The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it addresses what urgency and emergency are in their simplest terms; then, it places this in the context of the now very popular metaphor of imprisonment, which supposedly describes what is happening to us today; and in the final steps, it presents the task of critical theory today. Starting from the distinction between urgency and emergency (the main difference being that in the latter case there is an immediate threat or danger to life, health, property, or the environment, while in the case of urgency there is no such immediate threat or danger), the paper proposes the concept of Super-emergency as a name for a (contemporary) situation that is out of control and feeds on our own antagonisms and contradictions. The accompanying atmosphere or mood is the “mood of nightmare”, which also explains why it seems so natural for us today to speak of arrest, imprisonment, or entrapment. By pointing out some consequences of prison metaphors, we suggest in the last part of the paper that it is not only urgent to think about and deal with urgency and emergency per se, but also with their particular deviation – the Super-emergency. Even if we do not have time to think and act differently, as our leaders, the media, and propaganda keep claiming (“now we do not have time to listen, to discuss, to exchange opinions, to talk”), it is precisely urgent situations that provide time for reflection and radical action to reclaim our common future. In other words, what is really urgent and necessary for us now, today, is to free ourselves from this yoke of emergency in which we are trapped and which we call here the Super-emergency.

Tekst se loteva problematike krutosti izhajajoč iz tega, kako ta nastopa v vsakdanji vladajoči ideologiji. Če hočemo izmeriti pulz naše sodobne ideološke krajine, potem ne moremo mimo tega, da jo je nedavno močno pretresla ruska agresija na Ukrajino. Vojna v Ukrajini je bila večkrat označena za kruto, nasploh je krutost nekaj, kar danes soglasno velja za nekaj zavrženega in odvratnega. A za takšno velja tudi mučenje, ki se ga načelno preganja, skrivoma pa izvaja. Enako velja za vojno, ki soglasno velja za kruto. Kaj torej pomeni izjava »vojna v Ukrajini je kruta«, v kakšne kontekste se vpisuje? Tekst se tega vprašanja loteva na več ravneh, ki segajo od sodobnega pojmovanja vojne, krutosti, širšega zgodovinskega konteksta, v katerem izjava nastopa, pa do vprašanja ali to pomeni, da smo v nekem pomenu z eno nogo še vedno trdno v dvajsetem stoletju. Navezujoč se na Badioujevo delo Stoletje, ki izpostavlja vlogo strasti do realnega, vojne (ki naj bi končala vse vojne) in krutosti v dvajsetem stoletju, ta izjava pomeni tudi, da dvajsetega stoletja v nekem pomenu (še) ni konec in da bo morda z vojno v Ukrajini (znova) to stoletje (do)končno obračunalo s samim seboj.

Prispevek izhaja iz vprašanja, od kod izhajajo teze o tem, da nam danes vladajo sadisti, na katere naletimo tako v teorijah zarote kakor tudi v razlagah prevlade nasilja in krutosti v sodobni družbi. Prispevek najprej izpostavi nekatere pomembne spremembe, ki so nedavno nastale na področju politike, ekonomije in družbe (padec berlinskega zidu; viktimizacijo; krizo politike in vzpon neoliberalizma; spremenjeno dinamiko kapitalizma, ki ugrabi in valorizira afekt ter favorizira bizarno; tehnološke spremembe, ki omogočijo nastop novih družbenih medijev; premik obscenosti iz roba v središče; paradokse »konca zgodovine« in zgodovinskega zastoja; pandemijo; sprememba vsesplošnega razpoloženja iz tesnobe v štimungo nočne more, pri kateri je ključen problem užitek Drugega). Nato se loti zgodovinskih premen »sadizma«, ki so skozi 19. in 20. stoletje Sada reducirale na klinično kategorijo, določile pomen »sadizma« kot uživanja v trpinčenju drugih, pri Freudu, freudovcih in Frankfurtski šoli pa skonstruirale termin »sadomazohizem«, ki je bil uporabljen za analizo nacizma in ki ga je kasneje kot skrpucalo, ki s Sadom in Masochom nima nobene zveze, upravičeno kritiziral Deleuze. Posebno vlogo pri tem procesu splošne predstave o sadizmu imajo vojne propagande, klišeji in drugi procesi, ki so zaslužni za to, da je »sadomazohizem« kot spolna praksa in kot moda nedavno postal hkrati nekaj družbeno sprejemljivega, čeprav ima po drugi strani svojo vlogo ne le pri pornifikaciji družbe, temveč tudi pri uveljavitvi skrajno nasilnih oblik pornografije. Ne glede na vse te potvorbe »sadizma« in ne glede na neuporabnost »sadomazohizma« za konkretno analizo delovanja sodobne družbene vezi, pa nek sadizem v splošnem smislu, zlasti glede na vse poprej omenjene družbene in politične spremembe (trole, hejterje), ohranja svojo moč nad družbo. Za podrobnejšo analizo tega je treba vključiti vseprisotna, a malo analizirana fenomena Schadenfreude, zlasti na strani publike, in krutosti kot fenomena, do katerega je družba hkrati distancirana in z njim fascinirana. V tretjem koraku prispevek podrobneje razdela kaj Schadenfreude in krutost sploh sta, ter ju na koncu naveže na Lacanovo pojmovanje objet petit a.

