The role of cognition and motivation in understanding internal governance and hierarchical failure: a discriminating alignment analysis

Transaction cost economics (TCE) carefully analyzes market failure while remaining largely silent about hierarchical failure. We argue that this omission occurs because TCE's opportunism assumption does not consider organizational member motivations under different hierarchical forms. Thus, TCE does not fully examine opportunistic behavior under hierarchy, resulting in an incomplete governance analysis. To fill this gap, we build a discriminating alignment theory of hierarchical choice that incorporates explicit motivations under each hierarchical form. We make three contributions to TCE with this theory. First, using the counterproductive work behavior and goal-framing lit-eratures, we predict specific motivations (effort, visceral, financial or status opportun-ism, or collaboration) across hierarchical forms. Second, we predict when "efficient" hierarchical forms (mapped from Williamson's internal governance analysis) do not effectively mitigate opportunistic behavior, creating hierarchical failure. In these cases, we augment the hierarchical forms with supplemental governance mechanisms necessary to efficiently govern the exchange. Finally, we investigate how different moti-vations across hierarchical forms lead to excess misalignment costs to enhance our understanding of hierarchical failures. Examining how both transaction hazards and specific motivations drive particular behaviors allows for a more nuanced understand-ing of specific "costs and competencies" of hierarchy and, in turn, hierarchical failure in TCE.