Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters
AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS(2021)
摘要
We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copeland ^α , maximin, k -veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.
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关键词
Computational complexity,Electoral control,Copeland,Maximin,Veto,Plurality with runoff,Veto with runoff,Condorcet,Fallback,Range voting,Normalized range voting
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