The article starts from the question of where the theses that we are ruled by sadists today come from, both in conspiracy theories and in explanations of the prevalence of violence and cruelty in modem society. The article first highlights some important recent changes in politics, economics, and society (the fall of the Berlin Wall; victimisation; the crisis of politics and the rise of neoliberalism; the changing dynamics of capitalism, which appropriates and valorises affect and favours the bizarre; the new social media; the shift of obscenity from the margins to the centre; the paradoxes of the "end of history" and historical stagnation; the pandemic; the change in the general mood from anxiety to nightmare, in which the main problem is the enjoyment of the Other). The article then looks at the historical changes in the term "sadism", which in the 19th and 20th centuries reduced Sade's work to a clinical category, defined the meaning of "sadism" as the pleasure of torturing others, and constructed the term "sadomasochism" in Freud, the Freudians, and the Frankfurt School. The latter was used to analyse Nazism, and was later rightly criticised by Deleuze as something that had nothing to do with Sade and Masoch. War propaganda, cliches, and other processes play a special role in this process of forming the general conception of sadism; they are also responsible for the fact that "sadomasochism" as a sexual practice and as a fashion has recently become something socially acceptable, although, on the other hand, it has played a part in the "pomification" of society and in the recent enforcement of extremely violent forms of pornography. Notwithstanding all these distortions of sadism and notwithstanding the uselessness of sadomasochism in a concrete analysis of the functioning of modern social bonds, a certain form of sadism in general, especially in the face of all the social and political changes mentioned above (trolls, haters), retains its power over society. To analyse this in more detail, one must include the ubiquitous but little analysed phenomenon of schadenfreude, especially on the part of the public, and cruelty as a phenomenon to which society is both distanced and fascinated. The third step is to explain what schadenfreude and cruelty are and how they relate to l.acan's concept of objet petit a.

“The world” as a concept necessarily involves many difficulties and contradictions. The text presents some of them in a rather circular way, underlining the fact that we are always confronted with the dilemma of what to do with the world, or rather, what, which, and whose world we are dealing with. Beginning with some arguments about the claim that “the world is (out there),” and then moving on to certain dilemmas related to some views on the two-world theory, one inevitably comes across Marx’s thesis that the ultimate goal in relation to the world should be to “change it”. The text also presents some contemporary views thereon of Badiou, Nancy, and Ruda. Taking into account all these arguments and adding insights from Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Adorno as to the world and one’s worldview, we can only agree with Badiou’s statement about the only true goal of philosophy: “Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it.”

