Electoral Maldistricting

SSRN Electronic Journal(2020)

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摘要
We introduce a framework to theoretically and empirically examine electoral maldistricting-the intentional drawing of electoral districts to advance partisan objectives, compromising voter welfare. We identify the legislatures that maximize voter welfare and those that maximize partisan goals, and incorporate them into a maldistricting index. This index measures the intent to maldistrict by comparing distances from the actual legislature to the nearest partisan and welfare-maximizing legislatures. Using 2008 presidential election data and 2010 census-based district maps, we find a Republican-leaning bias in district maps. Our index tracks court rulings in intuitive ways.
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