The Secretary Recommendation Problem

Hoefer Martin
Hoefer Martin

EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Virtual Event Hungary July, 2020, pp. 1892019.

Cited by: 0|Bibtex|Views1|DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399478
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Other Links: arxiv.org|dl.acm.org|dblp.uni-trier.de|academic.microsoft.com

Abstract:

In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that has to make the hiring decision. The evaluating agent (the sender) signals the quality of the candidate to the hiring agent (the receiver) who ...More

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