Despite Badiou’s constant reference to “the Idea,” there seems to be no systematic presentation of “the Idea” in his opus, which is quite surprising for one of the most systematic philosophers. What is the Idea for Badiou? What does he refer to when he talks about the Idea? What does the Idea stand for in his system; what is it the name of? Departing from Badiou, of course, what I want to do is simply summarize his views, while being fully aware that Badiou himself (perhaps) would not subscribe to my account as presented here. Let me start with Badiou’s recapitulation of the “state of the art” from nearly a decade ago:

There is an ubiquitous belief that Europe is going through some kind of crisis. This is not something new, since Europe-or better, what counts as Europe-seems to be in a state of crisis by definition. What does it mean to claim that, and is the term "crisis" appropriate here? Which crisis and a crisis of what exactly? The trouble is that both words, i.e. "Europe" and "crisis", are fuzzy, and that everything depends on, first, how we define them, and second, how they interrelate. The paper shows how those who continue to use the notoriously slippery term "crisis" to describe the predicaments of today's Europe use it in a very specific way. There is a choice here: either we try to find more appropriate theoretical terms, or we continue to use the term "crisis" backed by our hidden optimistic belief in the future of Europe (as it is today). In that way the cure for Europe's ills and woes is Europe itself, for "Where the danger is grows also what can save us." In other words, the only cure for Europe is the EU, or more EU. The term "crisis" is in such cases but a mask, another name for European neoliberal governance.

The departing point are theses from Lacan's The Triumph of Religion. The text tries to provide elements for its understanding relating it to Lacan's own work as well as some other contexts. Although Lacan's position can be elucidated by different conceptual pairs (psychoanalysis/religion; symptom/world; "what does not go well"/"what goes well"; psychoanalysis /religion) and related to contemporary anxiety and discontents by scientific and technological advancement/progress, the text first points out the context of the word "triumph" in Lacan. It pertains to Imaginary in Lacan's sense, what is also related to Kojeve's Hegel and to "the end of history" (Kojeve). This particular "triumph of religion" is exposed by rather unknown Kojeve's text from 1946, which defines the need for Latin Empire, the project of Kojeve's engagement for what is now known as EU. The contemporary European relation to science and critical theory, a demand for their operationability, omnipresence of evaluation procedures, the Accoyer affair from 2003 in relation to psychoanalysis, put Lacan's claim about "triumph of religion" in a rather different context. The second part of the text points out some key Lacan's claims about science and religion, his thesis on "a true religion", Christianity and atheism. The final part of the text presents yet another context for The Triumph and puts the latter in the context of Benjamin's claim about capitalism as religion defined by its tendency to supress sleep and rest (Crary). This can be achieved only artificially and with the help of pharmacology, drugs and of what Laurent de Sutter names "narcocapitalism".

The starting point of the text is the question how a perversion of crisis 2008 can be understood. It first points out the ambiguity of the very term crisis itself and links it to ambiguity of perversion throughout history. In Lacan perversion is strictly conceived as a structure in which the Other is made to exist. Similar logic can be found in neoliberalism in the figure of the market as always finding solutions. The fetishistic disavowal at work in neoliberalism gets another turn in the crisis, but for it to really work it must be supplemented by what Freud calls 'fausse reconnnaissance', which something foreign and unknown cuts down to well known. With this final turn one can speak about perversion of the crisis.

The text presents the major outlines and theses of David Graeber's book Debt. The First 5000 Years and underlines its major faults. One of the major laudable qualities of this work is that it points out many dimensions of what debt really is, how it has changed throughout history, how we conceive it, and what is interconnected therewith. While it is ambitious and Graeber does overturn many myths and currently established notions, the work turns out to be theoretically and practically too loose in its presentation of the alternatives to the present situation, in its explanation of the causes of the crisis of 2008, as well as the very historical emergence of capitalism and its consequent phases, including the most recent one defined by financialisation and neoliberalism.

The text points out some aspects of the phenomenon of the joke as presented by Freud in his seminal work The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, which is here interpreted as the work which presents the relationship between the signifier and the object/drive. Some basic features of the joke are presented, its similarity with other formations of the unconscious, its specificity, the role of the Other in it and the role of surprise, and the relation between the joke and enjoyment. The paper concludes by linking the phenomenon of the joke with Lacan's interpretation of the drive.

