Published conference proceedings are difficult to review because they usually contain a variety of disparate essays of varying quality. Rarely is a reviewer presented with a coherent group of essays that are well written and based on solid research, but that is the case here. Due to space constraints, I will highlight only four.

This study is an analysis of the roots of human savagery, dealing with the fundamental questions of why the majority of violence is perpetrated by men, whether this is a matter of nature or nurture and whether anything can be done about it. The book provides some surprising answers, based on comparison of male violence among human and among man's closest relatives, the great apes. In three or four species, male violence is common, but the form of violence differs: male orangutangs tend to rape, male chimps wage war and male gorillas kill the offspring of other males. Only in the fourth species, the little-known bonobo, are males (as well as females) non-violent - females are co-dominant, there is no observable aggression between groups, and there is a high level and diversity of sexual activity. The findings are based on 30 years of field research on the behaviour and ecology of chimpanzees and other mammals in Africa.

The forgotten of the title is RAF Coastal Command's offensive against German sea-trade between 1940 and 1945. The fortunes of the campaign are followed throughout the war, and its success is then evaluated in terms of the shipping sunk, and the impact on the German economy.

This chapter traces the evolution of strategic doctrine in the Royal Air Force (RAF) between the wars, paying special attention to the concept of morale bombing, how it originated with Trenchard in the First World War, and how it evolved over the next two decades. The RAF had more experience with airpower in World War I, and in operations between the wars, than did most countries. However, the lessons of the war tended to emphasize the importance of tactical air operations, reconnaissance, artillery spotting, ground support, and air cover over the battlefield. Trenchard's views on the importance of strategic airpower had solidified since the war. This was due to several factors: there was no longer a British army in Flanders dependent on airpower for its survival, aircraft capabilities had increased, and if a goal of the RAF was to remain a separate service, then it stood to reason that a separate mission was necessary.

During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

Giulio Douhet has long been acknowledged as one of the world's foremost airpower theorists. His insights into the use of the airplane in war, and his predictions on the form future wars would take, were among the first to be clearly articulated and presented to the public. Yet, he remains an elusive and vaguely understood figure. Only a handful of his many dozens of works have been translated into English, and very little is known about his personal and professional life. Moreover, analysis of Douhet's works is not only dated-the excellent study by Bernard Brodie was published over three decades ago-but gives undue emphasis to the issue of nuclear weapons and their effect on Douhet's ideas. It is necessary to reassess his theories in the light of modem war, whose dominant characteristics are not nuclear weapons, but precision munitions, stealth technology, rapidity of application, and the ability to strike at great range. The Gulf War would seem to indicate that Douhet's arguments regarding the dominance of airpower in modem war may at last have some validity.

For centuries man has attempted to soften war's effects through moral and legal strictures. Nonetheless, when a nation's survival is at stake, laws and morals are often forgotten. That happened in World War II, and strategic bombing was singled out as being particularly horrible. Unfortunately and for various reasons, attempts to legislate war since then have met with little success. This article argues that the West has not employed airpower either illegally or immorally, and that airwar is not more inhumane or indiscriminate than other forms of war. In fact, as aerial weapons have become increasingly precise, they have acted to dramatically decrease civilian casualties and collateral damage. Rather than attempting to restrict air weapons, which has been the thrust of a number of legal efforts, jurists should instead concentrate on limiting those weapons and means of warfare that are considerably more deadly and destructive.

The International History Review - ...carefully, and intelligently, summarizes the major plans from 1945 through about 1952. Military History - I especially recommend this book to students seeking a concise overview of the war in its operational aspects, and to any reader interested in the military history of the World War II period. Military Review - a useful addition to the military readers library This scholarship is of the greatest significance...Rodd provides by far the best available overview of the subject and offers the most authoritative judgements...his book should be required reading in the military academies, the staff colleges, and the senior war colleges. - Journal of Military History