There is a large body of scholarship that probes the association of elite messaging and motivated reasoning with political behavior. Few studies, though, consider how these factors relate to validated mass behavior. Leveraging two national surveys, we assess voter alignment with President Trump and who voted by mail (VBM). Drawing on 2016 and 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES) data, we analyze the likelihood that Trump supporters: (1) voted by mail, (2) self-reported voting by mail, and (3) self-reported not voting by mail when they did (misreporting VBM). In 2016, candidate Trump spoke of a "rigged" election, but it was in the 2020 contest that President Trump indicted VBM as the principal reason he might lose reelection. Analyzing VBM before (2016) and during (2020) Trump's attack on this vote method suggests that leader opinion activation shaped the views of Trump voters and their actual voting behavior. In 2020, Trump supporters were markedly less likely to cast a VBM ballot and were also significantly more likely to disclaim voting by mail when they actually did. These findings have important implications regarding the extent to which purported and verified mass political behavior comports with leader-directed messaging.

What explains the Republican shift in Florida? Drawing on an original dataset-the result of processing and deciphering millions of registered voters' place of birth as recorded on their voter registration forms-we consider the party registration of migrants to the Sunshine State over each of the past dozen years. In addition to documenting that more recent voter election cycles reflect a growing trend in favor of GOP registration in Florida by those not born in the state, our findings are reinforced by logistic regression models controlling for demographic characteristics of registrants who migrated to Florida from 2012 to 2024. We also examine survey data to show Sunshine State newcomers are more aligned with the Republican Party. The recent shift to GOP registration in Florida is remarkable and uniform: migrants from Democratic northeastern states are now nearly as likely to register as Republicans as midwestern migrants who have long been more likely to register with the GOP upon moving to Florida. Notably, we find a sharp increase in Republican registrations occurring after the election of Governor Ron DeSantis in 2018-who was elevated by Donald Trump's endorsement-indicating that rising in-migrant GOP registration may be as predicated upon DeSantis' promise of a "Free State of Florida" as the perennial search for Ponce de Le & oacute;n's mythical "Fountain of Youth."

As partisanship strengthens in the United States, unaffiliated voter registration is also increasing. We conducted an original survey experiment to understand voter registration choices among registered voters in Florida and North Carolina, two states with substantial shares of unaffiliated registrants and persistent partisan polarization, but with differing primary participation rules. Institutionally, Florida holds closed primaries where only those registered with a political party may participate in the respective primary for that party. North Carolina holds semi-closed primaries that allow those not registered with a political party (i.e., unaffiliated registrants) to vote in party primary elections. The results of our experiment demonstrate that institutional context matters. Specifically, informing respondents of primary participation rules shapes voter registration recommendations. Among registrants who identify as independents, exposure to Florida's closed primary rule causes them to be more likely to recommend party registration, whereas awareness of the semi-closed North Carolina primary rule makes independents and partisans more likely to advise unaffiliated registration. However, in the absence of information explaining rules for primary participation, respondents are more likely to suggest that their friend register in alignment with their own political identity. In summary, our study provides valuable insights into how registration choices are conditioned by political identities and exposure to treatments that emphasize political conditions and primary participation rules.

For decades, in most states with a party registration option, the percentage of voters registering as unaffiliated with a major political party has steadily increased. But who are these registered voters in these polarized partisan times, and why might they register without a major party? We address these questions by drawing on parallel large-N original surveys of registered voters in two southeastern states experiencing a notable rise in registered independents but with different electoral rules for unaffiliated registrants. The closed primary rule in Florida reflects a much greater share of major party registrants versus North Carolina, which has a semi-closed primary rule. Nevertheless, even with these different primary laws, in both states we find that the decision not to register with a major party strongly covaries with identity as a political independent. Hence, registration rules may alter registration patterns, but individuals claiming to be less attached to a major party are markedly more likely to manifest this position by registering unaffiliated.

We analyze AP VoteCast survey data to determine if opinions toward the 2020 presidential election shaped participation and vote choice in the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff contests. Specifically, we estimate the impact of election denial and voter confidence on self-reported participation and voter preferences in the 2021 Georgia Senate runoffs. Election denial dampened the likelihood of voting in the 2021 Georgia Senate runoffs, and particularly among respondents aligned with President Trump. With respect to vote choice in these contests, election denial sided more with Republican preferences, whereas voter confidence increased Democratic support. This research highlights how opinions toward the 2020 presidential election registered notable effects on political behavior in the ensuing Georgia Senate runoffs, which decided partisan control of Congress' upper chamber.

Despite a growing national conversation about redistricting reform and an increasing number of political hobbyists making redistricting one of the most debated topics in American politics, we know surprisingly little about what citizens think about redistricting. Using original survey data on over 1,300 South Carolinians, we discover that many respondents remain agnostic or uninformed about the redistricting process. Across six models, partisanship is a key driver of South Carolinians' opinions on redistricting, with Republicans expressing more support for the current process than Democrats in this deep red state. We also discover that Black South Carolinians have distinct and generally more circumspect impressions of the redistricting process, particularly regarding descriptive representation. These findings will interest academics and practitioners who work in the areas of election science, public opinion, election law, and redistricting, and can inform our knowledge of how the public might respond to the United States Supreme Court decision in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP.

