Jogos Não Cooperativos de Localização de Instalações : uma Resenha Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games : a Survey

The Facility Location problem is a well-know NP-Hard combinatorial optimization problem. It models a diverse set of situations where one aims to provide a set of goods or services via a set of facilities F to a set of clients T , also called terminals. There are opening costs for each facility in F and connection costs for each pair of facility and client, if such facility attends this client. A central authority wants to determine the solution with minimum cost, considering both opening and connection costs, in such a way that all clients are attended by one facility. In this survey we are interested in the non-cooperative game version of this problem, where instead of having a central authority, each client is a player and decides where to connect himself. In doing so, he aims to minimize his own costs, given by the connection costs and opening costs of the facility, which may be shared among clients using the same facility. This problem has several applications as well, specially in distributed scenarios where a central authority is too expensive or even infeasible to exist. In this paper we present a survey describing different variants of this problem and reviewing several results about it, as well as adapting results from existing literature concerning the existence of equilibria, Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. We also point out open problems that remain to be addressed. Palavras-chave: Teoria de jogos algorítmica, localização de instalações, preço da anarquia, preço da estabilidade.