Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia

Objective epistemic consequentialism is the view that whether it is right or wrong, or good or bad to adopt a given doxastic attitude depends entirely on the consequences of adopting that attitude. Subjective epistemic consequentialism is the view that whether it is right or wrong, or good or bad to adopt a given doxastic attitude depends entirely on the expected consequences of adopting that attitude. Both forms of epistemic consequentialism can be applied to different doxastic attitudes. For example, it may be right to adopt a given belief insofar as this leads the agent to adopt more true beliefs." But epistemic consequentialism has primarily been applied to credences: subjective degrees of confidence in a proposition. One principle that has been proposed by subjective epistemic consequentialists who have focused on credences is that adopting a given credence is right if and only if adopting that credence maximizes expected accuracy—that is, if and only if the agent expects that adopting that credence will cause the agent to have a more accurate credal state overall. Epistemic enkrasia principles say that an agent should not adopt an attitude that