ObjectiveWe make use of multiple data sources to examine whether there has been geographical polarization in the political behavior of Texas Hispanics from 2012 to 2022. It is widely known that partisan divisions in the American electorate continue to cleave along geographic lines. However, much of this literature on the urban-rural divide does not focus on a specific racial group, and if it does, then it typically highlights differences among non-Hispanic white voters (Anglos).MethodsMaking use of aggregate- and individual-level data, we assess Texas Hispanics' party affiliation, participation, and vote choice according to geographic location.ResultsWe find notable evidence of geographic-based partisan polarization among Texas' burgeoning Hispanic population.ConclusionsAlthough the movement of rural/small town Texas Hispanics toward the Republican Party from 2012 to 2022 pales in comparison to this shift among Texas Anglos, a similar partisan dynamic manifests among the former group. We abstain from using the word realignment to characterize these changes in Texas Hispanics' political behavior according to geographic location, but, nevertheless, it is clear that the Democratic Party's hold on this potentially pivotal group in the Lone Star State's electorate has loosened, and especially among rural/small town Latinos since the rise of Donald Trump.

In this article, we examine individual- and state-level voter confidence in Georgia from 2020 to 2022-an extremely contentious moment in Georgia politics. For the first time in 28 years, Georgia's electoral votes went to a Democrat, Joe Biden, in 2020. Then, in early January 2021, Democrats won both of Georgia's two U.S. Senate runoffs, giving their party majority control. In the wake of these surprising, historic, and consequential losses, Georgia Republicans' voter confidence plummeted, and their party responded by passing comprehensive electoral reform in Senate Bill (SB) 202. Using survey data, we tracked voter confidence in Georgia before and after 2020, after passage of SB 202 in 2021, and after the 2022 midterm. Partisans' voter confidence is greatly affected by the winner/loser effect in election outcomes. Also, SB 202 did boost Republicans' confidence in Georgia's election system, which, in turn, increased their individual- and state-level voter confidence in the 2022 midterm. In contrast, Georgia Democrats overwhelmingly opposed SB 202; therefore, the bill did not have the same salutary effect on their voter confidence in the 2022 elections.

Voters use salient issues to inform their vote choice. Using 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES) data, we analyze how short-, medium-, and long-term issues informed the vote for president in the 2020 election, which witnessed record-setting participation. To explain the dynamics of presidential vote choice, we employ a voter typology advanced by Key (1966). Specifically, compared to standpatters, who in 2020 registered the same major party vote as in 2016, we find that new voters in 2020 and voters switching their preferences from 2016 cast their ballots in favor of Democrat Joe Biden. In the end, President Donald Trump was denied reelection by new voters and vote switchers principally because certain issues had a notable effect in moving their presidential preferences in the Democratic direction.

Redistricting is the causal agent responsible for two incumbents facing off in U.S. House elections and hence, despite the rarity of these matchups, they occur periodically due to district boundary changes. In this article, we examine who wins a recent and highly competitive incumbent duel: the 2024 GOP primary in Alabama’s congressional district (CD) 1. Our assessment of this race marks the first academic study to marshal large-N survey data for the purpose of gauging voter preferences in a dueling incumbent primary. This approach gives us a clearer understanding of what accounts for the outcome of a highly contentious and extremely close election. Our findings suggest the incumbency advantage was overridden by voter alignment with the MAGA wing of the Republican Party, which produced a narrow victory for the more MAGA/Trump-positioned candidate in this race.

In the aftermath of Republicans’ stinging losses in 2020 and 2021, which contributed to relinquishing the presidency and U.S. Senate majority, respectively, Georgia’s GOP lawmakers passed comprehensive electoral reform in Senate Bill (SB) 202. In this Field Note, we outline SB 202’s major provisions, and then present results of a survey querying Georgia local election officials (LEOs) to assess how SB 202 affected administrative performance in the 2022 midterm elections. Unquestionably, SB 202’s raft of reforms greatly altered Georgia’s administrative apparatus, but it is anything but clear that these changes in the aggregate either improved or detracted from the system it replaced. Indeed, the most credible judgment rendered from LEOs, is that administrative performance is case-specific, and therefore highly contingent upon the reform of interest.

Recent scholarship on the American South emphasizes how changing settlement patterns affect party politics. Specifically, places with high population growth are shifting toward the Democratic Party whereas localities shedding residents favor Republicans. This insight is important but also in need of empirical refinement. In this study, we examine settlement patterns and changes in the racial composition of the southern electorate at three different units of analysis: states, counties, and individuals with an original survey of respondents residing in the South. We include place-specific variables indicating where respondents grew up and where they currently live to gain a more accurate picture of how settlement patterns are altering the southern electorate.

This article chronicles and analyzes the changing state of party affiliation in the American South from the 1990s to the present. Party identification (PID) is examined with data from three survey sources: the American National Election Study (ANES), Cooperative Election Study (CES), and Exit Polls (national and state-level). Emphasis is placed on the changing PID patterns of white, Black, and Hispanic voters South-wide and in individual states. The findings strongly suggest that the current position of Republican electoral dominance will persist for some time to come, though there are multiple reasons why, in certain parts of the South, Democratic affiliation will likely increase.