Ambiguous Contracts
arxiv(2023)
摘要
In this work we explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design
of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and chooses an
action that maximizes their max-min utility, then the principal can strictly
gain from using an ambiguous contract. We provide insights into the structure
of optimal contracts, and establish that optimal ambiguous contracts are
composed of simple contracts. We also provide a geometric characterization of
ambiguity-proof classes of contracts. Finally, we show that when the agent
considers mixed strategies, then there is no advantage in using an ambiguous
contract.
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关键词
contracts
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