An Attack-Resilient Source Authentication Protocol in Controller Area Network.

ANCS(2017)

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摘要
While vehicle to everything (V2X) communication enables safety-critical automotive control systems to better support various connected services to improve safety and convenience of drivers, they also allow automotive attack surfaces to increase dynamically in modern vehicles. Many researchers as well as hackers have already demonstrated that they can take remote control of the targeted car by exploiting the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks such as Controller Area Networks (CANs). For assuring CAN security, we focus on how to authenticate electronic control units (ECUs) in real-time by addressing the security challenges of in-vehicle networks. In this paper, we propose a novel and lightweight authentication protocol with an attack-resilient tree algorithm, which is based on one-way hash chain. The protocol can be easily deployed in CAN by performing a firmware update of ECU. We have shown analytically that the protocol achieves a high level of security. In addition, the performance of the proposed protocol is validated on CANoe simulator for virtual ECUs and Freescale S12XF used in real vehicles. The results show that our protocol is more efficient than other authentication protocol in terms of authentication time, response time, and service delay.
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关键词
Controller Area Network, in-vehicle network security, authentication, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
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