Walking a thin line: a reputational account of green central banking

In this article, we provide a comparative case study analysis of the differentiated climate change engagement of the Bank of England (BoE), European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Reserve (Fed). Drawing on semi-structured interviews and a newly composed database of central banker speeches and legislative documents, we argue that climate (in)actions of these central banks are shaped by concerns over their reputation. A broad socio-political consensus on the need for climate change mitigation enabled the BoE and ECB to begin integrating CRFRs into their supervisory frameworks without affecting their socio-political reputation while the carbon bias in their own asset purchase programs compelled both central banks to also start greening their monetary policy to preserve their performative reputation. The Fed's more cautious moves have been driven by a fear of loss of technical reputation in the face of a growing transnational consensus on the financial stability risks of climate change.