Over the last decade, building human-level artificial general intelligence has moved from far-fetched speculation to being a concrete next-decade target for many of the largest AI organisations. Achieving this goal would have profound and far-reaching impacts on human society, which raises many complex questions for the decade ahead. This report investigates how AI itself might continue to develop in a post-AGI world along the continuum of machine intelligence. The endpoint of this continuum, Universal AI, is theoretically well understood, which provides some formal grounding for the main focus of this report: the transition from human-level AGI to artificial general superintelligence, which, intuitively, can be understood as a system that is more intelligent and cognitively capable than large organisations of humans. After characterizing ASI, the report discusses four potential pathways from AGI to ASI: scaling AGI, AI paradigm shifts, recursive improvement, and ASI emerging from large-scale multi-agent collectives. The report then discusses possible frictions and bottlenecks along these pathways. Determining whether the impact of these frictions will be negligible or substantial raises a number of concrete open research questions. Due to large uncertainties for predicting ASI progress, it cannot be ruled out that AI progress might continue to accelerate over the next years. This could imply that the image of a single transformative step change, caused by the introduction of human-level AGI into our society, could be inaccurate. More apt might be the prospect of a series of transformative societal changes caused by AI-enabled progress and breakthroughs across many areas of science and technology. Preparing for this prospect requires a massively interdisciplinary endeavour of global scope and interest.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms are useful for simulating social behavior in settings that are too complex for other theoretical approaches like game theory. However, they have not yet been empirically supported by laboratory experiments with real human participants. In this work we demonstrate how multi-agent reinforcement learning can model group behavior in a spatially and temporally complex public good provision game called Clean Up. We show that human groups succeed in Clean Up when they can see who is who and track reputations over time but fail under conditions of anonymity. A new multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation-based cooperation demonstrates the same difference between identifiable and anonymous conditions. Furthermore, both human groups and artificial agent groups solve the problem via turn-taking despite other options being available. Our results highlight the benefits of using multi-agent reinforcement learning to model human social behavior in complex environments.

Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies have been used to rate strategies (e.g. Elo), however recent work has expanded ratings to utilize game theoretic solutions to better rate strategies in non-transitive games. This work generalizes these ideas and proposes novel algorithms suitable for N-player, general-sum rating of strategies in normal-form games according to the payoff rating system. This enables well-established solution concepts, such as equilibria, to be leveraged to efficiently rate strategies in games with complex strategic interactions, which arise in multiagent training and real-world interactions between many agents. We empirically validate our methods on real world normal-form data (Premier League) and multiagent reinforcement learning agent evaluation.

A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden, possibly misaligned motivations and goals. Social deduction games offer an avenue to study how individuals might learn to synthesize potentially unreliable information about others, and elucidate their true motivations. In this work, we present Hidden Agenda, a two-team social deduction game that provides a 2D environment for studying learning agents in scenarios of unknown team alignment. The environment admits a rich set of strategies for both teams. Reinforcement learning agents trained in Hidden Agenda show that agents can learn a variety of behaviors, including partnering and voting without need for communication in natural language.

We build on the recently proposed EigenGame that views eigendecomposition as a competitive game. EigenGame's updates are biased if computed using minibatches of data, which hinders convergence and more sophisticated parallelism in the stochastic setting. In this work, we propose an unbiased stochastic update that is asymptotically equivalent to EigenGame, enjoys greater parallelism allowing computation on datasets of larger sample sizes, and outperforms EigenGame in experiments. We present applications to finding the principal components of massive datasets and performing spectral clustering of graphs. We analyze and discuss our proposed update in the context of EigenGame and the shift in perspective from optimization to games.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Data Release for Article: From Motor Control to Team Play in Simulated Humanoid Football This package releases a set of Python notebooks each reproducing a quantitativefigure featured in the research article "From Motor Control to Team Play inSimulated Humanoid Football". Usage The set of notebooks can be uploaded to and executed using theColab runtime service. Alternatively, these notebook files can be executed using aJupyter local runtime with the following commands usingvirtualenv.cd dm_soccer virtualenv venv source venv/bin/activate pip install -r requirements.txt pip install notebook jupyter notebook Dependencies All Python notebooks are tested against Python 3.7 as well as the versioneddependencies specified in requirements.txt. All dependencies are satisfied byColab as of August 2022 and can beinstalled locally with pip install -r requirements.txt if using a Jupyterlocal runtime. License and disclaimer Copyright 2022 DeepMind Technologies Limited All software is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (Apache 2.0); youmay not use this file except in compliance with the Apache 2.0 license. You mayobtain a copy of the Apache 2.0 license at:https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 All other materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0International License (CC-BY). You may obtain a copy of the CC-BY license at:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, all software andmaterials distributed here under the Apache 2.0 or CC-BY licenses aredistributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND,either express or implied. See the licenses for the specific language governingpermissions and limitations under those licenses. This is not an official Google product.

