economic, this article examines a small episode that illustrates how the "old-fashioned" approach to academic successions led, in 1939, to a clearly suboptimal decision at the University of Lausanne. The unintentional break from what had come before with L & eacute;on Walras, Vilfredo Pareto, and Pasquale Boninsegni paved the way for the brutal demise of the "Lausanne tradition," prompted a redefinition of the boundaries between economics and sociology and, ultimately, initiated a long barren period for the teaching of economics in Walras's former university.

Contributing marginally to the history of economic, this article examines a small episode that illustrates how the “old-fashioned” approach to academic successions led, in 1939, to a clearly suboptimal decision at the University of Lausanne. The unintentional break from what had come before with Léon Walras, Vilfredo Pareto, and Pasquale Boninsegni paved the way for the brutal demise of the “Lausanne tradition,” prompted a redefinition of the boundaries between economics and sociology and, ultimately, initiated a long barren period for the teaching of eco­nomics in Walras’s former university.

Contributing marginally to the history of economic, this article examines a small episode that illustrates how the "old-fashioned" approach to academic successions led, in 1939, to a clearly suboptimal decision at the University of Lausanne. The unintentional break from what had come before with L & eacute;on Walras, Vilfredo Pareto, and Pasquale Boninsegni paved the way for the brutal demise of the "Lausanne tradition," prompted a redefinition of the boundaries between economics and sociology and, ultimately, initiated a long barren period for the teaching of economics in Walras's former university.

Revised version of the honorary member lecture given at the 23rd ESHET

By contrasting Walrasian tatonnement (trial and error) with Vilfredo Pareto's marchandage (bargaining), this contribution examines Pareto's position on the question of the stability of general equilibrium and suggests an explanation for the abandonment of his intuition by modern theorists. In Pareto's terms, bargaining is merely a logical first approximation with no connection to the reality of markets in historical times. Asking why Pareto did not consider it useful to develop his idea of marchandage also helps clarify the status of his pure theory. If it had not been neglected by general equilibrium theorists, his refusal to integrate a stability theorem would perhaps have allowed economic theory to save itself more than thirty years of an exhausting labor leading finally to the negative results of Hugo F. Sonnenschein, Ricardo Mantel and Gerard Debreu.

Cet article examine les usages faits par Pareto de sa théorie économique pure dans la construction de sa sociologie. Après une discussion des différences méthodologiques (discipline quantitative vs discipline qualitative) et de la continuité conceptuelle entre économie pure et sociologie, l’article examine la notion d’utilité (ophélimité), les parallèles entre l’équilibre économique général et l’équilibre social du Traité de sociologie générale pour finalement aborder la difficile réconciliation dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être naissante entre l’optimum parétien et l’utilité sociale maximum. Cette contribution permet de rappeler aux économistes qu’au-delà de la « première approximation » de la théorie du choix rationnel fondée sur des agents pour lesquels la société n’est que « fonctionnelle », Pareto propose en fait une introduction à une théorie de l’action érigée au sein d’une société dans laquelle les individus font preuve d’un degré substantiel de sociabilité.

This contribution examines Sismondi's money, banking and credit theories and explores his public debt analysis (1803-1838) to connect the instability of market economy with his vision of the social contract. A detailed analysis is offered of the evolution in Sismondi's opinion on the nature of money and the banking system, and the part it plays in his trade cycle theory. Sismondi's monetary thought is then contextualised with a discussion of his policy-mix in relation to the Napoleonic war financing in Continental Europe. Connections with the upcoming flood of literature in England on the bullion controversy are also offered. Remarks are then suggested on the progressive emergence of an "art of public borrowing" according to which the people who provide the money also control the government. Finally, some reflections are proposed on the explicit connection established by Sismondi between budget deficits, the (ab-)use of inconvertible paper money and the partial collapse of the social contract initiated by banks and the governments using it. The entrenched instability of a market economy (discussed in an earlier article) is reinforced by the banking/credit system that works along similar line than any wealth-producing firm. Hence, thanks to the financial system, wealth does grow faster but at the expense of social justice.

This article examines the evolution of Sismondi’s price theory as well as his concept of market from 1803 to 1838. Sismondi’s early 1803 price theory in terms of supply and demand is first examined and contrasted with that of Smith in the Wealth of Nations. The progressive alterations brought to this initial formulation are discussed with the help of the relevant chapters from Nouveaux Principes ([1819] 1827) and from Études (1836–1838). In price theory terms, throughout the years Sismondi grew more and more skeptical about the process through which these prices would come about. Connecting this analytical issue with his concept of republican justice, he comes to the conclusion that a market economy characterized by unlimited competition will never lead to a socially desirable solution: such an order is neither efficient, nor natural or spontaneous and political economy is not morally neutral. In short, for Sismondi, the market never stood alone while, for him, the Ricardian approach gave nearly exclusive pride of place to market in the pursuit of wealth and happiness.

En utilisant la théorie calvinienne de l'intérêt, cette note s'intéresse à la doctrine de la prédestination comme l'une des origines possibles de l'autonomisation progressive du concept d'agent rationnel, l'une des pièces centrales de la théorie moderne des prix basée sur la logique de l'échange (dont le taux de l'intérêt n'est finalement qu'une dérivation).

Using as a test the drawn-out liquidity preference vs loanable funds debate between 1936 and 1956, this paper pursues two lines of inquiries: to illustrate first the progressive conquest of Keynesian macroeconomics by general equilibrium techniques to build the neoclassical synthesis; and, second, to evaluate the epistemological status of the general equilibrium model used by the various debaters who were still confused about the connections between formal models and interpretative contents; hence, they systematically overestimated general equilibrium explanatory capabilities.

Book Review| February 01 2020 Much More Than a Mere Optimum: On the Variorum Edition of Vilfredo Pareto’s Manual of Political Economy Manual of Political Economy: A Critical and Variorum Edition. By Pareto, Vilfredo, edited by Montesano, Aldo; Zanni, Alberto; Bruni, Luigino; Chipman, John S.; McLure, Michael. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, xxvi; 664 pp. $185.00. Pascal Bridel Pascal Bridel Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2020) 52 (1): 191–196. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-8009611 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Pascal Bridel; Much More Than a Mere Optimum: On the Variorum Edition of Vilfredo Pareto’s Manual of Political Economy. History of Political Economy 1 February 2020; 52 (1): 191–196. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-8009611 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsHistory of Political Economy Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2020 Duke University Press2020 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.