Side-Channel Trojan Insertion - a Practical Foundry-Side Attack via ECO
2021 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS (ISCAS)(2021)
摘要
Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.
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关键词
hardware security, manufacturing-time attack, hardware trojan horse, side-channel attack, VLSI, ASIC
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