Quantum Circuit Reconstruction from Power Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computer Controllers
CoRR(2024)
摘要
The interest in quantum computing has grown rapidly in recent years, and with
it grows the importance of securing quantum circuits. A novel type of threat to
quantum circuits that dedicated attackers could launch are power trace attacks.
To address this threat, this paper presents first formalization and
demonstration of using power traces to unlock and steal quantum circuit
secrets. With access to power traces, attackers can recover information about
the control pulses sent to quantum computers. From the control pulses, the gate
level description of the circuits, and eventually the secret algorithms can be
reverse engineered. This work demonstrates how and what information could be
recovered. This work uses algebraic reconstruction from power traces to realize
two new types of single trace attacks: per-channel and total power attacks. The
former attack relies on per-channel measurements to perform a brute-force
attack to reconstruct the quantum circuits. The latter attack performs a
single-trace attack using Mixed-Integer Linear Programming optimization.
Through the use of algebraic reconstruction, this work demonstrates that
quantum circuit secrets can be stolen with high accuracy. Evaluation on 32 real
benchmark quantum circuits shows that our technique is highly effective at
reconstructing quantum circuits. The findings not only show the veracity of the
potential attacks, but also the need to develop new means to protect quantum
circuits from power trace attacks. Throughout this work real control pulse
information from real quantum computers is used to demonstrate potential
attacks based on simulation of collection of power traces.
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关键词
Quantum Circuits,Quantum Computers,Side Channel Attacks,Power Trace Attack,Automated Reasoning,Mixed Integer Linear Programming
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