考虑政府奖惩机制,在制造商依赖零售商回收的闭环供应链中,当零售商的回收成本信息是不对称时,为探究制造商最优激励合同设计问题,本文构建制造商与零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过运用委托代理理论和显示原理求得实现对零售商信息甄别的最优两部定价合同菜单,并分析该合同菜单性质以及信息不对称的影响,最后探讨政府奖惩机制对均衡结果的影响.研究发现,随着零售商回收效率降低,制造商会提高批发价、减少转移支付.回收成本信息不对称会使制造商和供应链利润减少,零售商利润增加.政府奖惩机制的出台会使制造商降低批发价、提高转移支付.当政府的回收标准较高而奖惩力度较小时,奖惩机制的出台会使供应链利润减少,否则,会使供应链利润增加.

在一个制造商进行回收再制造的闭环供应链中,当制造商的回收成本信息是不对称时,考虑到供应链成员终止交易的情况,研究了零售商的最优两部定价合同设计问题,并探讨了该合同的性质以及回收成本信息不对称对整个闭环供应链的影响.研究发现:当制造商的回收效率较低时,制造商与零售商之间不会发生交易.当制造商的回收效率较高时,零售商使用两部定价合同菜单可以实现对制造商的信息揭露和激励,且制造商和零售商的利润随着回收效率降低而降低;信息不对称在大多数情况下会使制造商的利润增加,零售商和供应链的利润减少,还会使回收率和供应链成员间的交易机会减少.最后,通过算例分析得到两部定价合同可以近似协调信息不对称的闭环供应链.

The implementation of cap-and-trade regulation worldwide is bound to have some effects on supply chain decision-making. This paper investigates optimal pricing and product carbon footprint decisions of the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under cap-and-trade regulation by applying optimization and game theory. By comparing the optimal results between the centralized and decentralized decision-making models, we find that the optimal product carbon footprint and selling price not only depend on the carbon trading price and carbon cap allocated by the government, but also relate to the initial carbon footprint of the product and the decision-making methods in the supply chain. It is found that there is also a "double marginalization" in the decentralized situation, thus we coordinate the supply chain using a two-part tariff contract. Specifically, only the manufacturer adjusts dynamically the wholesale price and fixed fee within the coordinating contract according to different initial carbon footprint and the range of the carbon cap reduction by the government. Finally, we obtain several interesting conclusions from the numerical examples and provide managerial insights and policy implications from the analytical results.

考虑二氧化碳等温室气体对环境的破坏作用,建立了碳交易政策和碳税政策下政府和生产商间的Stackel-berg博弈模型,通过比较两种政策下生产商的最优环保创新水平、社会总产出、社会总碳排放量以及社会福利,探讨了两种碳减排政策的最优问题.研究表明,相比碳税政策,当二氧化碳等温室气体对环境的破坏作用较小时,碳交易政策下生产商的环保创新水平较高,社会总产出和社会总碳排放量较低,社会福利较高;当二氧化碳等温室气体对环境的破坏作用较大时,碳交易政策下生产商的环保创新水平较低,社会总产出和社会总碳排放量较高,社会福利较低.

This paper investigates the issue of demand forecast sharing in a supply chain, in which either the manufacturer or the retailer conducts demand-enhancing service. In the mode with manufacturer conducting service (Mode M), our analysis shows that if the service efficiency is high (low), the retailer should voluntarily (not) share its demand forecast. If the service efficiency is moderate, a side-payment contract or a bargaining mechanism can induce the retailer to share. In the mode with retailer conducting service (Mode R), no information sharing is the unique equilibrium. In both modes, supply chain members are generally better off when their forecasts become more accurate. Moreover, the positive impact of more accurate forecasts on both the manufacturer and the retailer is generally much stronger in Mode R than in Mode M. Finally, we find that both firms prefer Mode M to Mode R if the service efficiency is high, while they prefer Mode R if the service efficiency is low.

