Resource-Aware Dynamic Spectrum Pricing for Cognitive Radio Networks

Sharing of spectrum has been identified as a key requirement in cognitive radio networks(CRNs). We address the problem of spectrum sharing with spectrum pricing where the primary user wants to sell the spectrum to the secondary users. By equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the players in the spectrum sharing game aims to take the strategy which maximize its own profit under sojourn-time constraint for secondary users. In condition of spectrum sojourn-time is limited because of primary user’s channel usage pattern each of spectrum providers will choose different strategy to increase profit more. With the Bertrand model we analyze the impacts of several secondary users’ preference to spectrum product provided by primary user. (i.e., channel quality, spectrum substitutability and sojourn-time). We propose not only the static solution of the game but also practical one. We propose d-DBRSC algorithm which forces the price dynamically adjusted to the equilibrium in distributed way. The stability of the proposed scheme in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also studied.