You'Ve Got (A Reset) Mail: A Security Analysis Of Email-Based Password Reset Procedures

The password recovery process is a critical part of a website's functionality. Many websites that provide online services to their users also need to solve the problem of allowing their users to reset their passwords (e.g., if they have forgotten it). A popular, established technique for allowing a user to recover a lost account is to allow her to send a reset link to her own account via email. Although it might seem easy at a first glance, the security requirements of the password recovery process require web sites to carefully design each step of the process to be resilient even in the presence of an attack. In this paper, we present an in-depth security analysis of the email-based recovery mechanisms of a wide range of web applications. By manually registering accounts and triggering the password recovery process for each website, we were able to study the password reset mechanisms of web sites from three different groups in the Alexa Top 5K (i.e., popular sites, medium popular sites, low popular sites). In this work, we show that the lack of standards in the password recovery process plagues many websites with security weaknesses, and negatively influences the security of the reset process itself. We also show that concrete password-recovery reset attacks can be launched against a high percentage of websites that might even lead to account takeover.