Moving Forward by Looking Back: Reexamining the Role of Dependence in Board of Directors Literature

Director independence has been one of the most studied factors across the related literature on organization governance, including strategy, organizational theory, and in practitioner settings. The empirical research regarding independence is not consistent. The previous literature has taken a rather blunt conceptualization of independence. To further explore this conversation, this panel symposium aims to invite panelists to have recently discussed the independence construct to identify the underlying implications for corporate governance. The purpose of the symposium is to aid in scholars reigniting and further refining the understanding and exploration of (in)dependence into more nuanced and less blunt recommendations for best practices in corporate governance. More specifically, this symposium aims to 1) identify the pre-agency theory arguments and find a more refined treatment of dependence, 2) evaluate the potential different types of dependence: financial and social, 3) extend past the common sample of large firms and explore how dependence manifests itself in smaller firms making impactful strategic decisions, and 4) re-anchoring logics that have been lying dormant. Attendants will leave the symposium with a renewed sense of excitement and curiosity about the role of dependence on Board of Directors’ and the impact that has on corporate governance.