Call auction design and closing price manipulation: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock exchange

Journal of Financial Markets(2022)

引用 1|浏览1
暂无评分
摘要
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange adopted a standard closing call auction mechanism in 2008 but suspended its operation ten months later due to suspicion of widespread price manipulation. The Exchange revamped the mechanism with manipulation-deterrence enhancements and relaunched it in 2016. We exploit this unique setting to examine the effect of call auction design on closing price manipulation. Our results indicate that the standard call auction mechanism is vulnerable to closing price manipulation. Under this mechanism, overnight price reversal is more pronounced on days when derivatives expire and on days when large orders were submitted just before the market close.
更多
查看译文
关键词
Call auction design,Closing price manipulation,Overnight price reversal,CBBC,Sniping
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要