Security Assumptions in Dispersive-Optics QKD
arxiv(2024)
摘要
Quantum key distribution (QKD) seeks to provide a method of generating
cryptographically-secure keys between remote parties while guaranteeing
unconditional security. Implementations of high-dimensional QKD using
dispersive-optics (DO-QKD) have been proposed to allow for multiple secure bits
to be transmitted per photon while remaining cost-effective and scalable using
existing telecommunication technology [1]. In the recent literature, there have
been a number of experimental realizations of DO-QKD systems [2-6], with
security analysis based on the treatment in Ref. [1]. Here we demonstrate that
in the case of finite dispersion, the model assumed for the eavesdropper's
attack in Ref. [1] is non-optimal for the eavesdropper, which leads to a
significant overestimation of the secure key rate between parties. We consider
an alternative attack model that Alice and Bob find indistinguishable from the
Ref. [1] model, as long as they are restricted to making the measurements
typical in DO-QKD. We provide concrete examples where a significant gap exists
between the Holevo information, and therefore the secret key rate, predicted by
the two models. We further analyze the experiment in Ref. [2] as an example of
a case where secure key is predicted according to the Ref. [1] model, but where
in fact there is zero secure key rate when considering the full set of
collective attacks that an eavesdropper may perform.
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