Energy conservation investment and supply chain structure under cap-and-trade regulation for a green product & nbsp;

This paper studies the manufacturer's energy conservation investment and its impact on the endoge-nous supply chain structure under cap-and-trade regulation. We analytically show that the manufacturer prefers to partially integrate a component supplier only when the efficiency of its energy conservation investment is neither too low nor too high, and there is no partial integration when the efficiency of its energy conservation investment is either too low or too high. Additionally, partial integration increases supply chain profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. Moreover, when the energy conservation ef-ficiency is relatively high, the manufacturer emits higher carbon emissions with partial integration than without it. Furthermore, a generalized two-part tariff contract is presented to coordinate the supply chain with the energy conservation investment and the conditions for deriving an all-win outcome are derived. Finally, the present work numerically studies the impacts of the major carbon parameters on the coordi-nation model and yields several managerial insights.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.