Learning to combine control at the level of joint torques with longer-term goal-directed behavior is a long-standing challenge for physically embodied artificial agents. Intelligent behavior in the physical world unfolds across multiple spatial and temporal scales: Although movements are ultimately executed at the level of instantaneous muscle tensions or joint torques, they must be selected to serve goals that are defined on much longer time scales and that often involve complex interactions with the environment and other agents. Recent research has demonstrated the potential of learning-based approaches applied to the respective problems of complex movement, long-term planning, and multiagent coordination. However, their integration traditionally required the design and optimization of independent subsystems and remains challenging. In this work, we tackled the integration of motor control and long-horizon decision-making in the context of simulated humanoid football, which requires agile motor control and multiagent coordination. We optimized teams of agents to play simulated football via reinforcement learning, constraining the solution space to that of plausible movements learned using human motion capture data. They were trained to maximize several environment rewards and to imitate pretrained football-specific skills if doing so led to improved performance. The result is a team of coordinated humanoid football players that exhibit complex behavior at different scales, quantified by a range of analysis and statistics, including those used in real-world sport analytics. Our work constitutes a complete demonstration of learned integrated decision-making at multiple scales in a multiagent setting.

The success of human civilization is rooted in our ability to cooperate by communicating and making joint plans. We study how artificial agents may use communication to better cooperate in Diplomacy, a long-standing AI challenge. We propose negotiation algorithms allowing agents to agree on contracts regarding joint plans, and show they outperform agents lacking this ability. For humans, misleading others about our intentions forms a barrier to cooperation. Diplomacy requires reasoning about our opponents' future plans, enabling us to study broken commitments between agents and the conditions for honest cooperation. We find that artificial agents face a similar problem as humans: communities of communicating agents are susceptible to peers who deviate from agreements. To defend against this, we show that the inclination to sanction peers who break contracts dramatically reduces the advantage of such deviators. Hence, sanctioning helps foster mostly truthful communication, despite conditions that initially favor deviations from agreements.

The rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning has opened unprecedented analytics possibilities in various team and individual sports, including baseball, basketball, and tennis. More recently, AI techniques have been applied to football, due to a huge increase in data collection by professional teams, increased computational power, and advances in machine learning, with the goal of better addressing new scientific challenges involved in the analysis of both individual players' and coordinated teams' behaviors. The research challenges associated with predictive and prescriptive football analytics require new developments and progress at the intersection of statistical learning, game theory, and computer vision. In this paper, we provide an overarching perspective highlighting how the combination of these fields, in particular, forms a unique microcosm for AI research, while offering mutual benefits for professional teams, spectators, and broadcasters in the years to come. We illustrate that this duality makes football analytics a game changer of tremendous value, in terms of not only changing the game of football itself, but also in terms of what this domain can mean for the field of AI. We review the state-of-the-art and exemplify the types of analysis enabled by combining the aforementioned fields, including illustrative examples of counterfactual analysis using predictive models, and the combination of game-theoretic analysis of penalty kicks with statistical learning of player attributes. We conclude by highlighting envisioned downstream impacts, including possibilities for extensions to other sports (real and virtual).

Collective action demands that individuals efficiently coordinate how much, where, and when to cooperate. Laboratory experiments have extensively explored the first part of this process, demonstrating that a variety of social-cognitive mechanisms influence how much individuals choose to invest in group efforts. However, experimental research has been unable to shed light on how social cognitive mechanisms contribute to the where and when of collective action. We build and test a computational model of human behavior in Clean Up, a social dilemma task popular in multi-agent reinforcement learning research. We show that human groups effectively cooperate in Clean Up when they can identify group members and track reputations over time, but fail to organize under conditions of anonymity. A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation demonstrates the same difference in cooperation under conditions of identifiability and anonymity. In addition, the model accurately predicts spatial and temporal patterns of group behavior: in this public goods dilemma, the intrinsic motivation for reputation catalyzes the development of a non-territorial, turn-taking strategy to coordinate collective action.

We propose a system for conducting an auction over locations in a continuous space. It enables participants to express their preferences over possible choices of location in the space, selecting the location that maximizes the total utility of all agents. We prevent agents from tricking the system into selecting a location that improves their individual utility at the expense of others by using a pricing rule that gives agents no incentive to misreport their true preferences. The system queries participants for their utility in many random locations, then trains a neural network to approximate the preference function of each participant. The parameters of these neural network models are transmitted and processed by the auction mechanism, which composes these into differentiable models that are optimized through gradient ascent to compute the final chosen location and charged prices.

