Self-serving bias across strategic and non-strategic dictator games with production
Applied economics letters(2021)
摘要
This paper investigates behaviour across strategic and non-strategic dictator games with a preceding production phase. In both treatments subjects remain paired and play a trust game immediately following the dictator game. In the strategic condition subjects are informed about the subsequent trust game, while in the non-strategic condition they are not. Dictators in our non-strategic condition display a self-serving bias. On the other hand, dictators in our strategic condition are more generous and display no self-serving bias. Despite the increased generosity, transfers and earnings in the trust game are lower in the strategic condition. Results suggest that generosity, perceived as having a strategic motivation, can undermine trust.
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关键词
Real effort,dictator,distributive preferences,trust
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