Centralization represents the historical response of political elites to overcome the difficulties of coordination when faced with an external threat. Yet, we know little about the demand side of authority distribution in the context of a crisis. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of the effect of crises and coordination inefficiencies on the territorial preferences of individuals. We predict that crisis-time uncoordinated responses will prompt a centralizing shift in preferences. We tested this argument using online survey experiments in a comparative sample of 13 countries in the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic. The results show that exposure to unsuccessful intergovernmental coordination shifted individual preferences toward a more centralized power allocation in a majority of countries. This effect is moderated by contextual conditions, such as actual multilevel policy efforts and changes in the intensity of the pandemic. Individual-level territorial identity or partisan identification also intervenes as a significant moderator of our treatment.

The study of electoral competition of populist radical right (PRR) parties has mostly focused on the national and supranational levels, leaving the subnational arena unexplored. This article contributes to filling this gap by theorizing on PRR parties’ strategic behaviour in regional elections and testing the hypotheses using the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a case study. Combining new Regional Manifestos Project data with a qualitative exploration, the article shows that the AfD has adapted to a regional frame of competition in different ways. While its radical conservatism on cultural issues is cross-regionally homogenous, the positions in other dimensions do significantly vary across Länder, revealing a mix of economically rightist and leftist positions as well as a mix of national and regional identity appeals. The latter are combined with differentiated and conflictive competential demands. These findings pave the way for a more ambitious research agenda on PRR substate competition, which so far has been limited by the lack of comparable data.

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EDITORIAL article Front. Polit. Sci., 11 October 2022Sec. Elections and Representation Volume 4 - 2022 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.1053249

Abstract How do voters want their governments to respond when another country unilaterally withdraws from an international institution? We distinguish between negotiation approaches that vary in the degree to which they accommodate the withdrawing state's demands and argue that negotiation preferences are shaped by two issues. The first is voters’ exposure to the costs and benefits of accommodation. This exposure varies across issues, and we argue that citizens will generally prefer non-accommodation on zero-sum issues, but support more accommodation on cooperation issues, where non-accommodation puts existing cooperation gains at risk. Second, withdrawal negotiations create precedents, and citizens should therefore be less willing to accommodate the more they are concerned about the ripple effects of accommodation on the institution's stability. These concerns also confront citizens with two types of dilemmas depending on how favorably they view the institution themselves. To test our argument, we use survey evidence and a conjoint experiment conducted in Germany and Spain during the Brexit negotiations. We find that respondents overall are more willing to accommodate the UK on cooperation issues than on zero-sum issues, but also find evidence that Euroskeptics and Europhiles confront different issue-specific dilemmas. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics surrounding the challenges to multilateralism that have proliferated in recent years.

In this chapter we explore attribution of responsibility in multilevel systems from a threefold perspective. First, we explore individuals’ knowledge on who is responsible for what, the empirical challenges to measure it and its effects upon electoral accountability. Second, we shift the focus towards politicians and explore the blame attribution game in federal entities. We argue that, under some circumstances, politicians’ blame shifting strategies might help to achieve good policy outcomes. Finally, we analyse the role of group identities in biasing individuals’ attribution of responsibility. Using experimental evidence based on the Spanish case we show the impact of partisan identities in the assignment of responsibility for the management of the Covid19 pandemic. We also provide an original empirical analysis that shows that increasing polarization in Spain has resulted in a more prominent use of partisan cues in the assignment of responsibilities. © Ignacio Lago 2021.

One of the most significant economic trends in the last decades has been the integration of countries in international markets. What have been the consequences of global economic integration upon the territorial organization of the states? Has it contributed to centralize powers or to further decentralization? The literature so far has provided inconclusive evidence. In this article we shed new light on the relationship between economic globalization and territorial politics by using a varied source of data such as the Regional Authority Index, and the KOF indices of globalization for the period 1970–2010. Results show that economic globalization is positively associated to decentralization, particularly in those countries with more regionalist parties and where levels of inequality are lower.

Voters in many advanced democracies increasingly dislike their political opponents, a phenomenon that is known as affective polarisation. The growing animosity between electorates is particularly challenging in multiparty systems, where ruling is more dependent on cross-party alliances. In this work, we examine the case of Spain, a multiparty democracy that exhibits one of the highest levels of affective polarisation among advanced democracies. Using public opinion databases as well as extensive qualitative evidence, we operationalise and explore the evolution of affective polarisation in the Spanish electorate and its main drivers, with a particular focus on the competition for the left–wing electorate between the PSOE and Podemos during the 2015–2020 period.

Multilevel governance challenges some of the essential mechanisms to make democratic accountability work. On the one hand, citizens may struggle to assign responsibility for policy outcomes when powers are fragmented between different levels of government. On the other hand, in light of this institutional complexity, citizens may resort more frequently to their cognitive biases – such as partisanship– to assign credit and blame for policy outcomes, whereas political elites may face higher incentives to engage blame-avoidance strategies that in turn complicate responsibility assignments. This chapter delves into the accountability challenges of multilevel governance in Spain, exploring its mechanisms and analyzing variation in individual responsibility assignments and preferences over multilevel governance.