To help humanity solve fundamental problems of cooperation, scientists need to reconceive artificial intelligence as deeply social. To help humanity solve fundamental problems of cooperation, scientists need to reconceive artificial intelligence as deeply social.

We present a novel view on principal components analysis as a competitive game in which each approximate eigenvector is controlled by a player whose goal is to maximize their own utility function. We analyze the properties of this PCA game and the behavior of its gradient based updates. The resulting algorithm---which combines elements from Oja's rule with a generalized Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization---is naturally decentralized and hence parallelizable through message passing. We demonstrate the scalability of the algorithm with experiments on large image datasets and neural network activations. We discuss how this new view of PCA as a differentiable game can lead to further algorithmic developments and insights.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Abstract We present PAC-Bayesian bounds for the generalisation error of the K-nearest-neighbour classifier (K-NN). This is achieved by casting the K-NN classifier into a kernel space framework in the limit of vanishing kernel bandwidth. We establish a relation between prior measures over the coefficients in the kernel expansion and the induced measure on the weight vectors in kernel space. Defining a sparse prior over the coefficients allows the application of a PAC-Bayesian folk theorem that leads to a generalisation bound that is a function of the number of redundant training examples: those that can be left out without changing the solution. The presented bound requires to quantify a prior belief in the sparseness of the solution and is evaluated after learning when the actual redundancy level is known. Even for small sample size (m ~ 100) the bound gives non-trivial results when both the expected sparseness and the actual redundancy are high.

Existing evaluation suites for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) do not assess generalization to novel situations as their primary objective (unlike supervised-learning benchmarks). Our contribution, Melting Pot, is a MARL evaluation suite that fills this gap, and uses reinforcement learning to reduce the human labor required to create novel test scenarios. This works because one agent's behavior constitutes (part of) another agent's environment. To demonstrate scalability, we have created over 80 unique test scenarios covering a broad range of research topics such as social dilemmas, reciprocity, resource sharing, and task partitioning. We apply these test scenarios to standard MARL training algorithms, and demonstrate how Melting Pot reveals weaknesses not apparent from training performance alone.

Constructing agents with planning capabilities has long been one of the main challenges in the pursuit of artificial intelligence. Tree-based planning methods have enjoyed huge success in challenging domains, such as chess1 and Go2, where a perfect simulator is available. However, in real-world problems, the dynamics governing the environment are often complex and unknown. Here we present the MuZero algorithm, which, by combining a tree-based search with a learned model, achieves superhuman performance in a range of challenging and visually complex domains, without any knowledge of their underlying dynamics. The MuZero algorithm learns an iterable model that produces predictions relevant to planning: the action-selection policy, the value function and the reward. When evaluated on 57 different Atari games3-the canonical video game environment for testing artificial intelligence techniques, in which model-based planning approaches have historically struggled4-the MuZero algorithm achieved state-of-the-art performance. When evaluated on Go, chess and shogi-canonical environments for high-performance planning-the MuZero algorithm matched, without any knowledge of the game dynamics, the superhuman performance of the AlphaZero algorithm5 that was supplied with the rules of the game.

Tabular is a domain-specific language for expressing probabilistic models of relational data. Tabular has several features that set it apart from other probabilistic programming languages including: (1) programs and data are stored as spreadsheet tables; (2) programs consist of probabilistic annotations on the relational schema of the data; and (3) inference returns estimations of missing values and latent columns, as well as parameters. Our primary implementation is for Microsoft Excel and relies on Infer.NET for inference. Still, the language can be called independently of Excel and can target alternative inference engines.

This paper investigates a population-based training regime based on game-theoretic principles called Policy-Spaced Response Oracles (PSRO). PSRO is general in the sense that it (1) encompasses well-known algorithms such as fictitious play and double oracle as special cases, and (2) in principle applies to general-sum, many-player games. Despite this, prior studies of PSRO have been focused on two-player zero-sum games, a regime wherein Nash equilibria are tractably computable. In moving from two-player zero-sum games to more general settings, computation of Nash equilibria quickly becomes infeasible. Here, we extend the theoretical underpinnings of PSRO by considering an alternative solution concept, $\alpha$-Rank, which is unique (thus faces no equilibrium selection issues, unlike Nash) and applies readily to general-sum, many-player settings. We establish convergence guarantees in several games classes, and identify links between Nash equilibria and $\alpha$-Rank. We demonstrate the competitive performance of $\alpha$-Rank-based PSRO against an exact Nash solver-based PSRO in 2-player Kuhn and Leduc Poker. We then go beyond the reach of prior PSRO applications by considering 3- to 5-player poker games, yielding instances where $\alpha$-Rank achieves faster convergence than approximate Nash solvers, thus establishing it as a favorable general games solver. We also carry out an initial empirical validation in MuJoCo soccer, illustrating the feasibility of the proposed approach in another complex domain.