This paper studies the problem of sharing demand forecast information in a closed-loop supply chain with the manufacturer collecting and remanufacturing. We investigate two scenarios: the “make-to-order” scenario, in which the manufacturer schedules production based on the realized demand, and the “make-to-stock” scenario, in which the manufacturer schedules production before the demand is known. For each scenario, we find that it is possible for the retailer to share his forecast without incentives when the collection efficiency of the manufacturer is high. When the efficiency is moderate, information sharing can be realized by a bargaining mechanism, and when the efficiency is low, non-information sharing is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, the possibility of information sharing in the make-to-stock scenario is higher than that in the make-to-order scenario. In addition, we analyze the impact of demand forecasts’ characteristics on the value of information sharing in both scenarios.

考虑了由一个供应商和一个下游企业组成的供应链,研究了当供应商的生产污染排放会降低消费者对下游企业产品的需求时,下游企业通过监督敦促供应商降低排放,以及政府通过对供应商的生产污染征收惩罚税或对其减排投入进行补贴以达到保护环境目的.将生产污染排放对环境造成的负面影响纳入社会福利计算,通过数值仿真,给出了在消费者环保意识强弱和供应商初始排放程度不同的情况下,企业的利润,生产对环境造成的负面影响和社会福利,以及政府和企业的均衡选择.结果表明,当没有政府介入时,下游企业敦促供应商减排总是能提升下游企业的利润,但会降低供应商的利润,此时只有当下游企业给予供应商超过其利润损失的一定补贴额,供应商与下游企业才会就减排程度达成一致;当政府介入时,多数情况下,政府会选择补贴供应商,而下游企业不会去敦促供应商减排;少数情况下,政府会选择对供应商征税,而下游企业也会敦促供应商减排.

To investigate the effects of carbon cap-and-trade regulation on firm's production and low-carbon technology investment decisions, we firstly introduced a model for production decision without considering carbon cap-and-trade regulation as a benchmark. Under cap-and-trade regulation, we established the model for production decision and the model for joint decisions on production and low-carbon technology investment, then discussed the impacts of the carbon emissions quota and carbon trading price on firm' production quantity and carbon emissions as well as profits, and compared the optimal production quantity, total carbon emissions, and profit. Finally, the relevant propositions and corollaries were verified and analyzed by numerical examples, some management Implications for the firm making decisions on production and low-carbon technology investment and for the governments operating effectively the carbon cap-and-trade regulation were proposed.

We develop a two-period dual-channel model for a durable goods manufacturer to investigate how product durability and the channel structure create strategic issues that are significantly different from those in managing a dual channel for nondurables. The manufacturer can sell directly by its own e-channel and indirectly via an independent reseller. Our game-theoretic model nests Arya et al. (2007) as a special case when product durability reduces to zero and thus generalizes it to the durable goods setting. The equilibrium solutions indicate that, when the product is durable, both parties' profitability strongly depends on product durability and direct selling cost. In particular, we find that, compared to encroaching the reseller's market by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel that serves only as an information medium. Moreover, we find that, contrary to Arya et al.'s (2007) results, if product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer's encroachment is always detrimental to the reseller, and thus its bright side disappears. We test our model's theoretical predictions of the effects of product durability on manufacturer's and reseller's profitability with data from the U.S. x86 computer server market, and find strong empirical support-profitability of both parties is higher when product durability is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, and lower when durability is intermediate. (C) 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.

Recently developed business models in the book publishing industry have led to the emergence of a self-publishing model in which authors publish their works directly through a dominant e-tailer like Amazon without recourse to traditional publishers. In this paper, we examine whether it is profitable for such an e-tailer to adopt this approach, what publishers should do, and whether it is wise for authors to embrace this self-publishing trend. Specifically, we model the publishing and retailing structure of the book industry to assess how different channel power and structures may affect chain members's pricing and profits. Our analysis suggests that under certain conditions, it is wise for the publisher to cut off the supply to the dominant e-tailer, unwise for the author to choose the self-publishing model, and better for the dominant e-tailer not to implement a self-publishing mode. Using numerical analysis, we show that when the ratio of e-book buyers is high enough, even when the author's revenue sharing rate does not change, the publisher may retain the author as a client by encouraging consumers to buy e-books. We also show that although the self-publishing mode greatly reduces consumer welfare, it may increase social welfare.

