Regulatory capacity capture: the United Kingdom's online safety regime

Worldwide, governments are increasingly alarmed by the escalation of online harms and the apparent inadequacy of big tech companies in addressing such issues. While some democracies have swiftly implemented regulatory reforms, others, including the United Kingdom, have navigated a complex maze of challenges in adopting similar regulations. The UK's Online Safety Act (OSA) stands as a testament to these challenges. This study delves deep into the shortcomings in the government's regulatory capacity and their profound impact on shaping platform-aimed regulation. Drawing from rich empirical evidence from 33 elite interviews with stakeholders from government, industry, and civil society, and archival review, the paper proposes a four-part framework of regulatory capacity comprising information, treasure, authority, and organised expertise. The study finds: 1) the government lacks fundamental regulatory capacity, severely impeding effective platform regulation; 2) platforms hold superior resources for countering online safety issues; 3) capacity asymmetries between government and platforms pose sustained risks for regulatory capture. Bringing these findings into context with the OSA, the study argues: in order to harness superior platform capacity for regulatory purposes and avert risks of regulatory capture, it is imperative for the government to assert its authority, ensuring rigorous oversight and enforcement of the online safety regime. Moving forward, the capacity-based approach to regulation emerges as an innovative and potent analytical framework to analyse the complex constellations of actors and resources that drive both the successes and failures of emergent regulatory systems, and paving the way for devising more robust and effective regulatory solutions.