The text tries to show that Ranciere’s rethematisation of aisthesis is also “polemics” with a “hidden interlocutor” – Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze is the exemplary case in philosophy of what Ranciere calls the aesthetic regime of art. The reconstruction of the (inexistent) debate with Deleuze renders manifest not only the philosophical dimensions of the aesthetic regime, but also some open dilemmas and impasses of Ranciere’s own philosophical position. The first part of the text outlines some unexpected parallels between Deleuze and Ranciere, the second presents Ranciere’s critique of Deleuze, the third and final part outlines Deleuze’s Copernican turn, and its consequences, parallels, and differences with Ranciere.

The text tries to show that Ranciere's rethematisation of aisthesis is also "polemics" with a "hidden interlocutor" - Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze is the exemplary case in philosophy of what Ranciere calls the aesthetic regime of art. The reconstruction of the (inexistent) debate with Deleuze renders manifest not only the philosophical dimensions of the aesthetic regime, but also some open dilemmas and impasses of Ranciere's own philosophical position. The first part of the text outlines some unexpected parallels between Deleuze and Ranciere, the second presents Ranciere's critique of Deleuze, the third and final part outlines Deleuze's Copernican turn, and its consequences, parallels, and differences with Ranciere.

The text focuses on two manifestos for philosophy written exactly two decades after one another by Alain Badiou. It centres on the question what the manifestos brought for philosophy as such and what they tell us about certain internal passages of Badiou's own philosophical project. In the first part some consequences of Badiou's appeal to philosophy to take “one more step forward” are highlighted (Wo Ich war, soll $ werden) concerning time, act, and eternity; in the second part through a comparison of the two manifestos some novelties and strategic reasons for their introduction are shown (materialism and the eternality of Ideas).

The text focuses on two manifestos for philosophy written exactly two decades after one another by Alain Badiou. It centres on the question what the manifestos brought for philosophy as such and what they tell us about certain internal passages of Badiou's own philosophical project. In the first part some consequences of Badiou's appeal to philosophy to take "one more step forward" are highlighted (Wo Ich war, soil $ werden) concerning time, act, and eternity; in the second part through a comparison of the two manifestos some novelties and strategic reasons for their introduction are shown (materialism and the eternality of Ideas).

Our point of departing consists of two concepts, pleasure and desire, pointed out by Gilles Deleuze in his analysis and critique of Foucault's work. Foucault responded and hastened to show that his concept of pleasure has nothing in common with either the ordinary understanding of pleasure or with the conception attributed to him by Deleuze. In the essay the question of what Foucault's own conception of pleasure consists of is further elaborated. It turns out, finally, that Foucault in fact appears to be near Deleuze, condemning the idea of pleasure in the Deleuzian vein as a rotten idea, trying to maintain positivity, etc. However, precisely here, where he appears closest to Deleuze, he is also at the same time the farthest from him. Deleuzian desire is namely something "out-of-joint", some-thing which can be properly considered only by departing from the break of Modernity. In other words, Foucault's own theoretical project is in crisis, as diagnosed by Deleuze, precisely because it does not have and it does not want to have a concept of crisis as such.

The paper first situates the conception of quasi-cause within Deleuze's opus, especially concernig Deleuze's reading of Hume and Kant. It then proceeds to the role of quasi-cause in The Logic of Sense and links it with Lacan's differentiation between Cause and law. For Deleuze, the quasi-cause has its role in double causality, it is also something non-reducible on two heterogeneous multiplicties, it splits them from within in an unpredictable and incalculable way. There are certain parallels with Freud's notion of the unconscious here, especially with the dream-work, slips of the tongue, and jokes. However, Deleuze's sudden reversal and critique of psychoanalysis in Anti-OEdipe has to pay a price: it has to generalize the role once played by quasi-cause, link the quasi-cause itself with the capital, domination, and the state aparatus, and assign its role to chaos and becoming, all that in its conviction that this is the true nature of Lacan's objet petit a.