Moral Formation in the Family : A Research Agenda in Time Future

It is now commonplace in the historiography of science to think about fields of study as communities of practice (Daston & Most, 2015). As Stern (2003, p. 186) put it, “Talk of practice has become widespread, not only in the philosophy of social science, but throughout philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences.” The “practice turn” directs attention of historians and philosophers of science to the actual activities of scientists in the production and validation of knowledge (Daston & Most, 2015; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina & Savigney, 2001). Indeed, to regard practice as the fundamental category of analysis promises to reframe traditional concerns of epistemology (Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice, 2015) and displace traditional dichotomies (e.g., subject-object, schemecontent, belief-desire, rules-application, structure-action) as the starting point for understanding how mind, rationality and knowledge are constituted (Stern, 2003).