Differential fuzz testing to detect tampering in sensor systems and its application to arms control authentication
arxiv(2024)
摘要
In future nuclear arms control treaties, it will be necessary to authenticate
the hardware and software components of verification measurement systems, i.e.,
to ensure these systems are functioning as intended and have not been tampered
with by malicious actors. While methods such as source code hashing and static
analysis can help verify the integrity of software components, they may not be
capable of detecting tampering with environment variables, external libraries,
or the firmware and hardware of radiation measurement systems. In this article,
we introduce the concept of physical differential fuzz testing as a
challenge-response-style tamper indicator that can holistically and
simultaneously test all the above components in a cyber-physical system. In
essence, we randomly sample (or "fuzz") the untampered system's parameter
space, including both normal and off-normal parameter values, and consider the
time series of outputs as the baseline signature of the system. Re-running the
same input sequence on a untampered system will produce an output sequence
consistent with this baseline, while running the same input sequence on a
tampered system will produce a modified output sequence and raise an alarm. We
then apply this concept to authenticating the radiation measurement equipment
in nuclear weapon verification systems and conduct demonstration fuzz testing
measurements with a sodium iodide (NaI) gamma ray spectrometer. Because there
is Poisson noise in the measured output spectra, we also use a mechanism for
comparing inherently noisy or stochastic fuzzing sequences. We show that
physical differential fuzz testing can detect two types of tamper attempts, and
conclude that it is a promising framework for authenticating future
cyber-physical systems in nuclear arms control, safeguards, and beyond.
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