Exogenous threats pose a formidable coordination challenge to federations, as they compel governments at all levels to cooperate to prevent a collective risk. As the vertical fragmentation of powers complicates a coordinated response, we here argue that the central government becomes the focal point of the solution. In search of a more effective response against the threat, citizens coordinate their preferences around the centralization of authority boundaries in the federation. We test this argument using an on-line survey experiment in Spain, a country where the threat caused by COVID-19 has operated on top of non-negligible internal threats. The empirical analysis shows that exposure to vertical coordination failures prompt citizens to support a centralized redrawing of authority boundaries, though this effect is importantly conditioned by respondents’ ideology and territorial preferences. Our findings suggest that shocks may represent turning points for the stability of federations, as citizens demands for a redrawing of authority might be followed by beneficial or opportunistic adjustments of authority.

This paper shows that the role of national electoral dynamics on regional elections is highly mediated by institutional and electoral constraints at the regional level. Using data on statewide parties’ electoral competition in regional and national elections in Spain and Italy, results show that the contamination of regional elections is lower in regions where decentralization has travelled further and where strong regionalist parties dominate electoral competition. The paper also shows that these two channels -more regional authority and more regionalist competition- shape the regional manifestos of statewide parties by increasing their pro-regional positions. These findings represent a contribution to a better understanding of the extent to which regional elections are a separate electoral arena from the national one.

In devolved contexts, people may get it wrong in their responsibility assignments because they are unsure about who does what or because they filter their attributions of credit and blame through their political lenses. This paper theorises about these two mechanisms and tests the role of cognitive bias in moderating responsibility judgements in multilevel systems. Using a survey experiment on responsibility attribution for the NHS outcomes in Scotland and Wales, results show that partisanship is the strongest bias of responsibility assignments between regional and central authorities. Yet national identity also operates as cognitive bias, a role that so far has been theoretically and empirically overlooked in the literature. The empirical findings point to the role of partisanship and identity ascognitive guides to make responsibility judgements in complex institutional setting, such as the one that emerges from increasing devolution in the United Kingdom.

This paper explores the effect of national partisanship and Euroscepticism on individuals' causal responsibility attribution in European multilevel democracies. It is particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 European Election Studies, results show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer period.

The rise of regional governments in Europe has been often espoused on democratic grounds. Yet the democratic promise of political decentralization should be evaluated in light of its potential undermining effects upon the essential mechanism to make accountability work: citizens' capacity to assign responsibility for policy outcomes. People may get it wrong when assigning responsibility because they are not sure who is responsible for policy outcomes when powers are vertically fragmented between different levels of government and/or simply because their responsibility judgements are biased by political beliefs, which act as lenses through which attribution is filtered. How can we then make electoral accountability work in decentralized systems? This paper will explore this question by delving into the most important theoretical and empirical challenges in the study of attribution of responsibility and electoral accountability in decentralized contexts. At the theoretical level, there is still need of a better understanding of the relationship between federal institutional conditions and individuals' use of cognitive bias to cope with institutional complexity when assigning responsibility. The empirical challenge is to overcome the lack of comparable individual-level data on responsibility attribution for a broad range of country cases. This article is part of the April 2018 Symposium titled Shaping and Breaking Political Systems? How the Rise of Regions is Transforming Politics in Europe', which also includes Regionalization and the Transformation of Policies, Politics, and Polities in Europe by Michael Tatham and Heather A.D. Mbaye (DOI: ), The Rise of Regional Influence in the EU - From Soft Policy Lobbying to Hard Vetoing by Michael Tatham (DOI: ), Rethinking European Elections: The Importance of Regional Spillover Into the European Electoral Arena by Arjan H. Schakel (DOI: ) and Breaking-up within Europe: Sub-state Nationalist Strategies in Multilevel Polities by Daniel Cetra and Robert Lineira (DOI: ).

There is a large body of research showing that the provision of social policies is higher under proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian systems. This article helps advance this literature by showing that the geographic distribution of social recipients plays an essential role in moderating the impact of electoral institutions on social provision. Using data from twenty-two OECD countries, the results show that majoritarian systems increase the provision of social spending when recipients are concentrated in certain regions. When levels of concentration are high, social spending in majoritarian countries can surpass levels of provision in proportional representation systems.

This paper reviews the most important characteristics and of the Spanish Intergovernmental Councils (IGCs) and theorizes about the effect of the increasing fragmentation of the party system on the nature and dynamics of multilateral bargaining in IGCs. The essential argument is that party system fragmentation may have an impact on IGCs through its effect on the formation of minority and coalition governments. These types of governments may put an end to the two-bloc confrontation, bring to the system higher levels of party congruence between levels of government and lower the costs of compromise, three factors that may help to grease the bargaining process and, in turn, enhance the achievement of intergovernmental cooperation agreements. The positive effect will be conditional on several factors, namely the ideological coherence of inter-party alliances, the predominant type of government in the system (coalition or single-party minority) and the duration of governments.

The literature on party system nationalisation has yet to provide a better understanding of the impact of short-term factors upon the nationalisation of politics. This article helps to fill this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system nationalisation. The argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalisation by amplifying territorial variation in preferences for redistribution, limiting political parties’ capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960–2011 period confirm this hypothesis and show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated with a decrease in levels of party system nationalisation in the next election. The result is robust to variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of nationalisation. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic conditions on the nationalisation of politics, whereas any moderating effect of electoral system proportionality on the economy is not found.