In Defense of Modest Modal Skepticism

In “In Defense of Modest Modal Skepticism,” Edouard Machery responds to Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri and clarifies his views voiced in Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. Machery argues that his critique of the method of cases is not self-defeating despite the fact that the very method has been used in his book more than once, given that, according to him, his critique of that method does not rely essentially upon its validity. Machery also claims that his view was mischaracterized to some extent by Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri, given that his critique was directed against unrestricted claims about metaphysical modality, not to the restricted ones, like that of nomological possibility (or necessity), and the like. In the rest of his paper, Machery stresses the importance of conceptual analysis and prescriptive conceptual engineering.