基于供应链视角研究了碳标签制度下制造商和零售商的产品碳足迹和价格决策以及协调问题.通过建立集中式和分散式决策模型,分别得出了两种决策方式下制造商和零售商的最优策略组合,并分析了消费者环境意识对产品碳足迹和销售价格的影响.结果表明,碳标签制度下产品的碳足迹和销售价格不仅依赖于消费者的环境意识水平,还与其初始碳足迹以及供应链的决策方式有关.然后,引入两部定价合同实现了碳标签制度下供应链系统的完美协调.最后,通过算例分析验证了相应的结论.

In this paper, we examine the impact of manufacturers upgrading strategy of durable products on the decision of third-party entrant in a secondary market. To do so, we develop a two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer sells new durable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while a third-party entrant operates a reverse channel selling used products in the secondary market. The manufacturer releases an upgraded product (i.e., one that is technologically superior to the version introduced in the first period). We derive conditions under which it is optimal (1) for the manufacture to release an upgraded product in the second period and (2) for a third party entrant to enter a secondary market. We also find, through numerical analysis, that when upgrades are typically small or moderate, the upgrading of new products can increase a third party entrant's profitability in the secondary market but it does not benefit the third party entrant when upgrades are typically large. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

同时考虑政府征税和补贴以及消费者环保意识,研究生产商的低碳技术选择问题,探讨消费者环保意识、碳税和补贴对生产商3种技术下的碳排放和利润的影响.研究发现,当低碳技术补贴较大且消费者环保意识较强时,生产商采用多技术进行生产,否则,生产商以现有技术进行生产;生产商使用多技术生产的利润总是比仅采用低碳技术生产的利润要高;消费者环保意识的提高并不总能降低生产商的碳排放,而碳税的增加却总能降低其碳排放.

Both time inconsistency and double marginalization are important issues in the sale of durable goods. In particular, when a durable goods manufacturer sells her product through a conventional retail store, the intrinsic double marginalization would alleviate time inconsistency to some extent. However, current research pays no attention on the interaction between both issues under multiple-retailer and manufacturer encroachment scenarios. To fill this gap, in this paper, we study these two channel structures in the sale of durable goods. Our analysis reveals that channel profit in the multiple-retailer structure is always greater than that under integration. On the other hand, the manufacturer encroachment structure can eliminate both bad effects without commitment under some circumstances and the whole channel is well coordinated.

This paper adds to the growing remanufacturing literature by investigating a collaborative model in which the manufacturer serves as the remanufacturer's distributor while selling its own product. The paper extends the collaborative model that we have studied previously by characterizing it as a channel power structure under which the manufacturer plays the leader role in the collaboration. Furthermore, the paper compares this collaborative model with a competitive model in which the manufacturer competes with the remanufacturer in the market on pricing, sales volume and profit and finds that even if the manufacturer chooses to collaborate with the remanufacturer, it does not give up its market position; the manufacturer keeps the price of its product unchanged as the remanufactured product becomes increasingly acceptable to the consumer, and its product's sales volume remains unchanged in both models. Finally, this paper observes that the collaborative model benefits the manufacturer more than the competitive model, whereas the competitive model benefits the remanufacturer more than the collaborative model. Obviously, if collaboration benefits both of the manufacturer and remanufacturer, they will choose to collaborate, and the manufacturer will transfer part of its profit to the remanufacturer, but if competition brings them more profit, they will choose to compete in the market, and the remanufacturer will transfer part of its profit to the manufacturer.

