Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules

We investigate properties of core allocations in a pure exchange asymmetric information economy whose space of agents is modelled by a mixed market and commodity space is an ordered Banach space admitting an interior point in the positive cone. The information system in our framework is the one introduced by Allen (Econ Theory 29:465–487, 2006 ). It is shown that the main results in Grodal (Econometrica 40:581–583, 1972 ), Schmeidler (Econometrica 40:579–580, 1972 ) and Vind (Econometrica 40:585–586, 1972 ) can be established in our model. As a consequence of one of these results, the main result in Hervés-Beloso et al. (Econ Thoery 55:545–563, 2014 ) is obtained in our framework. Finally, we prove that core allocations are coalitionally fair and incentive compatible.