Incentive Mechanism of Medical Data Provider of Health Data Bank.

In a two-stage medical service supply chain system composed of health data bank and medical knowledge provider, the willingness of medical knowledge providers to share medical knowledge is of great importance. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper designs an incentive mechanism to promote medical knowledge providers' efforts to improve the storage of high-quality medical knowledge based on the double incentive dimension of "remuneration + value", and comprehensively analyzes the relationship between the optimal effort level and the incentive intensities. The study finds that the level of effort of medical knowledge providers is not only affected by the incentive intensities, but also affected by their own conditions such as professional proficiency. Remuneration incentives can always play a positive role, and there is a mutual substitution relationship between the two remuneration incentive intensities of health data bank and medical institution. Value incentive may play a counter role, and the setting of value incentive intensity needs to be adjusted according to the status of the medical knowledge providers themselves. (C) 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.