Sensors for Remote Power Attacks: New Developments and Challenges

Brian Udugama,Darshana Jayasinghe, Sri Parameswaran

2024 29th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC)(2024)

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摘要
Power consumption as a side channel has garnered significant attention in security research. Traditional power attacks, also referred to as power analysis attacks, necessitated physical access to target devices to measure power consumption fluctuations for disclosing sensitive information. Recent developments, however, have revealed that field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in remote settings and cloud services are vulnerable to remote power analysis (RPA) attacks, avoiding the need for physical access. Understanding evolving threats and sensor methodologies is crucial for the development of robust defense strategies. Thus, this paper discusses two stealthy on-chip sensors, the Voltage-Induced Time Interval Sensor (VITI) and the Power to Pulse Width Modulation Sensor (PPWM), offering effective means for conducting RPA attacks.
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关键词
Power Analysis,Power Consumption,Cloud Computing,Side-channel,Encryption,Oscillation Frequency,Design Considerations,Lookup Table,Secret Key,Computing Devices,Critical Consideration,Sensor Output,Delay Line,Hardware Resources,Power Fluctuations,Voltage Fluctuations,Dynamic Fluctuations,Threat Model,Time-to-digital Converter,Logic Design,Final Calibration,Clock Signal,Bandwidth Requirements,Hardware Security,State Machine,Resource Consumption,Clock Period,Attack Success
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