The Liberal International Order (LIO) has proven to be remarkably resilient in its history since World War II and has managed to thrive in the face of previous deep contestations. It is premature to count the LIO out on the basis of contemporary deep contestations. This chapter starts with a brief history of the LIO and then discusses three causes of these contestations: intrusiveness without inclusiveness, inequality, and incapacity (to solve urgent global problems). In addition, there are the regime survival interests of autocratic powers, whether rising (China) or in decline (Russia). The chapter also looks at possible sources of resilience for the LIO. The LIO survives depending on (1) the reaction by LIO defenders to the deep contestations; (2) the reform of crucial LIO institutions towards greater inclusiveness; and (3) effective institutional solutions with regard to tackling both global inequalities and the existential threat of climate change.

AbstractThis chapter analyzes US foreign policy with regard to the liberal international order since the early 2000s. US partial retrenchment from global leadership did neither start with Trump nor did it end when he lost his re-election in 2020. It already became visible during the Obama administration while Biden’s attempts to restore US global leadership have been limited. We concentrate on two explanations for the increasing selectivity and retrenchment of US foreign policy: The first focuses on international factors, emphasizing the relative decline of US power and primacy as well as the rise of China. This account is indeterminate and is ultimately incapable of explaining US withdrawal from global leadership. The second account points to US domestic politics and the increasing polarization and negative partisanship inside the US which is documented throughout this volume. Domestic developments inside the country largely explain US selectivity and increasing retrenchment from global leadership.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has thrust the issue of European Union and NATO enlargement back into the political spotlight. However, it remains uncertain whether established theoretical frameworks are still applicable in today's rapidly changing world. In response to this uncertainty, this debate section brings together five short reflection pieces, with a response from Frank Schimmelfennig, to assess the relevance of the theory of 'rhetorical action' in light of recent developments in European and international politics. How effectively does rhetorical action explain current EU and NATO enlargement processes, as well as broader forms of international cooperation? The authors find strong overall support for the theory's continued validity. However, they caution that the increasing politicisation of issues, the rising competition from populist, non-liberal forces, and the broader crisis of the Liberal International Order require more careful reflection and specification of the scope conditions that define the theory's limits.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

AbstractThis chapter brings together the research of Detlef Jahn on political parties with his seminal contribution to diffusion research. We argue that diffusion does not only help to account for the populist tide in Europe. It also allows to open up research on political parties for a more global perspective.KeywordsPolitical parties(right-wing) populismDiffusion researchEuropeanizationDiffusion mechanisms

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

This article contributes to two debates about international relations (IR) as a discipline: first, how global is IR, and how is it structured? Second, what is the state of theory in IR? We conducted (co-) citation analyses of both Web of Science (WoS) and—for the first time— non-WoS publications from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. With regard to the first question, we find that global IR resembles a core–periphery structure as a “hub and spoke” system whereby transatlantic core nodes are interconnected to each other and to some periphery nodes, while the periphery nodes are connected to the core but not to each other. IR scholarship in the periphery quotes the transatlantic theory cluster but is not linked to each other, not even in the same region. Knowledge produced in the periphery has to go through the transatlantic core in order to be recognized globally. As to the transatlantic core, we identify two major (co-) citation clusters: one committed to IR theory-building across issue areas from a variety of perspectives and the other focused on security studies with a strong emphasis on quantitative methods. With regard to the second question, global IR hangs together through references to the IR theory cluster consisting of North American and European authors who appear to define what IR theory is. Scholars in the periphery refer to this transatlantic IR theory cluster when engaging in theory-building. IR theories have become rather diverse and pluralistic, even in the core. While scholars still refer to the big “isms,” they use them around the globe in a synthesizing manner.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Electron-assisted hydroxylation of single-crystalline silica bilayer films grown on Ru(0001) is studied by high-resolution electron energy loss spectroscopy (HREELS) and electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) spectroscopy. The HREELS results reveal the formation of several hydroxyl species whose number and speciation depend on the defect structure of the film. For incomplete bilayer films, which exhibit nanometer-sized holes in the bilayer, the level of hydroxylation is significantly larger than for complete films. HREEL spectra taken in off-specular geometry provide evidence for the presence of hydroxyl groups with a transition dipole moment almost parallel to the surface for complete and incomplete bilayer films. Hydroxylation with isotopically labeled water ((H2O)-O-18) reveals a clear difference between the two cases-OH species on the incomplete film almost exclusively contain oxygen from water, while the more ideal film exhibits OH groups with oxygen atoms stemming from both water and the silica film. These observations not only indicate that the degree of hydroxylation is significantly enhanced for the incomplete film but also that the reaction mechanism for hydroxylation at defect sites of this film is different. To gain insight into the reaction mechanism of electron-assisted hydroxylation, in situ EPR spectroscopy of electron-bombarded adsorbed ice layers was combined with infrared (IR) spectroscopy and mass spectrometry. We show that the electron bombardment removes a significant part of the water layer and produces different reactive paramagnetic species, namely, O2D, D, and solvated electrons, which may be trapped at low temperatures. The interaction of the silica film with such species may lead to splitting Si-O bonds even for covalently saturated silica structures as found in the ideal bilayer film and thus provide insight into possible reaction mechanisms.

