DISCO Might Not Be Funky: Random Intelligent Reflective Surface Configurations That Attack
arXiv (Cornell University)(2023)
摘要
Emerging intelligent reflective surfaces (IRSs) significantly improve system
performance, but also pose a significant risk for physical layer security
(PLS). Unlike the extensive research on legitimate IRS-enhanced communications,
in this article we present an adversarial IRS-based fully-passive jammer (FPJ).
We describe typical application scenarios for Disco IRS (DIRS)-based FPJ, where
an illegitimate IRS with random, time-varying reflection properties acts like a
"disco ball" to randomly change the propagation environment. We introduce the
principles of DIRS-based FPJ and overview existing investigations of the
technology, including a design example employing one-bit phase shifters. The
DIRS-based FPJ can be implemented without either jamming power or channel state
information (CSI) for the legitimate users (LUs). It does not suffer from the
energy constraints of traditional active jammers, nor does it require any
knowledge of the LU channels. In addition to the proposed jamming attack, we
also propose an anti-jamming strategy that requires only statistical rather
than instantaneous CSI. Furthermore, we present a data frame structure that
enables the legitimate access point (AP) to estimate the DIRS-jammed channels'
statistical characteristics in the presence of the DIRS jamming. Typical cases
are discussed to show the impact of the DIRS-based FPJ and the feasibility of
the anti-jamming precoder (AJP). Moreover, we outline future research
directions and challenges for the DIRS-based FPJ and its anti-jamming precoding
to stimulate this line of research and pave the way for practical applications.
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关键词
random intelligent reflective surface,attack,disco
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