针对制造商应如何参与再制造竞争的问题,构建基于古诺竞争和消费者异质需求的两周期决策模型,求出了制造商进入再制造品市场时制造商和在位再制造商的生产决策区间,并与制造商不进入再制造品市场的情况相比较,分析了制造商的再制造策略对在位再制造商的影响,最后通过算例讨论了消费者行为对利润的影响.研究表明,制造商参与再制造竞争时,根据旧产品回收率和再制造节约成本的大小,制造商和再制造商可选择三个决策区间,每个决策区间包含六种不同的生产策略.回收率大于阈值时,随着回收率的增加制造商更倾向于进入再制造品市场.消费者对再制造品的接受程度较高时,回收旧产品较多的企业利润更大.

In this paper, we investigate an assemble-to-order supply chain including a manufacturer and two complementary suppliers, one produces component associated with traditional quality while the other produces component associated with environmental quality of the manufacturer's product. In response to consumers' demand over enhancing product's both quality levels, the manufacturer may collaborate with component suppliers to enhance quality design. Four model cases are considered: collaboration between the manufacturer and either supplier over associated quality design, collaboration between the manufacturer and both suppliers over quality design, or no collaboration. Particularly, we focus on the impact of governmental taxes over production emissions of firms. In response to the coercive governmental penalty, firms will invest in greener production to reduce emissions. We compare suppliers' quality design, all firms' emission reduction levels, profits as well as the total net impact on environment under the four model cases and how these equilibriums will be affected by governmental taxation and how firms should choose collaboration model. [Received 13 July 2013; Revised 16 December 2013; Revised 28 March 2014; Accepted 20 April 2014]

Aiming at the pricing of the original equipment manufacturer ( OEM) and the independent oper-ator ( IO) on remanufactured products in competitive environment, a two-period model was developed con-sidering consumers′heterogeneity of the demand for new and remanufactured products.The optimal collec-tion rate and optimal price were obtained and compared under the conditions that the OEM selling new products and remanufactured products with same price or different prices.Finally the effect of parameters on the profits of the OEM and the IO was discussed by numerical examples.The conclusions state that if the OEM sets uniform price for all products,the price of remanufactured products is higher and the quantity greater and the OEM and the IO make more profit.The results mean that even with the competition of the IO, the OEM setting uniform price for all products is better than setting different prices for new and reman-ufactured products.

To examine when the manufacturer and dominant retailer open their own Internet stores and how setting prices to ensure opening Internet stores are profitable. We consider a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one dominant retailer. The retailer has a physical store in a monopolist market. Depending on whether the Internet stores are opened successfully by them, we firstly obtain equilibrium prices and profits under four possible supply chain structures. Secondly, we identify several strategic conditions when it is optimal to open an Internet store for the manufacturer and dominant retailer and discuss its implications. It is interesting to note that multichannel retailing is not necessarily the best strategy for the dominant retailer. In addition, we investigate the impacts of problem parameters (the dominant retailer’s bargaining power and consumers’ disutility of purchasing a product from Internet store) on the manufacturer and dominant retailer’s pricing policies. We find that the manufacturer’s optimal price at her Internet store is not always being lower than the dominant retailer’s. Finally, we conduct numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results.

鉴于众多学者从宏观和微观层面研究了碳税对二氧化碳减排效果和企业生产决策的影响,本文首次从供应链的视角建立了集中式和分散式决策模型,分别讨论了碳税政策下制造商扣零售商的最优二氧化碳减排和定价策略,以及税率对单位产品二氧化碳减排量和销售价格的影响.研究表明:碳税政策下单位产品的二氧化碳减排量和销售价格不仅依赖于碳税税率,还与其初始二氧化碳排放量以及供应链的决策方式有关.此外,碳税政策下分散式决策存在“双重边际效应”问题,于是通过两部定价合同实现了供应链的完美协调.最后通过数值仿真进一步验证了相应的结论,并就如何提高供应链的减排效率给出了一些建议和对策.