Unrepresentable Justice: Looking For A Postqualitative Theory Of Social Change

I believe posthumanist philosophy promises the possibility of a more robustly ethical and political practice of social inquiry. I do not, however, believe analytic and rhetorical tools have been developed that deliver amply on that promise. This is less a reflection on the quality of efforts to do so, than it is on the scope of the challenge before us. Since this is an essay about what "postqualitative means to me," I speak from within the desire to see that promise more fully realized and the belief that there is much work yet to be done. Simply stating that concern directly and describing the grounds for it, however, would involve a performative contradiction. It would presume the challenge is an epistemic one that yields to better information and clearer representation. The challenge, however, lies within the limitations of representation itself and the way convention compels us to address our scholarship to a humanist spectator subject, as opposed to seeking to transform the subject of address. This essay, therefore, departs from standard prose conventions in an effort to both do and describe what needs to be done.