Militias and the Iraqi State

According to conventional wisdom, states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their territories, and delegate its operation to closely held state agents such as the military and police. Yet when faced with insurgencies, states often enlist the support of paramilitary organizations or militias. The competence–control tradeoff is especially stark in these cases, as states depend on capable militias to fight insurgents, but also risk losing control over them. This chapter examines the tradeoff in light of the relationship between militia groups and the Iraqi government. To bring a semblance of security to Iraq, both the United States and the Iraqi government used paramilitary groups such as the Sons of Iraq and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Following the withdrawal of US troops, the government has become increasingly beholden to Shia militias, yet the case defies a simple, sectarian logic. This chapter examines the choice of governance strategy vis-à-vis militias in Iraq, and changes in that strategy over time, providing insights into the governor’s dilemma, counterinsurgency strategy, and state formation.