Enclave-based privacy-preserving localization: poster

In cooperative spectrum sensing, multiple sensors work together to perform tasks such as localizing a target transmitter. However, the exchange of spectrum measurements leads to exposure of the physical location of participating sensors. Furthermore, in some cases, the sensitive characteristics of all participants can be revealed through the compromise of any one sensor. Accordingly, without guarantees about how data will be handled, there is little reason for such devices to work together. In this work, we protect the location of sensors cooperating in spectrum sensing by processing measurements within attestable containers, or enclaves. We use the enclave as a building block for new privacy-preserving particle filter protocols. We instantiate this enclave using Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and investigate how the inclusion of enclaves impacts sensor privacy, carefully enumerating the different threats present in centralized and decentralized architectures. We show that enclave-based particle filter protocols incur minimal overhead (adding 16 milliseconds of processing to the measurement processing function versus unprotected computation), whereas cryptographically-based approaches suffer from multiple orders of magnitude greater costs. Our work demonstrates that enclaves can be effectively deployed in a decentralized architecture while dramatically improving current data handling techniques.