This chapter examines the notion of power in relation to authority and the state. Power and authority are central concepts in politics. Politics is about competing interests and values, and this requires knowing something about power, since those who have power over others can determine which interests and values will be adopted by political decision-makers. The chapter first considers the link between power and authority before discussing the classic threefold typology of authority proposed by Max Weber: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal–rational authority. It then explores some conceptual questions about power; for example, whether it is the same as force, or whether it must be exercised deliberately. It also evaluates the methodological problems inherent in the measurement of power, particularly in relation to the different theories of the state such as pluralism, elitism, and Marxism.
Introduction 1. Animal ethics 2. Radicalism and revival the animal protection movement since the 1970s 3. Captives, companions and the law 4. Animal agriculture 5. Animals, medical science and consumer protection 6. Wildlife conservation 7. Animal protection and public policy 8. Animal liberation and direct action Conclusion
Abstract This review seeks to locate Vink's book, The Open Society and Its Animals, within the wider terrain of the political turn in animal ethics. It explains what is meant by a nonanthropocentric interspecies theory of democracy, and how it might be justified, and sets out Vink's distinction between the political and legal representation of animals together with her preference for the latter. While agreeing that there is a strong case for a nonanthropocentric theory of democracy, and that an enfranchisement model is preferable to one based on citizenship, the review argues that Vink overestimates the problems associated with the political enfranchisement of animals and underestimates the difficulties associated with their legal enfranchisement.
This chapter seeks to explore various dimensions of the debate about the political representation of animals. In the first place, it locates the representation of animals within the broader terrain of the political turn in animal ethics. Following this, the chapter considers the normative case for animal representation—and the consequences for democratic theory—and reviews the alternative means whereby it can be operationalised. It is argued that, contrary to Donaldson and Kymlicka, the enfranchisement model is preferable to the citizenship model and, contrary to Vink, that the political enfranchisement of animals is preferable to the legalistic alternative. This chapter concludes by outlining possible future research agendas.
This chapter serves three main functions. First, it identifies the ten core members of the Oxford Group, and documents their backgrounds and the circumstances of their arrival in the city of Oxford. The Oxford Group consisted of three married couples: Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch, Peter and Renata Singer, and Richard and Mary Keshen. Next were the three singletons who shared a house in Oxford: John Harris, David Wood, and Michael Peters. Finally, and slightly more at the periphery—partly because of his age and partly because he was not an Oxford student (or married to one)—there was Richard Ryder. Second, it describes the formation of the Oxford Group and the key role played by the gatekeepers. Here, a dynamic role was played by the Godlovitches and by Brigid Brophy who did most to bring the group together Finally, the role of what Farrell describes as the “magnet place,” in our case Oxford—and the university in particular—is dissected. The importance of access to a major seat of learning that had a unparalled reputation in the field of philosophy and which was at the forefront of the development of a new field of applied ethics is documented.
This chapter explores what animal ethics has to say about the issue of captivity. The best-known version of animal rights morally prohibits all use of animals, including confinement. One obvious response is to reject animal rights in favor of a traditional animal welfare ethic. It is argued in this chapter, however, that there are two ways it is possible to justify animal captivity from an animal rights perspective. The first involves the adoption of a more nuanced, interest-based, rights theory. This allows us to claim that animals do not have a strong enough interest in liberty to be accorded a right not to be kept in captivity. The second involves the adoption of a non-ideal theory of animal rights. This allows us to bracket liberty, and therefore the issue of captivity, as a component of an ideal theory and therefore not of immediate ethical concern.
This chapter examines the extent to which Peter Singer’s intellectual development can be explained by the formal academic environment. It therefore provides a case study testing the explanatory validity of the research school model (focusing on the hierarchical relationship within an academic setting in which the mentor/protégé relationship is the norm) as opposed to the collaborative circle friendship group model. Particular attention is placed on the role of Singer’s academic supervisor, the philosopher R. M. Hare. It is argued that Hare’s role was important in a number of ways but there were limits to his influence on Singer. In particular, Hare wrote little about animal ethics and was only a lukewarm vegetarian. Moreover, while both were utilitarians, Singer did not derive his utilitarianism from Hare.
Farrell’s model of a collaborative circle predicts that much of the creative work is conducted within pairings in which instrumental intimacy—the sharing of unpublished and often unwritten ideas—occurs. This chapter examines two key such pairings in the Oxford Group, between Peter Singer and Ros Godlovitch, and between Peter Singer and Richard Ryder. The chapter considers the impact on Singer’s intellectual development of his association with the Oxford Group in general and Ryder and Ros Godlovitch in particular. It demonstrates how the transformation in Singer’s thinking about animals was startling. He learned from Godlovitch and Ryder in particular but, at the same time, he impacted their thought too. It is plausible to suggest that Singer’s participation in the Oxford Group was a vital component of his emergence as the most important animal ethicist.
Combining theory, comparative politics, and international relations, Introduction to Politics provides an introduction to the subject. It covers both comparative politics and international relations, and contextualises this material with a wide range of international examples. The text takes a balanced approached to the subject, serving as a strong foundation for further study. The material is explored in an accessible way for introductory study, but takes an analytical approach which encourages more critical study and debate. Topics range from political power and authority to democracy, political obligation, freedom, justice, political parties, institutions and states, and global political economy
This chapter examines the claim that democracy is the ideal form of political obligation. It first traces the historical evolution of the term ‘democracy’ before discussing the debate between advocates of the protective theory and the participatory theory of democracy, asking whether it is possible to reconcile elitism with democracy and whether participatory democracy is politically realistic. The chapter proceeds to explain why democracy is viewed as the major grounding for political obligation, with emphasis on the problem of majority rule and what to do with the minority consequences of majoritarianism. It documents the contemporary malaise experienced by democracy and seeks to explain its perceived weaknesses as a form of rule. Finally, the chapter describes the new directions that democratic theory has taken in recent years, focusing on four theories: associative democracy, cosmopolitan democracy, deliberative democracy, and ecological democracy.
Abstract This book is an account of the life and times of a loose friendship group (later christened the Oxford Group) of ten people, primarily postgraduate philosophy students, who attended the University of Oxford for a short period of time from the late 1960s. The Oxford Group, which included—most notably—Peter Singer and Richard Ryder, set about thinking about, talking about, and promoting the idea of animal rights and vegetarianism. The group therefore played a role, largely undocumented and unacknowledged, in the emergence of the animal rights movement and the discipline of animal ethics. Most notably, the group produced an edited collection of articles published as Animals, Men and Morals in 1971 that was instrumental in one of their number—Peter Singer—writing Animal Liberation in 1975, a book that has had an extraordinary influence in the intervening years. The book serves as a case study of how the emergence of important work and the development of new ideas can be explained, and, in particular, how far the intellectual development of individuals is influenced by their participation in a creative community.
This chapter describes the subsequent lives and careers of the group of ethical vegetarians who met at Oxford. More analytically, it seeks to consider how influential their crusade for animal rights has been, focusing on the impact of Singer’s Animal Liberation. In short, it is difficult to quantify the contribution made by the Oxford Group, and Singer’s work in particular, to the revitalization of the animal protection movement since the 1970s. Clearly, Animal Liberation has had a considerable influence, for some acting as a catalyst for the way they see the world, and for others reinforcing, and giving structure to, their already existing disquiet at the way animals are treated. It is extremely likely, however, that the considerable strides made by the animal protection movement (documented in this chapter) would have happened anyway even if the Oxford Group, and Singer’s work on animal ethics, had not existed.