Areas of limited statehood where central government authorities lack the capacity of implementing and enforcing decisions and/or lack the monopoly over the means of violence, are ubiquitous. However, these areas are neither ungovernable nor ungoverned. Enormous variation exists, that includes badly governed places but also “good governance” in areas of limited statehood, sometimes separated only by a few blocks. Effective governance (public service provision, rule-making) depends on three factors: legitimacy; social trust relations within communities; and adequate design of institutions, including financial resources. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) should thus focus on building governance capacity rather than further engaging in state-building, which has failed despite substantial investments. If the central state is autocratic and/or predatory, building state capacity will only make a bad situation worse. Yet, if the central government is constrained by the rule of law and by democratic institutions, but lacks the capacity to implement and enforce decisions, then capacity-building might help improve governance.

ABSTRACT The EU is surrounded by areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) in its southern and eastern neighbourhood. Resilience has become a focus of attention in the academic debate on how to successfully deal with ALS and CO. Moreover, resilience-building is a new cornerstone in the EU’s foreign and security policy. However, to what extent is resilience a mechanism to cope with ALS and CO? What are the sources of resilience? To what extent does the EU act as a resilience builder or spoiler in its neighbourhood? By presenting a new conceptual framework for analysing the interplay between risks, resilience, and governance breakdown/violent conflict as well as through in-depth empirical evidence, this special issue puts forward three key arguments. First, resilience is a key mechanism to prevent governance breakdown and violent conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood. Second, three sources are key in building resilience: Social trust within societies and communities, legitimacy of (state and non-state) governance actors and institutions, as well as effective, fair, and inclusive governance institutions. Third, if external actors, such as the EU, seek to build resilience, they need to factor in long-time horizons, in-depth local knowledge, and a clearly designed strategy.

Policy makers and academics alike have mistakenly promoted an agenda which takes well-governed democratic and consolidated 'Weberian' states as the model for the world and the goal of development programs. Whilst Western industrial democracies are the exception, areas of limited statehood where state institutions are weak and ineffective, are everywhere, and, this books argues, can still be well-governed. Three factors explain effective governance in areas of limited statehood: Fair and transparent institutions 'fit for purpose,' legitimate governors accepted by the people, and social trust among the citizens. Effective and legitimate governance in the absence of a functioning state is not only provided by international organizations, foreign aid agencies, and non-governmental organizations but also by multi-national companies, rebel groups and other violent non-state actors, 'traditional' as well as religious leaders, and community-based organizations. Börzel and Risse base their argument on empirical findings from over a decade of research covering Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia.

Chapter 4 focuses on the variety of governors in areas of limited statehood. State and non-state, local, national, transnational, as well as international actors are motivated to engage in governance in areas of limited statehood if certain conditions are present. Moreover, we find the entire range of modes of governance, from hierarchical steering including the use of force to inclusive, participatory, and deliberative governance. We start with external state governance, including international and regional organizations, development agencies, and foreign governments. We then turn to the non-state sector, starting with (I)NGOs and multi-stakeholder partnerships. A very different type of actor are (multinational) companies who are usually not inclined to become governors to begin with. In contrast, “traditional” authorities, such as tribal chiefs and community leaders as well as non-state justice institutions tend to be among the most important indigenous governors in many areas of limited statehood. A rather unlikely group of governors are violent non-state actors such as rebel groups or warlords.